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 Several authors have challenged Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
as inoperable and technocratic for the issues surrounding water resources known as 
contemporary water resource politics. As a result, new methods and analytical 
frameworks have been suggested for IWRM that have been qualified as interdisciplinary 
water research. Interdisciplinary water research is proposed to be context-based and 
focused on politics and management. Thus, principles underlying IWRM, such as public 
participation are gaining more attention because those principles enable sustainable 
water resource decisions to achieve socio-economic and ecological equity.  
 This exploratory case study examines public participation in IWRM by looking at 
two villages in Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). Participatory activities used 
to incorporate villages into water resource decisions are evaluated at different levels of 
government up to an international river basin organization known as the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC). The study uses a critical Third World political ecology perspective 
to elucidate water resource politics surrounding low levels of participation found 
among IWRM institutions in Lao PDR. Findings also reveal public participation in water 
resource decisions is politically complex. The participation of villages in water resource 
development decisions was related to issues surrounding national policies such as 
poverty alleviation, land allocations, resettlement, and swidden agriculture. Meanwhile, 
other types of participation were found in which villages could maintain control over 
their water interests. The study concludes more research is required surrounding water 
resource politics to better identify more effective and genuine participation of people 
whose livelihoods are dependent on water resources. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT (IWRM) 
Integrated water resource management (IWRM) is a process used in developed 
and developing countries to facilitate a sustainable management of water and water-
related resources. IWRM attempts to balance multiple competing demands for water 
(Loucks, 2000; GWP, 2000; Jønch-Clausen, 2004; Warner, 2006) from water-
dependent ecosystems and society (Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, 2005).
 Perhaps the most familiar definition of IWRM amongst practitioners is from the 
Global Water Partnership (GWP), which defines IWRM as:  
―a process which promotes the co-ordinated development and management of  
water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic 
and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the  
sustainability of vital ecosystems‖ (GWP, 2000: 22). 
 At the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, Agenda 21 
recognised IWRM as necessary to manage water as ―a natural resource and a social and 
economic good, whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization‖ 
(United Nations, 1992: Chapter 18, Programme Area A, Para. 8).  Thereafter, numerous 
developments in the 1990s cemented IWRM as a prominent paradigm (Allan, 2003; 
Merrey et al., 2005; Conca, 2006; GWP, 2008). Conferences such as the International 
Conference on Water and Environment (1992), World Water Forums (since 1997), the 
International Conference on Freshwater Resources (2001), the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (2002) and the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment (2005) 
affirmed that managing water resources was so complex as to require interdisciplinary 
action. In addition, IWRM has been adopted by several countries as an official policy, 
which is well documented in the Global Water Partnership Tool Box. National and sub-
national levels of government have used IWRM to manage water systems such as the 
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BOX 1: DUBLIN PRINCIPLES 
Principle No. 1 - Fresh water is a finite 
and vulnerable resource, essential to 
sustain life, development and the 
environment. 
 
Principle No. 2 - Water development 
and management should be based on a 
participatory approach, involving users, 
planners and policy-makers at all 
levels. 
 
Principle No. 3 - Women play a central 
part in the provision, management and 
safeguarding of water. 
 
Principle No. 4 - Water has an 
economic value in all its competing 
uses and should be recognized as an 
economic good. 
Source: GWP, 1992. 
Murray Darling Basin in Australia, Chesapeake Bay in the United States (GWP, 2008), 
and the Cross River Basin in Nigeria (Akpabio, 2007). And, IWRM has been used by 
multiple governments for international river basins such as the Rhine, Nile, and 
Mekong. Meanwhile, international expert networks such as the World Water Council, 
International Water Management Institute, and International Water Association have 
emerged, followed by private research institutes, governmental research organisations 
and non-governmental agencies such as the World Resource Institute, Stockholm 
International Water Institute, World Wildlife Fund, and WaterAid.  
IWRM has several guiding principles: the Dublin Principles and the three ―e‖s. 
The Dublin Principles emerged from the 1992 International Conference on Water and 
Environment; their approach to water management integrates socio-economic and 
socio-political decision making with 
ecological decision making (see Box 1: 
Dublin Principles; Hermans et al., 2006).  
The three ―e‖s for IWRM were 
developed by the GWP and are based on 
GWP‘s ―perception of water as an integral 
part of the ecosystem, a natural resource 
and a social and economic good, whose 
quantity and quality determine the nature 
of its utilization‖ (GWP, 2008: 
http://www.gwptoolbox.org/index.php?o
ption=com_principle&id=7). The three 
―e‖s are economic efficiency in water use 
(due to the finite nature of water as a vulnerable resource); equity in recognising water 
as a basic right (in regards to both quantity and quality); and, environmental and 
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ecological sustainability (in that water is a life-support system and present 
management cannot compromise the use of water for future generations).  
1.0 IWRM: AS A POLITICAL PROCESS AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
The GWP affirms IWRM is a process (GWP, 2000; GWP, 2008). More specifically, 
IWRM is a political process requiring political reforms at all levels of government, from 
the local to the international scale (GWP, 2000; Fugl and Jønch-Clausen, 2001; Jønch-
Clausen, 2004). Institutional reforms, such as the integration of different disciplines, 
departments, and ministries, are required to facilitate an integrated approach (GWP, 
2000; Fugl and Jønch-Clausen, 2001; GWP, 2008). An integrated approach is needed 
because decisions about water are multi-facetted; water is value weighted as a finite 
resource with economic values and as a public good with normative values (Gleick, 
1998; GWP, 2000; Blatter and Ingram, 2001; Hermans et al., 2006; Warner, 2006). 
Hence, the full value of water is the combined value of water as a finite, economic, and 
public good (GWP, 2000). Water decisions are often linked to the distribution or 
allocation of water (Blatter and Ingram, 2001; Collentine et al., 2002; Allan, 2003; 
Falkenmark et al., 2004; Warner, 2006).  Consequently, IWRM decisions are political 
because they involve different interest groups with competing demands for water 
(Blatter and Ingram, 2001; Collentine et al., 2002; Allan, 2003). 
Particular attention to the political complexity of water resources has emerged 
in critical discussions of IWRM. The Dublin Principles which make IWRM a modern 
approach as a political process (Hermans et al., 2006) have been challenged by Asit 
Biswas (2004, 2008).  And, several authors have commented about the technocratic 
nature of IWRM that has hindered IWRM as a political process to be actively involved in 
political reforms (Banister and Scott, 2008; McDonnell, 2008; Warner, 2006). As a 
result, an investigation and prescription of new methods (McDonnell, 2008; Jeffrey and 
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Gearey, 2006; Falkenmark et al., 2004; Lankford et al., 2004) are suggested to 
evaluate IWRM that reflect the multiple uses of water (Warner et al., 2006) IWRM 
proposes to integrate in the arena of water resource politics  (McDonnell, 2008; 
Banister and Scott, 2008; Poolman and Van de Giesen, 2006; Heyd and Neef, 2006). 
From these critical discussions, the possible emergence of a water sharing paradigm is 
suggested by the United Nations World Water Development Report 2 (WWDR2) (UN, 
2006), explained further in Chapter 2. 
As a guiding principle, public participation permits IWRM to reach the goal of 
ecological and socio-economic equity by involving the public in the decision-making 
process (Mitchell, 1990; GWP, 2000; Slocombe, 2004; Delli Priscoli, 2004; Creighton, 
2005; Pangare et al., 2006). Public participation helps achieve a participatory decision-
making process (GWP, 2000; Delli Priscoli, 2004; Creighton, 2005; Warner et al., 2006; 
Warner, 2006) by recognising different stakeholders within the public (HarmoniCOP, 
2005; Warner, 2006; WWC, 2006; UNESCO, 2006; Newig and Özerol, 2008). Normative 
values can be incorporated into water resource management through public 
participation by using livelihoods perspectives and rights-based approaches (WHO, 
2002; Butterworth and Moriarty, 2003; Merrey et al., 2005; Herman et. al, 2006; 
Warner, 2006).  Furthermore, public participation illuminates larger democratic 
principles by showing transparency in how IWRM decisions are accountable and making 
IWRM decisions accessible to the public by establishing a working relationship with 
technical experts and decision makers (Collentine et al., 2002; Pahl-Wostl, 2002; 
HarmoniCOP, 2005; WWC, 2006).  
For the purposes of this thesis, participatory decision making will refer to 
bringing the public into IWRM decisions. Participatory decision making is a bottom-up 
approach (GWP, 2000; International Conference on Freshwater, 2001). Corbett and 
Lane (2005) describe bottom-up approaches in environmental management as a 
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means to facilitate direct participation of local actors who may have access to endemic 
knowledge concerning natural resources in their area (Berkes, 1999; WWC, 2006). 
Public participation in decision making links people whose lives are affected by water 
and water-related resource decisions to the bureaucracies that manage them (Gayer, 
1999). 
1.1 QUESTION GUIDING THE STUDY 
Because IWRM is context specific, how IWRM operates depends on where IWRM 
is being used. This study explores public participation in IWRM for a developing 
country by examining what control villages and villagers have in water resource 
decisions, in order to better understand the opportunities and barriers for villages to 
participate in IWRM decisions in a developing country. The question guiding the study 
is: how can villages participate in the integrated water resource management 
framework of an international basin? 
1.2 IWRM: IWRM FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
Jønch-Clausen (2004) suggests the diversity of IWRM applications is largely due 
to the varying contexts in which IWRM operates. IWRM is context specific. Context in 
IWRM refers to the specific geographical, historical, cultural, and economic 
characteristics of any country within which management occurs (Jønch-Clausen, 2004: 
9). In other words, context influences or shapes how IWRM is used to manage water 
and water-related resources (Jønch-Clausen, 2004; Kallis et al., 2006a). Therefore, 
different countries may implement the principles of IWRM differently, according to 
their physical geographical constraints and their historical, cultural, and economic 
characteristics.  
Differences in the ways countries use IWRM are often explained in terms of 
broad contextual generalisations that identify countries as developed or developing 
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FIGURE 1: SEVEN MISMATCHES BETWEEN INTERNATIONALLY AGREED 
PRINCIPLES AND THE EU WFD 
. 
 
Source: Rahaman et al., 2004: 574. 
(Butterworth and Moriarty, 2003; Rahaman et al., 2004; Merrey et al., 2005; Varis et 
al., 2006). The two groups of countries seem to have different water resource goals 
and different issues surrounding water resources. In a review of the goals in the 
European Water Framework Directive, Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman, Olli Varis, and 
Tommi Kajander (2004) compare the outcomes of several international conferences: 
the 1992 International Conference on Water and Environment, the 2000 Second World 
Water Forum, the 2001 International Conference on Freshwater, and the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development. They conclude that seven mismatches, 
demonstrated in Figure 1, exist between the principles of the European Water 
Framework Directive and the international principles for other countries, including 




Ultimately, Rahaman et al. (2004: 574) query the differences between the 
international principles for developing countries and countries in transition and the 
principles that guide the European Union. They ask, ―does the EU require others—
mainly developing and transition countries—to follow different principles than it 
requires from its member countries?‖ In an editorial by Olli Varis, Matti Kummu, and 
Marko Keskinen (2006, online document), the differences in water resource goals are 
said to have been shaped by history, the dependence of livelihoods on flows of natural 
resources, and the involvement of international development agencies. 
Adding to the complexity of public participation in IWRM are the water resources 
themselves. Rivers can cross jurisdictional boundaries and countries‘ borders, which 
increases the levels of government, organisations, and people involved in decision-
making. Managing an international river basin is beyond the capacity of one actor, 
political group, or nation to manage; thus, the study of hydropolitics illustrates how 
governments do or do not work with each other. Historically, top-down decision-
making models, wherein bureaucracies make choices without consulting the public 
(Elhance, 1999; Milich and Varady, 1999; Pigram, 2000), have been ineffective in 
fostering legitimate, effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent decisions in 
international basins (Milich and Varady, 1999; Hemmanti, 2002; Falkenmark et al., 
2004).  Hence, linking international decision making to local scales by using bottom-
up approaches such as public participation in water management is lauded as being 
able to integrate different stakeholders, promote enhanced governance, and 
decentralise decisions (Milich and Varady, 1999; Creighton, 2005).   
1.3 ANALYSIS OF WATER RESOURCE POLITICS: POLITICAL ECOLOGY 
FOR IWRMS 
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The examination of public participation in IWRM fits within a field of study 
known as political ecology. Political ecology identifies several areas of focus that can 
be useful in this thesis. Political ecology is the examination of natural resource 
decisions within a political economy with a ―clear notion of ecology‖ (Blaikie and 
Brookfield, 1987; Bryant and Bailey, 1997:2).  Or, political ecology can also be 
described as the examination of the relationships among  society, space, and nature by 
looking at how decisions are constrained, transformed, or enabled by nature or natural 
resources (Peet and Watts, 2004: 10) in which politics takes precedence (Latour, 
2004a). This study identifies with political ecology, specifically a critical Third World 
political ecology that combines critical political ecology and Third World political 
ecology; this will be further explained in Chapter 2, Public Participation and IWRM.  
Political ecology clarifies the political complexity surrounding   public 
participation in IWRM decisions in several areas, which addresses the aforementioned 
critical discourse from several authors (Biswas, 2008, 2004; McDonnell, 2008; Banister 
and Scott, 2008; Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006; Falkenmark et al., 2004; Lankford et al., 
2004). Political ecology centres upon the relationship between ecology and society at a 
local level within a political economy such as a provincial, national, or international 
level, for natural resource decisions (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Bryant and Bailey, 
1997); thus it is possible to examine public participation at a local scale in IWRM.  
A multi-level and multi-scaled field of study, political ecology looks at the 
relationship between society and nature at different levels of government and different 
levels of physical scale (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Peet and Watts, 2004). Thus, multi-
level analysis can aid in determining how levels of government and organisations are 
involved with the public.  Offering a theoretically diverse and robust foundation, 
political ecology also incorporates social theory, Neo-Marxism, feminism, and critical 
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theory (Forsyth, 2003; Robbins, 2004; Latour, 2004b; Walker A, 2006). Last, the 
centrality of power, the control over the ―environment and ability to allocate human 
and financial resources to projects and problems‖, in political ecology can aid in 
understanding water resource politics (Bryant, and Bailey, 1997: 41-42).  
1.4 CASE STUDY: LAO PEOPLE‘S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE 
MEKONG BASIN 
The case study examines public participation in IWRM for Lao People's 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR or Laos). Lao PDR is trying to implement IWRM and 
therefore one of the principles in IWRM, participatory decision making. Lao PDR can be 
described as a developing country because it demonstrates uneven applications of 
market-orientated reforms (Hart, 2001), such as special economic zones, and political 
economy, in trying to develop natural resources within its borders (Ong, 2006). In 
addition, Lao PDR has experience with international financial institutions, international 
donors, and international development agencies. Moreover, Laos has different 
experiences with democracy and citizenship than Western countries; it has a history 
marked by colonialism, the Cold War, and international intervention.  
Lao PDR is one of six riparian states (China, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Vietnam) sharing the international Mekong Basin.  Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam belong to an international river basin organisation known as the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) for the Lower Mekong River Basin. As a member state within the 
MRC, the Lao Government, like those of the other riparian states, is attempting to 
implement and operate an IWRM framework. In particular, the MRC is using the GWP's 
definition of IWRM. High profile international stakeholders, such as ministries and 
international financial institutions, are also involved in the political landscape of Laos 
within which IWRM operates.  Above all, the IWRM decisions made by the Lao 
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Government and other riparian states of the Mekong affect people‘s livelihoods in the 
Mekong Basin, specifically, villages which are affected by water resource decisions. 
1.4.1 SECONDARY QUESTIONS 
     Because public participation in IWRM for Lao PDR is complex, secondary questions 
are used to support the primary question by dividing the subject conceptually: 
1. How is IWRM institutionalised and operational for Lao PDR?  
2. What is the role of public participation in IWRM for Lao PDR? 
3. What organisations are involved in the public participation for IWRM, and in what 
activities do they engage in Lao PDR? 
4. What are the benefits from and limitations to public participation in IWRM for 
Lao PDR? 
1.4.2 OBJECTIVES 
In order to answer these questions, the objectives of this study are: 
1. Describe IWRM for a developing country such as Lao PDR in practice, and for 
villages as members of the public participating in IWRM.  
Relates to Secondary Questions 1 -3 
 
2. Explore the range of public participation activities, and the organisations 
formally related to IWRM and similar to IWRM, or informally related to IWRM, 
taking place in villages. 
Relates to Secondary Question 3 
 
3. Classify both formal and informal public participation in IWRM activities and 
identify opportunities for and barriers to public participation, according to the 
academic literature. 
Relates to Secondary Question 4 
 
4. Identify avenues and consequences of public participation through the 
comparison of public participation in IWRM and informal IWRM activities to the 
academic literature. 
Relates to Secondary Questions 4    
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1.5 METHODOLOGY USED IN THE STUDY 
 The study can be described as a qualitative case study that explores a 
contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2003: 41-54). Using multiple types of data from 
multiple methods, the study investigates public participation in IWRM for Lao PDR in 
the Mekong Basin using multiple embedded units for the analysis. These units are the 
actors or organisations directly involved with IWRM, such as ministries, donors, and 
commissions, and those indirectly involved such as international non-governmental 
organisations, consultant agencies, and sub-national departments.  Within these units 
are sub-divisions and individuals that are the embedded units of analysis—
departments, task forces, working groups, consultants, etc. (Yin, 2003: 13). For 
instance, a unit of analysis could be the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
embedded unit within the Ministry could be a Department of Irrigation, which itself 
consists of multiple embedded units, which could be the director of an irrigation 
program, the international agency monitoring the progress of that irrigation program, 
and the funding agency enabling that irrigation program to happen.  
Over nine months in Lao PDR, institutions directly involved with IWRM, that is, 
levels of government and the organisations affiliated with those levels of government 
which make IWRM decisions and policies as well as  implement IWRM were identified. 
These institutions were identified as embedded units comprising ministries, sub-
divisions of those ministries, departments, institutes, organisations, and individuals.  
To gather data, the following methods were used: interviews; a primary desktop 
literature review (a literature review done prior to field work); an on-site literature 
review; participant observation; physical evidence; and participatory rural appraisals. 
From August 2006 to April 2007, I collected data using an iterative four-part method 
of inquiry (explained in Chapter 4) to place the data in the context of Lao PDR and 
IWRM to answer the secondary research questions. Prior to conducting field work, the 
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study was reviewed by the Office of Research and Ethics at the University of Waterloo, 
and given clearance on August 6, 2006.  
1.6 ACADEMIC JUSTIFICATION AND CONTRIBUTION: 
The study can be described as an interdisciplinary study within the social 
sciences. The study contributes to filling a gap in literature concerning public 
participation in IWRM for a developing country and the water resource politics 
surrounding IWRM (UNESCO, 2006; WWC, 2006; Kallis et al., 2006a; Kallis et al., 
2006b; Banister and Scott, 2008; McDonnell, 2008). The study also contributes to the 
increasing literature suggesting IWRM should be livelihoods based and focused upon 
citizen rights at a domestic household level (Butterworth and Moriarty, 2003; Merrey et 
al., 2005; Herman et al., 2006; Warner, 2006).  
This study uses political ecology as a means to examine the water resource 
politics surrounding public participation in IWRM at different scales from the village to 
an international basin. The use of a political ecology analysis in IWRM is relatively new, 
as only a few authors (Allan, 2003; Browning-Aiken, 2005) have studied political 
ecology as it relates to other disciplines such as international development, political 
science, geography, and anthropology. In addition, this study is an exploration of 
political ecology outside of the basic land-based studies by looking at contemporary 
water resource politics that incorporate decisions on land (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 
192; Walker, 2005; Walker A, 2006). 
1.7 APPLIED CONTRIBUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE TO AUDIENCE 
Upon completion, the thesis will be provided to the National University of Lao 
PDR and future IWRM programs in the Mekong Basin upon request. Participants 
involved in the study will have access to this study through an open URL. Furthermore, 
the study will be accessible through the DirectoryofNGOs.org, a comprehensive 
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website for donors, international non-governmental organisations, universities, and 
research institutes, detailing the activities of a majority of the International Non-
Governmental Organisations (INGOs) working in Lao PDR. The study will also be 
submitted to the Mekong River Commission Document Library and MekongInfo.org, a 
free online database of research related to the management of the Mekong River.  The 
thesis will also be sent to M-Power (a NGO monitoring participation in the Mekong 
Basin), TERRA (Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance) with the intent that 
it be published in their journal Watersheds: People‘s Forum on Ecology, Juth Pakai (a 
UNDP journal on development in Lao PDR), and the Australian Mekong Resource 
Centre.   
 I regret the villages involved in this study did not directly benefit from the 
study. However, this study provides a record of how IWRM is being used in one 
developing country and demonstrates how poverty alleviation is integrated into 
decisions about land and water resources. Real-time recommendations, or 
recommendations while in the field, were given to field operators who worked with the 
villages, and training was provided for both local research assistants who accompanied 
me during the field work, which they have used to further their careers. Many of the 
professionals working in Lao PDR in IWRM and international development were 
exceptionally supportive of this study, as they were interested in bridging a perceived 
gap between theory and practice. As mentioned in the section Applied Contribution 
and Significance to Audience, an open URL will be made available to various 
organisations and research bodies.  
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 In the following chapters, this thesis investigates public participation in IWRM 
for Lao PDR.  This investigation examines how a segment of the public, villages, whose 
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livelihoods are connected to water resources, are able to participate in IWRM for the 
Mekong Basin under the MRC at a macro scale. The literature review in Chapter 2: 
IWRM and Public Participation further elaborates upon elements of public participation 
in IWRM, exploring the composition of the public as water users, stakeholders, and 
citizens, as well as the methods or activities organisations use to engage the public. 
The literature review introduces political ecology as a means to analyze the research 
question for the study. Chapter 3: Lao PDR and IWRM provides a brief overview of Lao 
PDR and IWRM. Chapter 4: Methodology discusses the qualitative methods and 
methodology used to assess the level and degree of control that villages have in IWRM 
decisions.  Data collected according to this methodology is presented in Chapter 5: 
Case Study—Remote Mountainous Villages in Lao PDR; presented according to the 
criteria identified in Chapter 2: IWRM and Public Participation to assess the level and 
degree of public participation in Lao PDR. Specifically, Chapter 5 presents using a 
multi-level approach, outlining the organisations involved, their mandates (policies 
and water interests), their activities, how they approach villages, and their direct 
involvement with villages. In Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion, public 
participation in IWRM is discussed within political ecology as a field of study in order to 
better understand the relationship between water resources and the public. The 
conclusion elucidates the progress of public participation in IWRM for Lao PDR as it 




CHAPTER 2: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN IWRM 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the politics surrounding water resources that seems to be 
missing from IWRM, as suggested by McDonnell (2008), Banister and Scott (2008), 
Warner et al. (2006), and Allan (2003) that fit within the emergence of a water-sharing 
paradigm (UNESCO, 2006; WWC, 2006). Public participation in IWRM is related to 
contemporary water resource politics since politics affects public participation. Water 
sharing is an emerging paradigm that has increased the attention to public 
participation in IWRM.   
Public participation in IWRM is needed to reach decisions that are socio-
economically and ecologically equitable. There are different levels (describing degrees 
of citizen power) at which the public is involved in IWRM decisions as users, 
stakeholders, or citizens. These different levels are used for the conceptual framework 
of this thesis. However, the conceptual framework is unable to address the issue of the 
effect that contemporary water resource politics has on public participation in IWRM. 
Thus, an analysis using a critical Third World political ecology field of study is 
proposed. By looking at public participation in IWRM within the context of 
contemporary water resource politics, this thesis seeks to better understand the 
relationship between the public and IWRM decisions. 
2.1 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN AN EMERGING PARADIGM 
The United Nations World Water Development Report 2 (WWDR2) (2006) 
describes water sharing as an emerging paradigm. Chapter 11: Sharing Water states 
that the water sharing paradigm ―emphasizes integrated management, the duty to 
cooperate, equitable utilization, sustainable use, minimization of harm and true cost, 
in addition to public participation‖ (UNESCO, 2006: 376-377). Public participation is 
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necessary because it decreases political tensions, promotes reaching decisions by 
consensus, and assists in finding reasonable and acceptable solutions (UNESCO, 2006). 
The search for a new paradigm, such as water sharing, has emerged from several 
areas: 
 new judicial norms such as the establishment of water as a public good 
under communal control, 
 flexible institutions which help to clarify ownership,  
 the establishment of competent legal authorities to enforce decisions,  
 the establishment of transparent national policies and mechanisms for 
coordination,  
 a focus on demand-driven water policies,  
 new concepts of water types (blue and green water, and virtual water), 
 and public participation (UNESCO, 2006: 377).  
The renewed focus on public participation in IWRM was also discussed in the 
2006 Fourth World Water Forum by the World Water Council (WWC) and the European 
Union‘s Water Framework Directive (EU WFD). The Synthesis Paper from the WWC 
Forum (2006) develops the idea of public participation as a political asset. It suggests 
that public participation enables the use of local knowledge for risk management, aids 
in the transfer of technology, creates social networks of awareness, and furthers 
innovation (WWC, 2006). The EU WFD  exemplifies the use of public participation 
(WWC, 2006) since public participation in water resource planning has been given ―new 
institutional stature‖ by the EU WFD, according to Kallis et al. (2006a). Public 
participation plays a key role in the EU WFD and is required by legislation (WWC, 2006). 
The European Union commissioned the HarmoniCOP Project in November of 2002 to 
produce a practical guide outlining the major concepts of public participation for the 
EU WFD and steps for implementation.  
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2.1.1 THE POLITICAL NATURE OF WATER 
The water sharing paradigm comes from a better understanding of the politics 
of water. Water has multiple values that cannot be readily transformed into monetary 
values (Acreman, 2001: 257; Blatter and Ingram, 2001). Water is valued as a resource, 
a communal good, a human right (see Gleick, 1997; WHO, 2002), an ecological right 
(see Falkenmark et al., 2004) and an economic resource (see Dublin Principles; Blatter 
and Ingram, 2001). The multiple values make decisions about water use, water 
management (WB, 2004; WWC, 2006) and the integration of water-related sectors 
(Allan, 2003; WB, 2004) political in nature (Allan, 2003; WB, 2004; WWC, 2006).  
IWRM is political because, as the WWDR2 (2006: 47) writes, ―water is power, and 
those who control the flow of water in time and space can exercise power in various 
ways‖. The WWC Synthesis Report (2006: 16) states: 
―Contemporary water polities reveal the existence of great societal and cultural 
diversity among user groups with very different understandings, interests, and 
perspectives about water issues; a situation that complicates the water policy 
process. Hence, IWRM plans should aim to acknowledge social disparities and 
political pluralism in order to proceed to establish the necessary water 
governance structures capable of dealing with decision making and conflict 
resolution in a democratic and egalitarian manner.‖ 
Water sharing acknowledges the political nature of water because it recognises the 
multiple values of water and the diversity of users (Warner et al., 2006). Moreover, 
water decisions embody risk, uncertainty, and vulnerabilities that go beyond the 
abilities of technical experts to assess or single stakeholders to represent (Creighton, 
2005). Thus, the participation of all users is sought (WWC, 2006). When responsibility 
is shared between decision makers (i.e., political institutions and bureaucracies) and 
the public, it can lead to more equitable socio-economic and ecological outcomes 
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(WCD, 2000; International Conference on Freshwater Resources, 2001; Dubash, 2001; 
Collentine, et al., 2002; Mostert, 2003; Delli Priscoli, 2004; Bandaragoda, 2005; 
Lundqvist, 2006; Conca, 2006). Hence, public participation continues to be an 
important principle in IWRM because the public involves users with multiple values 
regarding water. 
2.1.2 WATER ALLOCATIONS 
IWRM involves the distribution of water, and IWRM decisions are supposed to 
incorporate all water users affected by the changes to the distribution of water (Warner 
et al., 2006; Hermans et al., 2006). In a working paper, Allan (2003) suggests water 
allocations are the source of water politics because different stakeholders, each with 
different capacities, determine the distribution of water. Kallis et al. (2006b) and 
Banister and Scott (2008) depict political issues surrounding water allocations in IWRM. 
In an investigation of stakeholders in Naxos, Greece, Kallis et al. (2006b) demonstrate 
that water allocations are the central source of socio-political and economic tension 
between water users at different levels of government. Banister and Scott‘s 2008 case 
study examines the decentralisation of water resources in the Yaqui River Basin in 
Mexico. They argue that water allocations were ―a critical source of state authority in a 
context of declining federal power in the management realm‖ (Banister and Scott, 
2008: 67), thereby making water allocations a central part of federal and regional 
politics.  
Nonetheless, contemporary water resource politics appears nascent. Scott and 
Banister (2008: 63) suggest that technocrats and decision makers continue to ignore 
the ―deeply social, political and cultural nature of the hydrological systems [they] 
control.‖ Warner et al. (2006: 4) write, ―IWRM and adaptive management have tended to 
overlook the 'human factor'.‖ By ―human factor,‖ Warner et al. (2006) mean the diversity 
of water users and the multiple uses of water that are not necessarily reflected in 
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market prices (Acreman, 2001). McDonnell (2008) suggests that more research and 
discussion are required to investigate water allocations made through the complex 
water politics in IWRM. She suggests that IWRM decisions based on a scientific agenda 
to measure the accuracy of water supply is inadequate to address issues surrounding 
the equitable distribution of water. The observations of Ingram et al. (2008) are 
similar. As they conclude unless equity in water use is secured for all users, water 
reforms which seek to increase efficiency in the use of water resources will fail to meet 
the goal of sustainable water resource management.  
2.2 IWRM: NEEDING NEW METHODS 
2.2.1 IWRM: CRITICAL LITERATURE 
 IWRM has been challenged, most notably by Asit Biswas (2004). In ―Integrated 
Water Resource Management: A Reassessment,‖ Biswas (2004: 253) argues that IWRM 
is ―a nostalgic approach to a broader and more holistic way to manage water, as may 
have been possible in the past.‖ He argues that IWRM is based upon the principle of 
reductionism. Furthermore, Biswas (2004) argues that IWRM‘s attempt to integrate 
water and water-related sectors, such as water and energy, is unmanageable 
institutionally and therefore undesirable, if not counterproductive. Moreover, Biswas 
challenges IWRM as a political process, saying that, as a road map, IWRM lacks a 
starting point, a destination, and indicators of progress. He also claims ―objectives like 
increased stakeholder participation, decentralization, and decision making at the 
lowest possible level are unlikely to promote integration‖ (255); he thus challenges the 
utility of participatory decision making (the Fourth Dublin Principle) as a principle in 
IWRM. 
Mitchell (2004) rebuts Biswas, pointing out there is a difference between the 
normative and operational functions of IWRM. He agrees that the concerns about the 
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political reforms IWRM requires are relevant, including the likelihood of disciplinary 
and departmental conflicts, turf wars, and operational uncertainty in similar 
departments such as energy and water. However, he points out that conceptually IWRM 
remains robust and that Biswas does not offer an alternative to achieving sustainable 
management of water resources when water is so clearly connected to other sectors 
such as energy, food, health, and transportation. Furthermore, the lack of evidence to 
back Biswas‘s general claims that IWRM is undesirable leaves the reader questioning if 
there are any alternatives to such a widely used concept.  
  Biswas (2008) has re-iterated his earlier claims but addressed certain 
inconsistencies in his argument. His overall dissatisfaction with IWRM remains. He asks 
―a very fundamental question: why it has not been possible to properly implement a 
concept that has been around for some two generations in the real world for macro- 
and meso-level water policies, projects and programmes?‖ (2008: 21). Stating that 
critics of IWRM have been ostracized, Biswas writes that practitioners of IWRM are 
uncritical and not very accepting of criticism. Biswas claims that the international 
community did not agree to the Dublin Principles that make up IWRM; rather, the 
Dublin Principles were decided on by a few experts during a meeting. Biswas also 
castigates the Global Water Partnership for its work in increasing the popularity of 
IWRM, which he says is a waste of resources. In an attempt to present more evidence to 
back his claims, Biswas offers a literature review, which was not included in the first 
article. From this literature review, he finds three ―unwelcome developments.‖ First, he 
claims that no clear definition of IWRM exists, despite the continued acceptance of 
IWRM. Second, he says that IWRM has produced only meager results. Third, he says 
that IWRM needs ―an objective, impartial and undogmatic assessment of the 
applicability of integrated water resources management‖ (2008: 21).  
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 Evidence in Biswas‘s 2008 article to support his claim that IWRM is undesirable 
remains problematic if not inconsistent. The adoption of IWRM by several countries 
(see GWP, 2008) in practice, by international conferences, by expert networks, by 
research institutions, and by non-governmental organisations refutes Biswas‘s claim 
that the Dublin Principles, and therefore IWRM, have not been accepted by the 
international community. As well, he offers no alternatives to IWRM. Therefore, Biswas‘ 
argument is incomplete for two reasons; it overlooks the gains in both theoretical and 
applied knowledge from IWRM, and it overlooks the importance of timeliness, as some 
water issues are pressing. Biswas continues to claim IWRM is reductionist, but his call 
for an impartial, undogmatic, and objective assessment has two contradictions (2008: 
21). First, the premise IWRM is reductionist contradicts the definition of IWRM as a 
context-specific and interdisciplinary concept, as pointed out by Mitchell (2004). 
Second, an ontological and epistemological contradiction exists. Biswas inadvertently 
implies there is a two-sided argument between reductionist and constructivist 
positions, that a ―right‖ and ―wrong‖ exists, and that the world is indeed moving in a 
progressively reductionist trend. This position contradicts the relativist claim that the 
increasing complexity of water has ―reduced disciplinary knowledge‖ in a twenty-first-
century world characterised by interdisciplinary knowledge (Biswas, 2004; 2008).  
2.2.2 IWRM: INTERDISCIPLINARY WATER RESEARCH AND METHODS 
Other critics, such as Jeffrey and Gearey (2006), are more particular, citing the 
difficulties of obtaining data and reports to provide evidence supporting IWRM. Jeffrey 
and Gearey (2006)‘s brief review of the critical literature looks at the gap between the 
theory (policy) and practice (the implementation of policy) of IWRM (Jonker, 2002). 
These findings are supported by the findings in a joint paper by the International Water 
Association and the United Nations Environment Programme (2002). Jeffrey and Gearey 
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(2006: 4) conclude that the type of science that IWRM uses should be acknowledged, 
rather than IWRM being dismissed altogether:  
―we envisage a need for the development of new metrics (things to classify or 
measure), techniques (ways of classifying or measuring), and analytical 
frameworks (perspectives on the utility of classes or measures)‖.  
Lankford et al. (2004) elaborate on this ―type of science‖ as a ―new type of science‖ 
representing interdisciplinary water research. Falkenmark et al. (2004) discuss the 
purpose of interdisciplinary water research as being a water science in which water for 
nature is non-negotiable in terms of management. However, Kallis et al. (2006b) in a 
separate editorial explain that although water science has a definite place in IWRM, the 
role of interdisciplinary water research is also to look at context-based approaches. In 
other words, the growing understanding about the political nature of water has made 
contemporary resource politics a part of interdisciplinary water research (UNESCO, 
2006; WWC, 2006; Kallis et al., 2006b; Banister and Scott, 2008). 
McDonnell (2008) suggests the information on which IWRM practitioners base 
their decisions is an ontological problem (2008). She explicates how the physical data 
used for science-based decisions are concerned with accuracy in measuring water 
supplies. This type of knowledge, she explains, is maladapted to measure judicial 
power, capacities of actors, and the water interests that make up water resource 
politics (2008: 141). McDonnell (2008) suggests that case studies can be used to 
assess contemporary water resource politics and governance in IWRM by using multi-
levelled stakeholder analysis (see Kallis et al., 2006b; Poolman and Van de Giesen, 
2006; Heyd and Neef, 2006; Banister and Scott, 2008). Thus, appropriate methods in 
stakeholder analysis are appropriate for the examination of contemporary water 
resource politics in IWRM. 
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2.3 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN IWRM: NECESSARY FOR SOCIO-
ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL EQUITY 
Public participation has expected outcomes in IWRM. Listed in the EU WFD pre-
amble 14, these outcomes are distilled by HarmoniCOP (2005) to be learning together 
and managing together through social learning. Social learning in public participation 
is said to build trust, develop consensus, resolve conflict, and find joint solutions that 
are technically sound and implementable (HarmoniCOP, 2005). Social learning involves 
having stakeholders understand the technical aspects of river basin management and 
recognise other stakeholder interests in order to find solutions (HarmoniCOP, 2005). 
The caveats regarding public participation are that social learning is resource intensive 
and that no specific outcome of social learning can be defined. In addition, social 
learning is about sharing responsibility between the government and public, and 
cannot be imposed (HarmoniCOP, 2005: 4).  
Public participation is expected to improve the quality of IWRM decisions by 
making them effective, equitable, legitimate, and socially feasible through social 
learning, decentralisation, and governance (International Conference on Freshwater 
Resources, 2001; Collentine, et al., 2002; Mostert, 2003; Delli Priscoli, 2004; 
Bandaragoda, 2005; Lundqvist, 2006; Conca, 2006; Newig and Özerol, 2008). Özerol 
and Newig (2008:641) list several objectives that motivate and justify the use of public 
participation: 
 increasing public awareness of environmental issues; 
 increasing the quality of decisions by drawing on  local knowledge; 
 social learning and developing a shared understanding of the problem 
dimensions; 
 less litigation, fewer misunderstandings, fewer delays and more effective 
implementation; 
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 public acceptance, commitment and support with regard to decisions and plans; 
 stronger democratic legitimacy of decisions since the public is allowed to have a 
say in and/or an influence on the decisions at stake; 
 social goals such as the building of trust in institutions. 
2.3.1 EXPECTED OUTCOMES: LOWEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL 
Public participation in IWRM increases the quality of decisions through the 
principle of subsidiarity, which essentially leads to the decentralization of decision 
making regarding   water resources (International Conference on Freshwater 
Resources, 2001; WB, 2004; WWC, 2006). The principle of subsidiarity identifies the 
lowest appropriate level of management for equitable and efficient solutions (Brooks, 
2002; Butterworth and Moriarty, 2003; Ribot, 2004; Warner, 2006). The lowest 
appropriate level can be defined, according to Føllesdal (1998), as a sub-unit of a 
greater organisation, such as the nation-state. Yet, the nation-state may intervene 
where the local level cannot achieve a desired outcome independently (Føllesdal, 1998: 
194).  
2.3.2 EXPECTED OUTCOMES: DECENTRALISATION 
Decentralisation is supposed to increase the efficiency, efficacy, and equity of 
natural resource management to reach ecological sustainability (Ribot, 2004; 
Lundqvist, 2006; WCC, 2006). Decentralisation changes the distribution of power by 
handing greater authority to local authorities and citizens to make natural resource 
decisions, thereby enabling local level decisions to be relatively autonomous (Ribot, 
2004). This process can rely on non-governmental organisations known as civil society 
organisations (Brannstrom et al., 2004; Ribot, 2004; WWC, 2006). Civil society 
organisations are frequently seen as a means to decentralise citizen power because in 
theory they can identify and respond to resource needs quickly, so that local issues can 
be placed within a broader national context (Brannstrom et al., 2004; Ribot, 2004; 
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WCC, 2006; GWP, 2008). Hence, the participation of the public involves organised civil 
society groups (GWP, 2008). These groups institutionalise IWRM through ―deliberative 
and participatory institutions like river basin organizations, micro-basin committees 
and groundwater committees‖ (WWC, 2006:15).  
2.3.3 EXPECTED OUTCOMES: GOVERNANCE 
Broadly speaking, ―good‖ governance or normative governance describes 
decisions that are transparent, accountable, collaborative, accessible, and democratic 
(Hemmati, 2002; Adger et al., 2003; Eckerberg and Joas, 2004; Millennium Ecosystems 
Assessment, 2005; WWC, 2006). For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of 
governance, particularly water governance, is based on the GWP definition (2003). The 
GWP identifies governance as a distributed system composed of different parties with 
different roles and responsibilities. These different parties are the government, civil 
society, the private sector, and individuals. Water governance, according to the GWP, is 
based on a balance of power and actions at different levels of authority that develop 
water resources for national socio-economic goals (GWP, Dialogue on Effective Water 
Governance, 2003: 2). The premise of water governance is that the nation-state or 
national government alone cannot solve societal problems and reach equitable, 
efficient, and effective management of water as a finite resource (GWP, Dialogue on 
Effective Water Governance, 2003: 6; Newman et al., 2004; Finger et al., 2006). In 
terms of operation, governance has been described by the WWDR2 (2006: 48) as ―the 
exercise of power in policy-making and whether or not to implement particular 
policies‖.  
2.4 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: COMPOSITION AND ANALYSIS 
2.4.1 COMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC 
Public participation depends upon the definition of the public as users, 
stakeholders, or citizens in order to determine the type of participation in which the 
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public is involved. The classification of ―water users‖ implies an organisation or water 
user association which constitutes a civil society (GWP, 2008). Extending beyond the 
physical boundaries of the catchment, water users include those who benefit from the 
trade and services of a catchment, such as through the supply of water through 
diversions, the catching and selling of fish, and the production of food (Johnson, et al., 
2002). Johnson et al. (2002) suggest user participation has significant implications for 
the sustainability of watershed management, and for the improvement of 
organisational mechanisms for decision making. Encouraging the participation of water 
users in decision making and defining the public as water users is problematic. Water 
users include living organisms, human and non-human. Non-human users provide 
invaluable ecosystem services, raising the question of which should take precedence 
(Falkenmark et al., 2004). Although the concept of water users serves as an 
ecologically rational choice, as suggested by Johnson et al. (2002), the jurisdictional 
boundaries confining the actions of water users is opaque. Political conflicts, water 
rights, and the capacity to exercise rights are missing from the definition of water 
users. Moreover, the political realities of contemporary water resource politics, as 
discussed above, are not necessarily incorporated into a definition of the public that is 
based solely on the concept of water users.  
A ―stakeholder‖ is a narrower definition of the public, according to the 
HarmoniCOP Guidebook (2005), presented in Box 2. Crucial for defining problems, 
setting priorities, monitoring, and evaluation, the participation of stakeholders is 
supposed to increase project performance (Johnson et al., 2002). Stakeholder 
participation is usually one component of IWRM models (Jaspers, 2002; GWP, Dialogue 
on Effective Water Governance, 2003; HarmoniCOP, 2005; MRC, 2006; Millennium 
Ecosystems Assessment, 2005).  
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Chapter 11: Water Sharing by UNESCO 
defines public participation as the involvement 
of the public as ―citizens‖: ―public participation, 
the most intense form of interaction between 
authorities, experts and citizens, implies shared 
leadership, truly joint planning and a 
democratic delegation of power‖ (UNESCO, 
2006: 389). This understanding of the public as 
―citizens‖ is shared by Gaventa (2004) and the 
Hungarian Declaration (1999; found in Gayer, 
1999) which discuss citizenship as a more 
direct connection between people and the 
bureaucracies which affect them. The 
involvement of citizens in environmental issues beyond electoral politics is suggested 
in order to legitimise decisions in environmental governance (Collentine et al., 2002; 
Baber and Bartlett, 2005; Eckersley and Joas, 2005; Kabeer, 2005). The participation of 
citizens is also purported to support rights-based approaches to governance and thus 
to foster human rights (see Arnstein, 1971; Raco and Flint, 2001; WHO, 2002; Mostert, 
2003; Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Warner, 2006; Hermans et al., 
2006).  
UNESCO (2006) draws a clear line between ―engaging citizens in public 
participation‖ and ―citizen participation.‖ ―Citizen participation‖ is an idealised concept, 
according to UNESCO (2006), in which all stakeholders are active, open, and competent 
in planning and negotiation. However, ―engaging citizens in public participation‖ is a 
pragmatic means to negotiate and plan amongst planners, decision makers, and 




Public: includes individuals, 
organisations, and 
associations that do not 
perform official government 
functions. 
 
Stakeholder: anyone who has 
a ―stake‖, that is, anyone who 
will be affected by or has the 
ability to influence the 
outcome of decisions. 
Stakeholders can include 
individuals, companies, and 
economic and public interests 
such as non-governmental 
organisations. 
 
Source: Modified from 
HarmoniCOP, 2005: 2. 
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citizens in order to deal with the ―harsh demands of public policy‖ (UNESCO, 2006: 
390).  
The literature on public participation uses different interpretations of the public. 
For the GWP Tool Box website (2008), the public is defined as civil society, where ―all 
relevant categories of water users should be represented in the association.‖ Both 
Mostert (2003) vis-à-vis HarmoniCOP (2005) and Pahl-Wostl (2002) make a distinction 
between the general public and stakeholders. The public can be composed of 
organised groups, stakeholders, and unorganised groups (the "general public‖), 
according to Mostert (2003). Interpretations of public participation can range from the 
involvement of the general public only, which is at a lower threshold of participation to 
stakeholder participation, which involves stakeholders with a specific water interest 
(Pahl-Wostl, 2002).  
For the purposes of this thesis, public participation will be defined using the 
definition by UNESCO (2006). UNESCO (2006) defines the public as composed of 
stakeholders and citizens, similarly to Mostert (2003). Under this definition, 
―stakeholder participation‖ involves only some groups, whereas ―public participation‖ 
involves all, including the general public. The inclusion of all covers the diversity of 
users discussed by Warner et al. (2006), and therefore takes into account 
contemporary water resource politics. Therefore, the definition of public participation 
used in this study, following UNESCO (2006), supports the emerging water sharing 
paradigm.  
2.4.2 METHODS, LEVELS, AND DEGREES FOR ANALYSIS 
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FIGURE 2: SHERRY ARNSTIEN‘S LADDER 
  
 
Source: Fig. 8 Arnstein, 1971 
 
 
HarmoniCOP (2005) cites three main levels of participation: informational, 
consultative, and active involvement. Informational is the lowest level, where 
information about water decisions is given to the public. Consultative is higher, where 
the public is able to react to government proposals. And, lastly, active involvement 
offers more opportunities for the public to participate in decision making by discussing 
water resource decisions with authorities, helping determine policy agendas, being 
involved in decisions, and participating in implementation. Public involvement is 
different from public 
participation in that 
―public involvement 
implies two-way 
communication and is a 
means of engaging 
community members in 
information exchange and 
dialogue‖ (UNESCO, 2006: 
389). Therefore, the public 
may be involved, but that 
does not necessarily 
equate to the type of public 
participation sought in engaging citizens as described by UNESCO (2006).  
Although HarmoniCOP defines three main levels, background papers of 
HarmoniCOP (2005) edited by Mostert (2003) indicate that five levels were initially 
considered, drawn from Sherry Arnstein‘s (1971) ladder of participation. In the case of 
IWRM, Mostert (2003) elucidates the five levels of participation as informative, 
consultative, discussion, co-decision making, and, finally, decision making. Mostert‘s 
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(2003) levels originate from Arnstein‘s ladder, which has even more levels (Figure 2). 
Degrees of citizen power, omitted from Mostert (2003) and therefore HarmoniCOP 
(2005), are included by Arnstein (1971). Although the omission of those degrees of 
citizen power is not explained by Mostert (2003), the general consensus of both 
Arnstein (1971) and Mostert (2003) is that the higher the level of participation, the 
higher the degree of citizen power. 
The activities, procedures, and methods used to engage the public correspond 
to the different levels of public involvement demonstrated in Table 1. Work from Sherry 
Arnstein, Andrea Cornwall, and Erik Mostert informs Table 1. Cornwall (2003) adds a 
new dimension to understanding the public by referring to how the public is engaged 
according to four categories (as objects, instruments, actors, or agents); these 
categories correspond to what she classifies as types of participation (from beneficiary 
participation to citizenship transformation).  
The methods through which the public is asked to participate may not 
accurately reflect water resource politics. Even though these methods may indicate a 
degree of participation, they do not take into account socio-economic and political 
barriers to participation in IWRM decisions (Kallis et al., 2006a). Kallis et al. (2006a: 
216) write about the methods used to assess participation, stating that there is ―a lack 
of accumulated research critically assessing alternative participatory methods in terms 
of their applicability and limitations in different contexts.‖ Kallis et al. (2006a) raise 
several points regarding the use of participatory methods that may reflect socio-
economic and political barriers related to making scientifically sound decisions in a 
context of limited data, knowledge, high uncertainty, and legitimacy.  
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TABLE 1: LEVELS AND DEGREES OF PARTICIPATION 




The public is 
provided with or has 
access to 
information. (This 
may not be genuine 
public participation, 
but is the basis for 
all forms of it.) 
 
1. Leaflets and brochures 
2. Mailings 
3. Use of the media: press releases, press 
conferences 
4. Information centres 
5. Repositories (other than 4, e.g., libraries and 
city halls) 
6. (Travelling) exhibitions 
7. Information hotlines/ contact persons 
8. Open houses 
9. Field trips 
10. Briefings (at meetings of residents' 
associations, women‘s clubs, etc.) 
11. Internet and other ICT tools (see chapter 5) 
12. Cultural events (e.g., street theatre, especially 
for raising awareness) 
Token: participation is functional, 
to enlist people in projects or 
processes, so as to secure 
compliance, minimize dissent, and 
lend legitimacy. This is often 





The views of the 
public are sought. 
 
13. Reply forms 
14. Opportunity to comment in writing 
15. Public hearings and meetings 
16. Interviews 
17. Opinion polls 
18. ―Stakeholder analysis‖ 
19. Gaming 
Token: participation is 
instrumental, to make projects or 
interventions run more efficiently 
by enlisting contributions and 
delegating responsibilities. This is 






20. Internet discussions 
21. Advisory commissions/boards, focus groups 
22. Non-binding referenda 
Methods 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 could also be 
used. 
 
3. Discussion:  
Real interaction 
takes place between 
the public and 
government. 
 
23. Small group meetings (―workshops‖, 
―charrettes‖, ―coffee meetings‖, ―round tables‖, 
―study circles‖, ―brainstorm sessions‖, ―planning 
cells‖, ―citizen juries‖, etc.) 
24. Large group meetings involving splitting up 
into smaller groups and/or rotation between 
front benches and back benches or between 
subgroups (e.g., working groups, ―Samoan 
circles‖, ―open space meetings‖, carrousels) 
25. Virtual (Internet) discussions 
Methods 8, 9, 10, 11, 19 and 21 
Citizen Power: participation is 
consultative, to get in tune with 
public views and values, to garner 
good ideas, to defuse opposition, 
to enhance responsiveness. This is 













26. Negotiations, e.g., resulting in a ―voluntary 
agreement‖ 
27. Stakeholders represented in governing bodies 
28. Corrective referenda and binding referenda 
initiated by government. 
Some of the meeting formats mentioned under 
23 and 24. 
29. Multi-stakeholder platforms 
Citizen Power: participation is 
transformative, to build political 
capabilities, critical consciousness, 
and confidence; to enable citizens 
to demand rights; to enhance 
accountability. This is associated 
with citizenship transformation. 
Agents 
5. Decision making: 
The public performs 
public tasks 
30. Water users‘ associations and other NGOs 
performing public functions 
31. Popular initiatives 
Citizen Power: participation is 
transformative, to build political 





Some of the meeting formats mentioned under 
23 and 24 . 
and confidence; to enable to 
demand rights; to enhance 
accountability. This is associated 
with citizenship transformation. 
Here, the public is completely self 
functioning. 
Adapted from: Mostert, 2003: Table 1. Public Participation levels and methods (not exhaustive); Cornwall, 2003: Table 1. 
Modes of Participation; and Arnstein, 1971: Fig 8. Eight rungs on a ladder of citizen participation. 
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2.4.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
To analyse public participation in IWRM, this study draws from Table 1. Figure 3 
illustrates Table 1. The single line to the far right indicates the level of citizen 
involvement that corresponds to the degree of citizen power (Arnstein, 1971; Mostert, 
2003), the methods used (Mostert, 2003), the type of participation and how the public 
is viewed (Cornwall, 2003).  
2.5 CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
An equivalent to the HarmoniCOP (2005) Guidebook for developing countries 
was not found in the survey of literature concerning public participation in IWRM. As 
already established in the Introduction, the operation of IWRM in developing countries 
differs from the operation of IWRM in developed countries. Different contextual 
variables exist, as discussed by Rahaman et al. (2004), Hermans et al. (2006), Jønch-
FIGURE 3: CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN IWRM 
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Clausen (2004), Kallis et al. (2006b), and Banister and Scott (2008). These contextual 
variables yield different expected outcomes of public participation. 
2.5.1 CONSIDERATIONS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
USING IWRM 
Developing countries work with uneven geographies of market-oriented 
development, and these have political implications (Hart, 2001). The lack of reliable 
hydrological data lends credence to the idea that participatory approaches are needed 
to collect biophysical and socio-economic data from water users (Merrey et al., 2005; 
Creighton, 2005; Hermans et al., 2006), even though these data may not necessarily 
be recognised by the ―hard sciences‖ (Patton, 1990). Furthermore, developing countries 
have an added element of political complexity because of the presence of international 
development agencies (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Francis and Roberts, 2003; Thomas, 
2003; Ribot, 2004; Corbett and Lane, 2005; Poolman and Van De Giesen, 2006), which 
often overlook themselves as stakeholders in the participatory processes for IWRM 
(Poolman and Van De Giesen, 2006). 
Participation also has a specific meaning in international development as Kumar 
(2002) explains, differentiating between participatory development and participation-
in-development (Table 2). 
Participatory Development Participation-in-Development 
Approaches conventional project 
practices in a more participatory and 
sensitive manner. 
Entails genuine efforts to engage in 
practices that openly and radically 
encourage people‘s participation. 
Is introduced within the predetermined 
project framework. 
Stems from the understanding that 
poverty is caused by structural factors. 
It attempts to alter some of the 
underlying factors that lead to poverty. 
Is a top-bottom form of participation, Is a bottom-up form of participation, 
TABLE 2: PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
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in the sense that management of the 
project defines where, when, and how 
much the people can participate. 
in the sense that the local people have 
full control over the process, and the 
project provides for necessary 
flexibility 
Is the more prevalent practice. It is 
more dominant in terms of resources 
available. 
Is more prevalent with NGOs than with 
the government. 
Source: Oakley, 1991 found in Kumar, 2002: 27  
 
Thus, the critical discussion of participation in international development applies to 
IWRM for developing countries because public participation activities used by IWRM 
institutions can determine participation in international development as suggested in 
Table 2. Several authors (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Francis and Roberts, 2003; Ribot, 
2004; Chhotray, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Corbett and Lane, 2005) are critical of 
participation in developing countries. The use of participation by expatriates and 
international researchers in international development has led to allegations of co-
option, which is the use of local knowledge and local participation to legitimize 
international agendas (developmental aid, research agendas, policy, and international 
principles) without an equitable result and without the informed consent of local 
participants (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Ribot, 2004; Corbett and Lane, 2005; WWC, 
2006). In addition, critical discussions concerning participatory methods have also 
questioned the validity of applying Western-style democratic citizenship in non-
Western countries (McLaverty, 2002; Gaventa, 2004; Kabeer, 2005). Because terms 
such as ―participatory methods‖ and ―participatory decision-making‖ are used in IWRM, 
Poolman and Van De Giesen (2006) conclude that IWRM practitioners must be 
conscious of the discourses surrounding international development for developing 
countries. 
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2.5.2 EXPECTED OUTCOMES IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FOR IWRM IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In a global pilot study found in the WWDR2 Chapter 2, the Access Initiative 
reported  several generalisations about the outcomes of public participation 
independent  of developed or developing countries. The Access Initiative pilot study 
assessed public participation in China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, 
Thailand, the United States, and Uganda. Public participation study was defined as 
incorporating environmental and social factors into decisions, thus making for higher 
quality decisions (UNDP and IFAD, Access Initiative, 2006: 77). The broad survey also 
indicated weak levels of public participation in terms of constitutional guarantees, also 
independent of developed or developing countries. However, literature regarding the 
principle of subsidiarity, decentralisation, and governance shows context-specific 
considerations in developing countries. 
When the principle of subsidiarity is applied to developing countries the literature 
suggests that the lowest appropriate level for determining local water security is the 
household to village level (Allan, 2003; Butterworth and Moriarity, 2003; Merrey et al., 
2005; WWC, 2006; FAO and IFAD, 2006). Nonetheless, households are often 
represented, researched, and defined in villages (Butterworth and Moriarty, 2003; 
Merrey et al., 2005; WWC, 2006; FAO and IFAD, 2006).  
Discussions of drinking water and sanitation in villages are generally paired with 
poverty alleviation (Butterworth and Moriarity, 2003; Merrey et al., 2005; WWC, 2006; 
FAO and IFAD, 2006). Frequently cited figures are that 1.1 billion people lack access to 
safe drinking water and the 2.6 billion lack access to basic sanitation (International 
Year of Sanitation, 2008). These figures represent people living on less than 
$1USD/Day or $2USD/day as an indicator of poverty (GWP 2003; Merrey et al, 2005) in 
reference to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG, 2008). The MDG identifies 
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developed countries as the donors, partnering with developing countries, the 
beneficiaries. Thus, discussion of water security in villages is associated with poverty 
alleviation (see MDG, 2008; Headington et al., 2007).  
That calculation, equating the lack of access to drinking water and sanitation with 
incomes of less than $1USD/Day or $2USD/day, is flawed, according to Wescoat Jr. et 
al. (2007). For instance, when the calculation is applied to the United States, it would 
indicate that 100% of the population has access to safe water and sanitation. Yet, in a 
case study of Colorado, Headington et al. (2007) determined that pockets of poverty 
exist. The analysis also shows that sanitation services are fragmented, especially in 
areas of low income, among Hispanic populations, and in rural and mountainous 
terrain, where access to water services is inadequate. Headington et al. (2007) 
conclude that a context-based approach would offer a more accurate definition of 
water security and water poverty in developing countries. 
Decentralised decisions that involve villages also involve an added element of 
political complexity. Although local level decisions maybe efficient and effective at 
bringing local issues into natural resource management, the equity surrounding 
decisions and normative expectations such as legitimacy, accountability, and 
transparency have led to discussions of embedded authorities in developing countries 
by Francis and Roberts (2003), Ribot (2004), Lane and Corbett (2005), and the WWC 
(2006). These embedded authorities are sometimes referred to as customary 
authorities (Francis and Roberts, 2003; Corbett and Lane, 2005) or traditional 
organisational heads (Ribot, 2004), such as village chiefs, district officials, and 
international NGOs. Embedded authorities act as representatives of villages 
(Brannstrom et al., 2004; Ribot, 2004; Corbett and Lane, 2005; WWC, 2006) and are 
often involved in power plays in water resource politics (Walker, 2003; Banister and 
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Scott, 2008). As a result, embedded authorities can use decentralisation reforms to 
divert funds for their own interests (political or economic or social) at the expense of 
the villages they represent (see Francis and Roberts, 2003; Ribot, 2004; Corbett and 
Lane, 2005; WWC, 2006).  
Developing countries also have different experiences of citizenship (Hickey and 
Mohan, 2005; Gaventa, 2005; Kabeer, 2005; Ong, 2006), and this may also affect how 
water is governed. Bandaragoda (2005) points out that the democratic experiences 
which countries have may affect public participation, particularly in Asian developing 
countries. Ong (2006) proposes that the type of government can create different tiers 
of citizenship in regard to the spatial development of resources. She gives the example 
of economic development policies applied to specific physical areas, such as the New 
Economic Zones in China, Malaysia, and Singapore, and that have territorialised labour 
rights in these zones, creating tiers of citizenship (2006). Therefore, the scope of 
public participation in decisions about natural resources can be limited by the 
democratic experiences and type of government in an area (Bandaragoda, 2005; 
Kabeer, 2005; Ong, 2006).  
2.6 CRITICAL THIRD WORLD POLITICAL ECOLOGY 
 This study uses a field of political ecology known as Third World political 
ecology, but with a critical perspective. Third World political ecology addresses specific 
challenges facing developing countries in regard to decisions by different actors, 
including the impacts of international actors (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). A ―bottom-up‖ 
approach, Third World political ecology critically looks at the policy and water interests 
of actors in international development and development theory from the perspective of 
fields predominantly in the disciplines of geography, anthropology, and sociology 
(1997: 17). Politics is central in a Third World political ecology approach, because 
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politics concerns the interactions between actors and the environment/natural 
resources and recognises that weak actors also have the power to pursue their 
interests (Bailey and Bryant, 1997: 25). A Third World political ecology interprets power 
as ―control over the environment and ability to allocate human and financial resources 
to projects and problems‖ (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 41-42). Hence, politics for Third 
World political ecology is applicable to IWRM (see Allan, 2003; WWC, 2006; UNESCO, 
2006).  
2.6.1 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECOLOGY: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Vayda and Walters (1999) are widely known critics of political ecology. They 
argue that political ecologists have less to do with ecology and more to do with politics 
that cannot achieve or explain environmental change. In response, Walker (2005: 76) 
argues in ―Political Ecology: Where is the Ecology?‖ that these critics‘ charge is 
―an exaggeration; while some political ecology has indeed branched in 
directions that do not engage biophysical ecology or environmental change 
directly, the tradition of careful examination of environmental change (rooted in 
older cultural ecology) remains alive in political ecology today.‖ 
Forsyth (2003: 132) explains how critical political ecology attempts to reconstruct a 
more ―transparent and relevant basis for politics‖ by revealing the politics involved in 
scientific explanations. Forsyth (2003) clarifies how generally understood statements 
on environmental degradation are oversimplified. Therefore, the decisions derived 
from oversimplified statements are faulty because they mask the uncertainty, debate, 
and complexity of environmental decisions (Forsyth, 2003: 36-79).  
Contemporary political ecology also uses language as a means to achieve a 
critical perspective and enable cultural sensitivity (Robbins, 2004; Peet, and Watts, 
2004; Walker, 2005). Zimmer and Bassett (2003) argue that language matters because 
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specific terms such as socio-ecological relationships, environmental politics, and 
environmental policy can have entirely different foci than ecology does. Narrative or 
―story‖ is used in political ecology to explain how power, language, and culture shape 
decisions (Forsyth, 2003; Robbins, 2003; Latour, 2004a; Walker, 2006). Walker (2006) 
agrees with Forsyth (2003) that political ecologists need to be better ―storytellers‖ in 
relaying complex situations to policy makers so they can make better decisions. 
According to Robbins (2004), language can also polarize environmental problems, 
yielding flat characters (‗good guys‘ and ‗bad guys‘). Consequently, the complexity of 
environmental decisions (i.e., uncertainty, debate, and risk) is omitted (Forsyth, 2003). 
Furthermore, language poses ethical implications since political ecology is part of 
Western discourse (Latour, 2004a) and therefore belongs ―to large institutions which 
political ecology seeks to challenge‖ (Robbins, 2004: 116). Thus, a critical Third World 
political ecology examines how language shapes ―nature‖ and environmental interests. 
2.6.2 For the Case Study 
Third World political ecology is multi-levelled or multi-scaled (see Cox, 1998; 
Bulkeley, 2005). It enables an examination of the local level within the context of a 
greater political economy in natural resource decisions (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; 
Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Five main aspects define Third World political ecology, 
according to Bryant and Bailey (1997: 20-25) a specific environmental problem, such 
as tropical deforestation or water pollution; (2) power relations among different actors; 
(3) inter-linked political and ecological problems of a specific geographic region; (4) 
socio-economic characteristics such as class, ethnicity and gender; and (5) the 
interests and actions of actors in political-ecological conflicts.  
A critical Third World political ecology can be used to frame the analysis of 
water resource politics for public participation in IWRM. The first aspect, a specific 
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environmental problem, is the involvement of the public in IWRM decisions in a 
developing country. Second, since Third World political ecology is multi-levelled, a 
multi-levelled stakeholder analysis as demonstrated in IWRM case studies by Kallis et 
al., (2006a), Poolman and Van de Giesen (2006), Heyd and Neef (2006), and Banister 
and Scott (2008) satisfies the second requirement that the study concern power 
relations among actors. In the third aspect, IWRM decisions are interlinked politically 
and ecologically to a specific geography, as IWRM policies and projects depend upon 
the location of water resources and the context of decisions (see Rahaman et al., 2004; 
Jønch-Clausen, 2004; Kallis et al., 2006a; McDonnell, 2008). Fourth, as mentioned 
above, the local level is of particular interest in Third World political ecology. The 
principle of subsidiarity in IWRM focuses on the local level, such as villages that have 
socio-economic and political characteristics. Fifth, the activities which actors use to 
engage villages may reveal areas of potential political-ecological conflict. In this study, 
the conceptual framework will be used to analyse public involvement in IWRM, while 
the discussion of water resource politics will use a critical Third World political ecology 
perspective. A critical Third World political ecology perspective elaborates upon power 
relations, geography, socio-economic characteristics of actors, and the interests of 
actors and their activities that the conceptual framework is unable to illustrate because 
it focuses on the levels of public involvement at different jurisdictional levels. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Public participation in IWRM is a part of an emerging paradigm of water sharing, 
which thus involves water resource politics. Water resource politics in IWRM appear 
nascent (WWC, 2006; Warner et al., 2006; McDonnell, 2008; Banister and Scott, 2008) 
in that they focus on the supply of water to address equity while seeking efficient 
management of water resources (Kallis et al., 2006a; Ingram et al., 2008; McDonnell, 
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2008) and giving little attention to the diversity of water users (Warner et al., 2006). 
New methods proposed for IWRM, such as stakeholder analyses, take into account the 
political nature of water decisions (Allan, 2003; Biswas, 2004; Falkenmark et al., 2004; 
Lankford et al., 2004; Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006; Kallis et al., 2006a; Biswas, 2008; 
Banister and Scott, 2008; McDonnell, 2008).  
The EU WFD has renewed interest in public participation in IWRM as a means to 
make better quality decentralised decisions (Collentine, et al., 2002; Mostert, 2003; 
Conca, 2006; Kallis et al., 2006b; Özerol and Newig; 2008). However, the outcomes of 
the EU WFD model are observed to be different in developing countries (see Rahaman 
et al., 2004; Bandaragoda, 2005; Poolman and Van de Giesen, 2006; Varis et al., 2006; 
Heyd and Neef, 2006; Banister and Scott, 2008). Public participation in international 
development in developing countries has a different meaning and has an added 
political dimension due to the involvement of international actors (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001; Francis and Roberts, 2003; Ribot, 2004; Chhotray, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Corbett 
and Lane, 2005; Poolman and Van de Giesen, 2006). Thus, a critical Third World 
political ecology perspective is needed to discuss water resource politics and public 










CHAPTER 3: LAO PDR AND IWRM 
3.0 INTRODUCTION: LAO PDR 
Lao People‘s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) meets several criteria that define a 
developing country, as discussed in Chapter 1.  It has a recent history driven by 
political agendas from a post-colonial Cold War era, and now Lao PDR is using 
international development to foster economic growth through a market-based 
economy (Hart, 2001). Through the development of its natural resources (Rigg, 2005), 
the Lao Government anticipates challenges to natural resource development because of 
the country's physical geography, being a mountainous land-locked. For these 
reasons, Lao PDR‘s socio-economic status remains that of a developing nation (Lao 
Government et al., 2008).  
Poverty alleviation and economic growth are priorities of the Lao Government 
(Sixth National Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSEDP). The socio-
economic characteristics of poverty are said to reflect the physical geography of Lao 
PDR because Lao PDR is a land locked country (Lao Government et al., 2008). Thus, 
factors such as the environment, land-use, and natural resources shape interventions 
and policies by actors in the development of Lao PDR that also influence international 
development activity (Lao Government et al., 2008). 
Water resource development and the implementation of IWRM, is seen as a 
means to fulfill objectives to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth by the 
NSEDP.  The development of water resources is also interpreted by the Lao Government 
as an opportunity to link Lao PDR to the rest of Southeast Asia through the Greater 
Mekong Sub-Region Program (GMS Program). In sharing the resources of the river, the 
Lao Government is a member of the Mekong River Commission (MRC). One means to 
develop water resources is through the potential hydropower in Lao PDR that is 
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exportable to other countries. The development of hydropower directly affects Lao 
PDR‘s neighbours because of Lao‘s position in the upper reaches of the Mekong River.  
3.1 LAO PDR 
Lao PDR is a communist state, organised as a one-party system under the Lao 
People‘s Revolutionary Party since 1975. The majority (80%) of the approximately 5.6 
million people are engaged in agriculture (ADB, 2007). Lao PDR is defined as a Least 
Developed Country (LDC) by the United Nations (United Nations Development Program 
for Lao PDR Website: http://www.undplao.org/) with a ranking of 130 out of 177 on 
the Human Development Index (2007). The annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 
2001 – 2005 had increased from $1.76 billion USD to $2.88 billion USD (Table 3).  
Public investments, such as infrastructure, are primarily financed through overseas 
development assistance. Approximately 70% to 80% of public investments in Lao PDR 
are from overseas development (Jerve, 2001; United Nations, 2002; Pham, 2004).  In 
1986, the Lao Government started to make economic reforms to move to a market-
based economy based on a policy titled New Economic Mechanisms.  
 
Lao PDR is a multi-ethnic nation, comprising different ethnic groups. The 
Government of Laos classifies ethnic groups into three categories: the Lao Loum 
(Lowland Lao), Lao Theung (Midland Lao), and Lao Sung (Upland Lao). As many as 230 
ethno-linguistic groups exist in Lao PDR, one of the cultural assets distinguishing Lao 
TABLE 3: BROAD ECONOMIC FIGURES FOR LAO PDR 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross Domestic Product, GDP (billions USD) 1.76 1.82 2.14 2.50 2.88 
Government Financed % of GDP 12.40 12.60 12.70 11.70 12.00 
Official Development Assistance and Official 
Aid (billions) USD 2.45 2.78 3.00 2.72 2.96 
Source: World Bank Group, 2007; ADB, 2007. 
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PDR as a nation (Chamberlain, 2001). As pointed out by Chamberlain (2001), the 
distinction between lowland and upland divisions of ethnolinguistic groups has a direct 
influence upon eco-societal relations within ethnic groups, most notably, perceptions 
of gender, labour, forest practices, and conceptions of space.  
3.2 PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 
 Approximately 80% of Laos is mountainous; flat flood plains are found in the 
South (Lao Government, Census, 2005). The most pronounced topographical features 
are the highlands in the North, the Bolovens Plateau in the South, and the natural 
border of the Truong Son Mountains (Annamite Mountains) in the West. Land-locked, 
Lao PDR is sandwiched between China, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia.  
All but two provinces share an international border (sometimes three) (Lao 
Government, Census, 2005).The Mekong River is a defining feature in Lao PDR. The 
Mekong River provides a natural border between Lao PDR and Thailand to the west.   
The ‗Mother of Rivers‘ in Lao, the Mekong River originates from the Himalayas. 
The area of the Greater Mekong Basin is 795, 000 km2 and the river is approximately 
4,880 km in length (MRC, 2005; World Research Institute, 2003). Lao PDR occupies 
202 000 square kilometers (25%) of the total catchment, with 1898 km of the Mekong 
River‘s length passing through the nation (Lao Government, Census, 2005).  The 
Mekong River's average discharge is 15,000 cubic meters per second and the lowest 
flow an estimated 1,700 cubic meters per second (MRC, 2005). About one-third of the 
Mekong's flow is fed from tributaries and the Mountains of Lao PDR.  The Upper 
Mekong River Basin consists of China and Myanmar (Burma), and the Lower Basin 
consists of Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. The Lower Basin has most of the 
catchment area, and supplies most of the average flow from the Mekong‘s tributaries. 
Due to highly variable precipitation, the Mekong River Basin has   ―wet‖ and ―dry‖ 
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seasons, in a region prone to both monsoons and droughts.  The ―wet season‖ occurs 
between May and October, whereas the ―dry season‖ is between November and April. 
3.3 THE MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION AND LAO PDR 
The desire to develop the Mekong River for navigation, irrigation, flood control, 
and hydroelectricity has existed since Western colonial expansion in the 1860s-1890s.  
Until the 1990s, the Mekong River had been one of the few rivers in the world to be left 
relatively untouched by development. Founded in 1957, the Mekong River Committee 
under the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) involved Laos, 
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam in attempt to develop the region.  However, this 
organization became largely ineffective as a result of the Cold War and national 
independence movements, including a coup d‘etat in 1978 by the Khmer Rouge.  
On 5 April 1995 in Chiang Rai, Thailand, the Lower Mekong states of Laos, 
Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia signed a treaty entitled the ―Agreement on 
the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin." This 
international treaty affirmed that cooperation was necessary for a peaceful and 
economically prosperous future through the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The 
goals of the MRC are to alleviate poverty (MRC, 2001; MRC, 2006), promote economic 
growth (MRC, 1995), and promote international cooperation (Elhance, 1999; Conca, 
2006; Finger et al., 2006). The international community has supported the Mekong 
River Commission through many forms of technical support, and substantial aid to 
develop the river, alleviate poverty, develop the economies of the basin states, as well 
as facilitate a basis of cooperation.  Even though China and Myanmar are not members 
of the Commission, in 2002 they became ―dialogue partners,‖ where agreements have 
been made to share some data concerning the flow from the main stem of the Mekong 
River.  
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Since the inception of the Mekong River Committee in 1957, the effects of large 
engineering plans on inhabitants of the basin have been of concern.  For example, 
White (1962: xi) presented the economic and social aspects of development to the 
Mekong Committee, saying:  
―it would be a grave mistake to believe that heavy investment in dams, canals, 
and generators, however expert the engineering and however generous the 
foreign assistance, would automatically lead to solid growth in social structures 
and economic production.‖ 
This statement is still true today. The MRC has adopted IWRM, using the 
definition of the Global Water Partnership (GWP). Perhaps one of the greatest 
constraints to implementation of IWRM by the MRC is the absence of membership by 
the Upper Mekong riparian states of China and Myanmar. Some authors have observed 
that as ―dialogue partners,‖ Myanmar and most notably China have a soft approach to 
international cooperation, whereby upstream countries can be disengaged from 
downstream water issues (Bakker, 1999; McCormack, 2001; Chenoweth et al., 2002; 
Nguyen, 2003; Dore and Xiaogang, 2004; Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Mehtonen, 2008).  
Although it is a dialogue partner with MRC, China has commenced building a series of 
cascade dams in Yunnan as illustrated in Map 1. This project coincides with the Greater 
Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) project of the Asian Development Bank, which prioritizes 
regional electric grid expansion (Sneddon and Fox, 2006).  The impacts of upstream 
dams are controversial, in that China‘s role in control of the river‘s flow influences 
water levels, fisheries, sediment transport, navigation, energy, ecosystems, and 




The development of hydropower along the mainstem of the Mekong River has 
led to speculation by several authors that economic growth is a source of cooperation 
for China with the other nations (Bakker, 1999; Chenoweth et al., 2002; Sneddon and 
Fox, 2006; Mehtonen, 2008). However, Sokhem and Sunada (2008: 146) argue that the 
belief that regional economic growth projects like the GMS project and hydroelectric 
projects on the main stem of the Mekong will ―automatically result in a ‗common 
MAP 1 UPPER MEKONG DAMS 
         
 
Source: International Rivers, 2009  
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prosperity‘‖ is an assumption.  The myth that regional economic growth will be 
equitably distributed among the riparian states in the Mekong (Bakker, 1999; Sokhem 
& Sunada, 2008) has increased interest in main-stem developments on the Mekong 
River (Chenoweth et al., 2002; Sneddon and Fox, 2006). This main-stem focus has 
detracted attention from water resource developments on equally important tributaries 
(Chenoweth et al., 2002; Sneddon and Fox, 2006) which drain into the main stem of 
the Mekong River and contribute to the regional sustainable development in the 
Mekong River Basin (Bakker, 1999; Chenoweth et al., 2002; Sneddon and Fox, 2006; 
Mehtonen, 2008; Sokhem and Sunada, 2008). In Map 2, existing and proposed dams 




 MAP 2: LAO PEOPLE‘S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WITH KEY EXISTING AND 
PROPOSED DAMS 
Source: Modified from Internationals River Website, 2008 
**High resolution image, zoom in for details. On print, text is legible.  
See Annex: Map for larger view  
52 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 This chapter described Lao PDR‘s status as a ―least developing country,‖ and 
defined how water is conceptualised as a resource to be developed for economic 
growth and poverty alleviation. Lao PDR‘s physical geography has shaped a growing 
desire to develop hydropower and increase economic growth. Poverty alleviation and 
economic growth are definite motivations for development of hydro-power, increasing 
the attention given to main-stem developments along the Mekong River, hence the 
creation of the MRC. However, as indicated in Map 2, other water resource 
developments along branches of tributaries draining into the Mekong are equally 
important. These water resource developments have socio-economic and ecological 
impacts on people living in the Mekong Basin. Therefore, poverty alleviation in Lao PDR 
provides regional and national interests to develop water resources. Regionally, the 
MRC is concerned with main-stem activities to promote economic growth and 
cooperation among riparian states to alleviate poverty with definite motivations to 
develop hydropower. And, nationally, the Lao Government feels that Lao PDR‘s physical 
geography is the reason for its socio-economic weakness that requires economic 
growth and projects like the GMS to alleviate poverty and move out of the title of a 









CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY  
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study can be described as an exploratory case study with multiple 
embedded units. The research design is used to examine the relationship between 
public participation and IWRM in two villages. The two villages, referred as Village A 
and Village B, are located in a project site of an international non-governmental 
organisation (INGO), the German Agro Action (Deutsche WeltHungerHlife GAA). Village 
A and Village B enabled a study of how villages could and did participate in IWRM 
decisions. The villages were comparable because they were under the same 
development project, located within the same district, had the same ethnic 
composition, and had a similar demographic profile. A third village was also examined, 
referred to as REF Village. The REF Village was examined separately because this village 
was further along the GAA‘s development plan, and did not illustrate some of the key 
changes happening in Village A and B. For example, the preliminary Participatory Rural 
Appraisals (PRAs) and planning process, initiated by the GAA, had been completed in 
the REF village four years earlier. Because references were made from Village A and B 
to REF Village, information concerning the REF Village was gathered to triangulate data. 
Villages were determined as appropriate units of analysis for theoretical reasons, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, and for logistical reasons such as working with the GAA 
project timeline; time of preliminary PRAs; location of villages as targets of poverty 
alleviation projects;  time of data collection indicated in the research timeline; 
organisation of the GAA project in getting to and from villages;  relations GAA had with 
district and provincial authorities; timeliness of getting permissions from district and 
provincial authorities; and time allotted for funding. A plurality of methods was 
employed that led to the collection of data to inform the findings of this study. 
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4.1 EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY DESIGN 
I chose a case study research design because my study satisfies two main 
criteria for ―how‖ and ―why‖ questions that characterise a case-study approach, 
according to  Yin (2003). First, a case study approach enables the investigation of a 
contemporary phenomenon, in this case how villagers could participate in decisions 
about water, using a concept called IWRM.  Second, the case study relies upon multiple 
sources of evidence that builds upon prior theories in development, sustainable water 
resource management, and public participation. From this evidence obtained from 
multiple sources and from different methods, information was triangulated to validate 
the findings.  
As already mentioned, public participation in developing countries using IWRM 
from a village to international scale is largely unstudied. Therefore, I chose an 
exploratory strategy, using participatory methods, to examine villages under the 
existing organisational framework of IWRM in Lao PDR in comparison to the conceptual 
model referred to in Chapter 2 of public participation in IWRM. Furthermore, an 
exploratory strategy enables an inductive approach, where themes, patterns, and 
categories emerge out of the data collected prior to the analysis (Patton, 1990: 390; 
Palys, 2003: 12).  An exploratory strategy was designed to identify political 
organisations known as actors relevant in the study. These actors represented different 
governments, national policies, and international development policies. In addition, 
these actors included different departments, development projects, and individuals. 
4.1.1 RESEARCH TIMELINE 
 Field work was conducted over a nine month period from August 2006 to April 
2007. Preliminary research was conducted in the first three months in which I 
accustomed myself to the language, culture, and politics in Lao PDR. I obtained a 
language competency: I could ask questions if I didn‘t understand a word, and most of 
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my vocabulary consisted of words I picked up related to ―food security‖. In this time, I 
commenced my on-site literature review, which initiated a preliminary investigation of 
key informants and discussion with other researchers in Lao PDR. I also used this time 
to speak with facilitators familiar with participatory methods in Lao PDR to determine 
the limitations of my research design. The susequent six months were devoted to the 
collection of data in my villages, at various levels of governments, and with 
international actors. I conducted two separate field visits in remote villages located in 
the Mekong Basin under the GAA‘s timeline. The first field visit lasted one week, during 
the GAA‘s preliminary PRA in November 2006, and the second ten days in December 
2006 which collected the remaining data for GAA‘s preliminary PRA. Each visit to 
villages lasted for an average of a three day period per visit in Village A and Village B, 
with one night in REF Village before returning to the provincial capital. Afterward, 
interviews were conducted with key informants at different levels of government and 
key IWRM organisations for the next five months of the study.   
4.1.2 RESEARCH ASSISTANTS 
Two research assistants were hired. Both spoke Lao and English fluently, and 
one spoke different dialects of Hmong.  The assistants were found through key 
informant interviews, as well as through referrals from other graduate students who 
had completed field research in the area. With each assistant, the case-study protocol 
was reviewed before entering the field. Research assistants were asked to give their 
insights into the methods as well as anticipated translation of the questions (See 
Annex: Methodology under Case Study Protocol).  Questions were designed with 
language and cultural barriers in mind. Potential questions were prepared ahead of 
time with the research assistants, with the understanding that the questions should be 
simple, easy to translate, as well as easy to answer. Each research assistant had to 
agree to the terms of the study outlined in the Information Letter and forms indicated 
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in Annex: Methodology, under Information Letter: Research Assistants and Forms. The 
research assistants helped to organise groups, record resource maps, assist in 
translation for the GAA, and explain my research ethics and objectives to participants.  
Both of my research assistants had to sign a letter of intent that outlined they would 
maintain the confidentiality of the participants in the study, that they understood the 
contents in the letter of intent, and would not discuss the research or participants with 
anyone. Furthermore, the importance of confidentiality in the study was repeatedly 
stressed during the field period. 
4.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
The methods informed and shaped the findings related to the primary research 
question. These methods included a literature review, key informant interviews, 
participatory methods, participant observation, photographic evidence, and notes from 
secondary investigators.  
4.2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A desktop literature review and on-site literature review were conducted 
throughout the research period.  Initially, the literature review drew from secondary 
sources, including documents from:  
 the internet database Mekonginfo.org,  
 published documentation available on the Mekong River Commission‘s 
(MRC) website,  
 academic journals,  
 reports from the GWP,  
 international development institutions,  
 international financial institutions,  
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 and books as well as other documentation from a library search were 
consulted. 
This documentation amounted to approximately 100 separate pieces of 
documentation. During the on-site literature review in Lao PDR, I was able to review 
primary literature such as project reports, studies conducted within the site area, raw 
data from different organisations, government statistics, quantitative data from 
international organisations, and newspapers. These resources totalled approximately 
100 separate pieces of documentation. Newspapers available in Lao PDR were the 
English version of the Vientiane Times, and the Bangkok Post. The on-site 
documentation involved was obtained at the international development offices libraries 
at the Mekong River Commission Document Centre, Asian Development Bank, GTZ 
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), Concern Worldwide, IUCN, 
World Bank, and L'Ecole Française D‘Extrême-Orient. Internet databases and 
documentation was obtained by collaborating with other academic researchers. I also 
leasrned of several internet databases, such as the Directory of NGOs in Lao PDR, the 
National Agriculture and Forestry Institute, and the LaoFAB Google Group, to further 
inform the research. After my field work in Lao PDR, I revisited questions emerging 
from Lao PDR with another desktop literature to confirm and triangulate my findings 
from library resources. In total, I reviewed approximately 280 different pieces of 
documentation. 
4.2.2 PARTICIPATORY METHODS  
Participatory rural appraisals (PRA) were used in conjunction with interviews. The 
main objective of the PRA was to gather data about the priorities of the village in 
relation to water and if water was a priority in the village in the face of development. 
Initially, the study drew heavily upon Chamberlain (2001) and Kumar (2002) as 
demonstrated in Table 6. Once in the field, consultations with facilitators of PRAs in 
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Lao PDR from the Asian Development Bank, INGOs like Concern, German Agro Action 
and CUSO, as well as anthropologists.  Facilitators of PRAs emphasised having a 
flexible plan. I used six participatory rural appraisal methods listed in Table 4 with 
interviews and focus groups illustrated in Table 5 of the next section. 
Method Description Objectives 
Informal 
Discussions 
Talk about village histories, rituals, 
village hierarchy, what they see in 
other villages and their opinion. 
Establish a common basis 
of understanding and 
rapport.  




Establish a common basis 
of understanding and 
rapport. 
They do it: Villagers and village residents as 
investigators and researchers—
women, poor people, school 
teachers, volunteers, students, 
farmers, village specialists.  They do 
transects, observe and interview 
other villages. 
May be used in conjunction 
with other methods, 
thereby collecting a wide 
range of data and 
perspectives that an 




Local people use the ground, floor, 
or paper to make to map natural 
resources, construct three-
dimensional models, and farm 
maps.  
 
Able to identify water 
strategies, while building 
consensus within the 
village over water use. 
Sometimes used in 
planning to explain 
changes or possible 
changes in the village. 
Transect walks: Walking with or by local people 
through an area, observing, asking, 
listening, discussing, identifying 
different zones, soils, land uses, 
vegetation, crops…etc.  






Villagers decide upon their 
priorities, and choose which they 
Finding out if water was a 
priority in the village as 
TABLE 4: PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAL USED IN THE STUDY 
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feel they need well as aid in identifying 
water-related resources.  
Adapted from: Chambers (1994: 960) and Kumar (2002) 
 
Women were not engaged in the preliminary PRA activities (priority rankings, 
resource map, or village planning) by the GAA because there was not a Lao Women‘s 
Union Representative in the village. The Lao Women‘s Union is called a mass media 
organisation that promotes gender equality and gender equity in international 
development with an extensive national network with representatives at provincial, 
district, and village scales (see ADB, 2004).  Because women had not been engaged in 
the resource mapping or ranking of priorities, a a separate PRA with women in Village 
A was conducted, mirroring the same method as the GAA, starting with a resource map 
to open discussions. This was done for Village A to test the use of the resource map as 
an effective PRA. The resource map consisted of the women gathered around an area 
outside the village chief‘s house. One woman had taken a stick because she was the 
only one who spoke Lao, and drew the map in the dirt with the stick with the input of 
other women.  The women were given little guidance, and just asked to make a map of 
their village in relation to the others, drawing things they felt were important. On the 
whole, the PRA went well and generated a lot of discussion for the village priority 
rankings.  
The village priority rankings followed the methods of the GAA, first by 
brainstorming different topics, then enabling the women to ―vote‖ for which one they 
thought as the most important. Done early in the morning at approximately 7:00am, 
this time seemed to work as most of the women in the village woke at 4:00-4:30am to 
start their daily chores. This first PRA took place near the end of the harvest season for 
rice. Water was not specifically mentioned as that could have influenced their thinking 
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or responses. Approximately, 28 women showed up from Village A, declining to 22 
later in the PRA.  While each woman wanted to vote, they would talk among their peers 
before making a decision during the PRAs. This PRA took three and a half hours. 
Another PRA was undertaken a month later to confirm the findings of the first 
session with Village A by using a different technique.  The second PRA was generated 
by GAA staff and my own assistant, where baskets with drawings of village priorities 
were laid out on a table. Each woman was given a sunflower seed to put into a basket 
to vote.  This was with the intention to save on time as the last PRA took too long.  
This PRA took less time, about an hour, and my field visit took place during the Hmong 
New Year, where both women and men take a 10 day to three week holiday to meet 
prospective brides and grooms.   
4.2.3 INTERVIEWS  
Key informants were used in this study so that information could be gathered 
efficiently, and uncover previously unfamiliar information, critical to the success of the 
case study (Gilchrist, and Williams, 1999: 72-74; Yin, 2003). Questions in the interview 
were semi-structured, following the objectives of my study. Most of the interviews 
were recorded digitally, which I could playback on my computer, so that I could ask 
follow up questions. As I knew I was going to be in Lao PDR for nine months, I was able 
to have subsequent interviews. This was helpful because I could revisit questions and 
subject matter to test if there were any inconsistencies in the participant‘s information. 
Furthermore, I was able to ask more in-depth questions as I became more familiar with 
Lao PDR, the issues surrounding public participation, and IWRM in Lao PDR.  
I also used the key informant interviews to test and formulate the village-level 
participatory rural appraisals (PRAs). Many of my discussions involved both PRA 
practitioners as well as anthropologists. I found these interviews very useful, as a great 
amount of localised experience in participatory rural appraisals (both from Lao and 
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International facilitators) offered an insight into the challenges of PRAs that the 
desktop literature did not elaborate upon. For instance, women are often too busy 
taking care of children to contribute to PRAs.  Sometimes if snacks such as sunflower 
seeds or candy are provided, this can give you time to talk with the women. Also, 
following farmers in their daily schedule also offers the ability to build better rapport, 
as by working with the women during their daily chores. Several PRA facilitators during 
the interview suggest I consider the time I do my PRAs, such as avoiding harvesting 
seasons. I was unable to avoid a harvest season for my first field trip, where women 
were busy harvesting rice in the field, however, for the second, more time was 
available with women because it was Hmong New Year, which lasted 10 days. 
Moreover, key informants provided a critical perspective to PRAs that was useful for my 
analysis. 
 Initially, I identified my key informants from the on-site literature review as and 
referrals from other graduate students, different government departments, 
international aid offices, and banks. Often, authors of some of the primary and 
secondary literature were available in Lao PDR, worked in Lao PDR.  A diversity of 
individuals representing various international development organisations 
(governmental and non-governmental), donors, facilitators, planners, projects 
technicians, project or program managers, resource engineers, government staff, 
government authorities, anthropologists, and technical experts was interviewed. They 
can be divided into the categories indicated in Table 5. A total of 33 interviews were 
conducted in English. A translator was used for interviews conducted in Lao, namely 
for district and provincial government interviews. 
Name of Organisation Area of Authority or 





TABLE 5: LIST OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
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Key Informant Interviews Directly Related to IWRM Organisations 
Mekong River Commission 
(Basin Development Plan)  
Regional 5 1.5 hours 
Lao National Mekong River 
Commission Basin 
Development Plan Planning 
Division (including 
Secretariat) 
National to Provincial 
(rarely District) 
1 2 hours 
Water Resource 
Coordination Committee 
National to Provincial 
(some interaction with 
District) 
2 2 hours 
Key Informant Interviews Affiliated with Villages  
German Agro Action   International to District 8 2-3 hours  
DED (German Development 
Service) 
International to District 
(sometimes Village 
scale) 
2 1 hour 
European Commission International to National  2 1 hour 
Key Informant Interviews with Actors Potentially Affiliated with IWRM Organisations 
and Villages  
District Authorities District to Village 4 1 hour 
Provincial Authorities Provincial to Village 4 0.75 hours 
Key Informant Interviews with Unaffiliated IWRM  Actors (for triangulation) 
Consultants International to Village 2 2 hours 
Technical Experts from 
other projects 
International to Village 4 1 hour 
TOTAL  33  
 
 Interviews with farmers, facilitators of PRAs, project staff, and district authorities 
related to villages in the field site were approached differently due to language 
barriers. For instance, for IWRM experts whose first language was English I would refer 
to water governance in discussing how villages were involved in the decision-making 
process. If I was with an official whose language was not English I would ask how 
villages could make decisions about water and who in the government would be 
responsible for handling those decisions. These language barriers included with my 
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limited understanding of the Lao and Hmong. Neither of the GAA staff of my team, nor 
the district authorities, spoke Hmong. In general, the GAA staff and district authorities 
spoke Lao, the official language in Lao PDR. Every time I spoke with a participant, 
regardless to how many meetings I had in the day, I reviewed my protocol for ethics, 
even if they had heard it before. An ethics review prior to entering Lao PDR had been 
approved and I had clearance to conduct interviews according to principles outlined by 
the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. 
  Focus groups were also used to collect data. The advantages of focus groups 
are that a large amount of information can be obtained with a large group of people, 
and the discussion can be controlled.   Disadvantages of focus groups can also occur, 
such as some members speaking more than others, limitations on the number of 
questions that can be raised, and unexpected interruptions (Patton, 1990: 335-336). 
The ability to control who spoke in these focus groups unexpectedly was aided by my 
inability to speak the participant‘s languages.  Thus, participants would talk among 
themselves and come to a conclusion, then pass that conclusion to my assistant who 








14 The average interview was 0.5 hours for each session. 
The total time was difficult to measure because many of 
the conversations elapsed over periods of a couple days. 




3 Talked about changes in the water regime of the village 




6-8 Talked about the priorities, the current water regime of 
the village, and changes to supply in water. 









Tai Lue: 6 




Talked about the changes in water as a result of 
drinking taps being built by the GAA. 






These were PRAs engaged by the German Agro Action 
that focused upon ―problems‖ seen by the women, their 
effect, and possible solutions. This focused mainly upon 
family planning and health. 
A separate PRA was conducted to see the priorities of 







These were PRAs engaged by the German Agro Action 
that focused upon ―problems‖ seen by the women, their 
effect, and possible solutions. This focused mainly upon 
family planning and health. 
PRA: Men 




These PRAs dealt with a resource map, village priorities, 
village planning, and a cause/effect diagram. 




Focus groups were incorporated to determine a general consensus over how 
water was governed and to uncover the opinions of villagers concerning water resource 
developments by the GAA.  In focus groups which I had conducted, the village chiefs in 
Village A and B had been notified prior to the PRA activity, requesting heads of 
households to see if their wives would like to participate in the forums. After the 
participatory rural appraisals (PRAs) of the GAA, I would enlist women in these PRAs to 
see if they were available for a focus group a day in advance. I also participated in their 
daily activities by cutting up cassava for the pigs and feeding chickens, a chore done 
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by the women in the village. The two focus groups in Village A and Village B were with 
women to discuss the changing regimes in water access. I found these small groups to 
be helpful in uncovering general agreements about how water was governed. I also 
brought sunflower seeds and candy during the focus group, the sunflower seeds and 
candy were popular with the kids while they played near the women during the focus 
group. Thus, I was able to take my time in talking with the women. 
 The third focus group was more complex, involving men and women in a 
collaborative effort with staff from the GAA and my assistant. The GAA staff and my 
assistant both helped with the logistics of contacting the men and women, what types 
of questions to ask, and how to record the information needed for the study. The GAA 
staff were given instructions to divide the men and women into separate ethnic groups; 
however, during the focus groups, the men and women re-organised themselves. The 
men chose to gather together, delegating two people to write a summary of the group 
while the women divided themselves up into smaller groups with a mixture of ethnic 
backgrounds. Conducting a focus group involving three ethnic groups of both men and 
women in REF village, I had asked what they thought of the change with drinking water 
taps installed in their village in November 2006. The men had combined their 
responses  on a sheet of paper which they had delegated one person to record their 
answers; meanwhile the women  divided  into separate groups according to their 
ethnic groups, and instead of talking to the GAA staff, decided to talk among 
themselves and write what they felt to report to the group later.  
4.2.4 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
Described as ―looking with a purpose,‖ I used a combination of participant-as-
observer and observer-as-participant (Palys, 2003: 203), reflecting different levels of 
involvement by the researcher (Hong and Duff, 2002).  As participant-as-observer, the 
investigator is involved in the research with participants by asking questions about 
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what is happening to understand a process, whereas an observer-as-participant 
enables the investigator to step-back and observe participants to understand a process 
(Hong and Duff, 2002). I played a variety of roles, as an investigator, as a participant in 
different activities, and facilitator as a participant-as-observer (Palys, 2003: 213). As a 
participant-as-observer, I was engaged in participatory rural appraisals, such as 
participating in the household responsibilities of the women, working with the GAA 
team, and engaging people in resource decisions.  As an observer-as-participant, I 
also had the opportunity to examine how the GAA team engaged villages in their PRAs, 
to learn from the GAA staff about how they did their PRAs, as well as to ask villagers 
how they felt about these PRAs.  The framework describing how I conducted the 
participant observation used questions similar to J. Goetz and LeCompte (1984: 112-
113), as cited in Bogdewic‘s (1999: 55) chapter entitled Participant Observation:  
1. Who is present? What are their roles? How did they enter the setting? Why is 
each person present? Who seems to be in charge? 
 
2. What is happening? Who is involved? What is the tone of the communication? 
Is it routine or unusual? 
 
3. When does this happen? Is this the regular time for this occurrence? How 
long does it last? 
 
4. Where is this happening? Is this the usual place? How is the space used? Who 
seems to be comfortable here and who is not? 
 
5. Why is this happening? What precipitated in this occurrence? How is this 
activity organized? What are the rules? How are various events observed 
connected?  
 
 I watched the GAA perform several PRAs: resource mapping, ranking of village 
priorities, a cause and effect analysis, and collection of socio-economic data through 
discussions with farmers. Then I aided GAA staff with their PRAs in family planning and 
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health issues with women in Village A and Village B. Afterwards, I designed my own 
PRAs based upon what I had seen and did in comparison to the literature I read on 
PRAs (Chambers, 1994; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Kumar, 2002; Rowlands, 2003; 
Hickey and Mohan, 2005) and what I learned from speaking with other PRA 
practitioners. 
4.2.5 PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
 Digital photos were taken of maps and government documents found in the 
villages, as well as the villages themselves. I took photos of the PRAs done by the GAA, 
and documentation used by the GAA, as well as the village chief. This was useful in 
recalling events, as well as providing concrete evidence of how maps, documents, and 
the conduct of PRAs were done. Some of the photos included audio recordings as a 
reminder of the object if written in Lao or the rationale for taking the picture.  
4.2.6 PRIMARY FIELD NOTES AND FIELD NOTES FROM SECONDARY 
INVESTIGATORS 
Field notes for my own use were written throughout the day, and then re-
written for clarity shortly after returning from the villages. Two research assistants 
were asked to write a journal throughout the research period to discuss what they 
thought of the villages, the GAA project, and reactions of villagers, as well as any other 
issue they considered important. The team from the GAA mainly comprised staff living 
in the Project district, whose family came from there, or had recently moved into the 
area within a 3-4 year period. GAA facilitators were asked for their feedback about the 
PRAs they were doing. Feedback of these PRAs focused upon elements they found 
difficult and useful.  
4.3 SELECTION OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANISATIONS AND VILLAGES 
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When I arrived in Lao PDR, I found public participation activities directly 
engaging villages in Lao PDR under the Mekong River Commission‘s (MRC) Basin 
Development Plan were not being used. As a result, I looked at what other 
organisations were doing in terms of public participation or participatory activities 
directly engaging villages involving water resources. Looking at the mandates of 
different organisations and their activities, I identified several potential organisations: 
Concern (not Worldwide Concern), the GAA, GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit), and Action Against Hunger (also known as Action Contre La Faim). 
All have objectives that engaged villages using participatory activities in water resource 
decisions. Of these organisations, the GAA was chosen. The GAA fit with many of the 
constraints such as funding, timing, and logistics. A description and criteria for 
selecting the GAA will be explained in Chapter 5. And, thus, the villages examined 
were from the GAA project site. The GAA had its own team, and I had to hire my field 
assistants for my field visits to help translate and organise PRAs for my research. My 
field assistant also had to be approved on my research visa by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the provincial authorities, and district authorities in Oudomxai. This took time, 
and my assistants were not always approved by the Ministry because they feared my 
assistants were not ―qualified.‖ 
4.4 LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH 
Several methodological limitations were found in the study. These limitations 
include the methods used to collect data, the role of the researcher, cross-cultural 
issues, and sensitivity of information.  
4.4.1 LIMITATIONS OF METHODS: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS  
Interviews and observations of the GAA team were scrutinized for the 
phenomenon known as the ―Hawthorne effect.‖ The Hawthorne effect occurs when a 
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participant being studied is conscious of being studied and thus behaves differently. 
As the Hawthorne effect could distort the data, information from the interviews was 
triangulated with various methods and information from other interviews to determine 
a common theme, pattern, or trend (Holden, 2001). From my experiences in 
conducting interviews in Village A, Village B, REF Village, and different organisations 
(government and non-governmental), I found a level of self-censorship  was 
dependent upon the participant‘s feeling of information‘s political sensitivity even after 
signing the letter of information. Villagers would either decline to comment or explain 
there was little they could do to change their situation to end a subject. For 
governmental and international organisations, interviews would usually begin with 
statements from participants to ensure they were recorded as politically aligned to 
institutional mandates (policies and water interests). 
Data collected from interviews also varied in quality. Some interviewees were 
inconsistent in their statements when revisiting subjects, or rewording phrases, but on 
the whole, most interviewees answered clearly. Even though participants were assured 
that their participation and comments would be treated in confidence, and most 
interviews were done outside their working places, candid responses from some 
participants were hard to obtain. The number of interviews was difficult to quantify in 
duration, as many of them occurred over a period of a couple days. Furthermore, at the 
request of some participants, a digital recording device was not used. One of the 
problems with digital recordings in the field was the amount of memory recordings 
took. The sheer volume of voices recorded in a 16 hour period made it such that I had 
to delete conversations that did not relate to the research questions. 
Influencing some key informant interviews were the experiences of some 
participants with other researchers. These participants voiced their concern over the 
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control they had over the information because some studies in which they had 
participated previously had been used ―improperly.‖ Thus, the responses from 
informants varied from those who were open, while others were guarded in how they 
answered my questions. Another consideration was the issue of water resource 
development and domestic political issues that limited the exploration with key 
informant interviews. Participants in government and international development 
agencies in particular were quick to identify areas of my questions which they felt 
could be highly contentious political areas, such as resettlement. Sometimes 
participants would either decline to answer, or request to talk more about participatory 
activities and governance. Most interviewees were generous in giving me their time. 
Shortly after interviews with participants, I provided them a copy of the transcript for 
them to approve. 
Although key informant interviews are essential pieces of data collection, I 
found interviews relaying empirical experience more useful, often in the form of a 
narrative, than participants trying to substantiate their opinions by referring to other 
projects they had ‗heard‘ about.  Some participants had stated information they gave 
me on on governance, public participation, the involvement of international 
development agencies in Lao PDR, and national policy as fact. I would revisit this 
information and ask if they could offer evidence to support their claims, such as the 
study they were getting their information from, how they knew what they knew, and if 
they could offer any documentation or another informant to back up their statements. 
Sometimes these claims could not be substantiated, reinforcing why multiple methods 
are needed. 
As mentioned, I was able to speak with some key informants numerous times, 
with follow up questions over a period of six months. Many of the experts I consulted 
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were difficult to reach because they had busy work schedules.  Thus, the availability of 
key informants was inconsistent. I had to wait months before being able to talk some, 
as they may have been on sabbatical, on-leave, at a training workshop, or conference. 
Others were more readily available, after or before business hours. Other issues 
regarding access and availability of informants included the access to field sites. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to visit my field sites numerous time because if I wanted to 
enter legally, I had to receive permissions from the provincial and district departments, 
as well as go with a GAA team because the villages were remote and, for safety reasons 
I could not travel alone.   
4.4.2 LIMITATIONS IN PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION AND PARTICIPATORY RURAL 
APPRAISALS 
 I found several limitations in using participant observation and participatory 
rural appraisals. One limitation of being a participant-as-observer in collaboration with 
the GAA was the separation of my study from the GAA as an organisation. The villages 
could have thought I worked for the GAA.  I had the GAA explain who I was, as a 
researcher, and I reminded participants in my interviews, focus groups, and PRAs that I 
was separate from the GAA, even though I was working with them.  
 Before collecting any data through interviews, informal discussions, and PRAs, 
participants in villages were reminded of how I was going to use their information. I 
cannot say for certain if all the villagers understood that I was also observing the GAA 
and what critical research meant.  
 A limitation as an observer-as-participant was the effect upon the GAA and its 
PRAs. First, I had no experience of being a farmer, an ethnic minority in Lao PDR, or a 
Lao citizen, or PRA facilitator.   Thus, my deep understanding of what was happening 
was limited. Second, before entering the GAA project site, I met with the project 
manager and GAA team to explain what I was doing,  their  participation in the 
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research, their confidentiality, and how I was going to collect data. In collecting data 
from the GAA, I was aware that GAA facilitators of PRAs may have been conducting 
their PRAs differently than their usual practice, as the staff were aware of my role as a 
researcher that could alter how I understood how the GAA conducted PRAs. Some staff 
seemed to care while others did not. 
Another factor limiting the data quality was the PRA method. Despite the 
language barrier between the Hmong and Lao, some of the activities such as mapping 
seemed like a game. Some  suggestions for playing games as a PRA method, like 
having villagers draw pictures of dream villages, pictures in the sand, and passing 
around a stick to indicate whose turn it was to talk, seemed disrespectful. I cannot be 
certain if participants doing PRAs fully understood them, and I am uncertain if these 
PRAs helped build rapport between myself and the participant or the GAA and the 
participant. I think the level of respect between the participants and me was best 
gained through interviews and focus groups, even if only one person could speak Lao 
for everyone, and they were more effective than the mapping and village rankings. 
Furthermore, the quality of data was better from the interviews and focus groups. One 
more limiting factor of the PRA method was treating the PRA like a method similar to 
following a recipe book. I found PRAs as a method to be limited because they lacked 
creativity, adaptability, and flexibility for a context-specific situation. In the case of 
team building, in trying to have facilitators understand the ―fun‖ of a PRA, the method 
seemed to work in the training of GAA staff. However, at a village scale, some of the 
PRAs were found to be limited, such as doing transect maps and recording village 
priorities, which I copied from the GAA. The maps, which will be explained in Chapter 
5, were poorly understood by participants. Meanwhile results from the priorities 
discussed in Chapter 5, illustrated different results from men and women. 
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Furthermore, the ―fun‖ aspect of the PRA seemed inappropriate in addressing adult 
men and women because I felt I was disrespectful. Instead, informal discussions, 
partaking in daily chores and asking how-to, as well as the transect walks as a means 
to generate discussion yielded better data and seemed more appropriate.  
The other challenges of using PRAs as a method are the normative expectations 
of their use. The literature suggests that PRAs should be used under the condition it 
will contribute to village control over natural resource decisions also referred to as 
citizen power. Without that control, the efficacity of the PRA is limited (see Chambers, 
1994; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Rowlands, 2003; Cornwall, 2003; Cornwall, 2004; 
Hickey and Mohan, 2005). The practice of PRAs by the GAA staff did not match the 
best practices identified in the literature (Chambers, 1994; Kumar, 2002). Chambers 
(1994) and Kumar (2002) suggest best practice as being on the same level as 
participants (not being the only one standing in a lecture style), allowing participants 
to do most of the talking, and enabling genuine participation.  
 Originally, I wanted to conduct PRAs on my own with my research assistants, 
however, I quickly realised how little I understood of Hmong or Lao culture, the work of 
the GAA, my own experiences compared to my participants and my position as a 
researcher. I had no experience being a Hmong farmer or GAA personnel, nor was I an 
expert in either Lao or Hmong culture. Moreover, under the normative expectations of 
the PRAs, I had no authority or legitimacy to use PRAs as a method because I could not 
guarantee their efficacity in enabling the change villagers wanted. Or, in other words, I 
was a foreigner who had no right to advise or implement a tool meant to change the 
political and domestic circumstances (such as empowering women) of my participants. 
Thus, I focused my research on the evaluation of the GAA‘s position and PRAs. 
4.4.3 CROSS-CULTURAL ISSUES  
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I used an iterative method of inquiry to incorporate cultural and societal issues 
into the research design as I became aware of those issues the longer I lived in Lao 
PDR, which I found from McCraken (1999) as demonstrated in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows 
how data collected for analysis and the methods used for collection are constantly 
reviewed, integrating cultural and societal issues constantly as those issues are 
discovered. The more I understood about Lao PDR and issues surrounding IWRM, the 
more I applied those issues to my research questions. I had used my preliminary 
collection of data from practitioners to inform my methods before entering villages, as 
well as drew from my own experiences living and working in Lao PDR. I also taught a 
participatory development course titled Development and Education where the class 
comprised Lao university students and Lao from other provinces who worked for 
international development agencies looking to complete a certificate degree in 
International Development in English.  From my students, I gained an important 
perspective about how they viewed international development in Lao PDR, and the 
pride they took in working on the issues facing their country. Taking a number of 
language lessons, I also lived in a village outside of the city centre of Vientiane, the 
capital of Laos.  Once I started to understand the structure of the language, I had a 
great appreciation for the language barrier of Lao PDR.  
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4.5 SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION 
 To conduct research in Lao PDR legally, I had to obtain a research visa, which is 
generally issued only to those affiliated with an established development organisation 
or national institution. I found that some of the information and issues raised in the 
on-site literature review suggested that water had the potential of being a politically 
sensitive topic. The involvement of Government officials in my research was 
unavoidable due to their role in development projects, as well as my own work, thus 
confidentiality was a primary concern. Throughout my field work with GAA, a 
FIGURE 4: ADAPTED FOUR-PART METHOD OF INQUIRY 
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government or GAA observer was present, and sometimes during interviews with 
officials. Emphasising confidentiality, I had the government observer and GAA observer 
sign the same letter of intent that I had my research assistant sign, confirming that 
they understood the letter of intent, the objectives of my research, maintaining 
participant confidentiality, and keeping information to themselves. Also, I emphasised 
how they would be legally bound to this letter as if it were a contract. 
 Data were encrypted while in Lao PDR with Pretty Good Privacy Software, as the 
interviews were recorded digitally. Digital photos and sensitive documents, including 
hardware to store data, were locked in a guarded Project House. Information from 
participants was understood to be gained by varying degrees of trust, which raised a 
number of ethical considerations. As exemplified by Palys (2003), an ethical question 
exists regarding the rights of the participants and knowledge gained for the study.  On 
one hand, sensitive data should be included in the study which would imply limits to 
the confidentiality of the participants.  This does not imply a limit to the ethical 
obligations of the investigator, but risk of compromising the participants‘ 
confidentiality and welfare exists. On the other hand, I also had the option of omitting 
data I felt was too sensitive because it would compromise the confidentiality and 
welfare of the participant. Here, the rights of the participants were placed before the 
research itself.  
Participants who I felt could be at risk of being identified were asked to keep 
information to themselves, especially after an interview. Particular care was given to 
the villages, as their geographical nature and involvement with the GAA could be used 
to identify the villages and, hence, compromise their confidentiality. Only the GAA 
knew which villages I went to. Most of the participants in the key informant interviews 
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were given the opportunity to review information they provided, as well as given the 

























CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY: REMOTE MOUNTAINOUS VILLAGES IN LAO 
PDR 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Data presented in this chapter follow a stakeholder analysis, examining actors at 
different levels of authority to determine public participation in IWRM for Lao PDR. The 
study first looks at villages, following levels of authority outlined by the Lao National 
Mekong River Commission (LMNC) in Table 7. The study also starts with villages 
because they are the lowest appropriate level used by the international NGO (INGO) in 
the study. In Table 7, the administrative designations specify levels of authority and 
―key agencies‖ or actors also responsible for public participatory activities. Each actor 
is ranked according to the Conceptual Framework described in Chapter 2 in Figure 3, 
so each actor and corresponding level of government had a line indicating their level of 
citizen involvement with the villages. The participatory activities used by each actor in 
Lao PDR are matched with methods described in Table 1. As outlined in the 
Framework, methods have corresponding degrees of citizen power, levels of 
participation, and types of participation. Together, the degrees, levels, and types of 
participation make up an indicator for the involvement each authority has with villages. 
A critical Third World political ecology perspective is used for the analysis of 
water resource politics, using the same data as for the Conceptual Framework, but also 
other types of data in five other areas. First, Third World political ecology examines 
international actors such as the INGO in the study. Thus, an extra ―administrative‖ area 
was determined to exist, because international development projects can follow 
separate rules and procedures from those in Table 7. Second, Third World political 
ecology examines the power of actors at different levels of authority. Power is 
determined by an actor‘s water interests, as well as the actor‘s ability to implement 
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those interests. Third, Third World political ecology examines power and the ability to 
implement water interests. The ―Indicative Area Extent‖ in Table 7 shows the role of 
land in water resources. The jurisdictional authority, or administrative area, of each 
level of authority is tied to land, thereby tying water resource development to land at 
different spatial radii. Although a physical area establishes administrative boundaries, 
the development of water resources depends upon the ability of an agency to accrue 
capital and distribute that capital (human, physical, and financial). Therefore, IWRM in 
Lao PDR is interlinked to a specific geographical area because the location of water 
resources can determine the type of development happening. Fourth, Third World 
political ecology investigates how other actors view villages. It thus provides a multi-
scaled picture of the socio-economic characteristics of villages, as well as of how 
villages understand their situation. The examination of socio-economic characteristics 
may also illustrate water issues in contemporary water resource politics surrounding 
villages. Fifth, Third World political ecology examines participatory activities in ways 
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Source: Table 7 Watershed Level in Lao PDR from LMNC, 2004. 
5.1 VILLAGES  
5.1.1 DESCRIPTION OF VILLAGES 
 Two villages located in the Muang Nga district in the Northern Province of 
Oudomxai were the focus of the study. The two villages, A and B, are Hmong. Another 
village, the REF village, was also used in the study to triangulate information. The 
Hmong in Village A, Village B, and REF Village practiced upland swidden agriculture, 
also referred to as shifting cultivation, and slash-and-burn agriculture. The villages I 
examined are defined as remote by the GAA and Socio-Economic Atlas of Lao PDR (Lao 
Government et al., 2008: 10). They had no road access by vehicle for at least a half 
day‘s walk and were approximately a day‘s journey from the district capital. Village A 
and B were in the preliminary phases of GAA‘s planning process for development.  
 Village A and Village B were a part of a set of villages, totalling five. At the time 
of the study, villages surrounding Village A were termed sub-villages by GAA staff and 
district authorities. Village B was classified as one of the sub-villages surrounding 
Village A. Sub-village, as a classification of the villages surrounding Village A, did not 
indicate differences in size, ethnicity, proportion, or wealth.  
Field work took place in November 2006 and December 2006. Prior to my visit, 
the district and provincial authorities had determined land allocations for Village A, 
Village B, and the other sub-villages in September 2005 (see Annex: Land). The four 
sub-villages, which included Village B, around Village A were to be amalgamated in a 
new location close to Village A. Combined, the five villages numbered 145 households 
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with approximately 680 inhabitants. The proposed area of development is indicated in 
the maps below. Village A and Village B seemed to have had little interaction with each 
other, except for meetings involving village planning such as the preliminary PRAs 







MAP 4: SCHEMATIC OF VILLAGE A AND VILLAGE 
B AFTER DEVELOPMENT 
 
*Not to scale  
MAP 3: SCHEMATIC OF VILLAGE A AND 
VILLAGE B BEFORE DEVELOPMENT 
 
*Not to scale 
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5.1.1.1 Geographical Features of the Site 
  Northern Laos is mountainous, characterized by limited arable land, and a high 
potential for hydroelectric projects, according to the Northern Region Development 
Plan (NRDP) (2004). Also mentioned in the NRDP are energy, forest products, 
agriculture, minerals, and other resources which makeup the exports from Lao PDR to 
with neighbouring countries. And, as the NRDP explains 
―by western standards most people in Northern Lao PDR are poor, severe 
poverty is not widespread and community life is generally much better than 
indicated by US dollar income measures‖ (NRDP, 2004: 21).  
The GAA project site was located within the Mekong Basin. Village A and Village 
B were near a river to be referred to as the River that eventually drains into the 
Mekong. Both villages had little vegetation around their homes with their crops located 
further away, nearby bamboo forests used for construction.  
5.1.1.2 The Hmong  
 The residents of Village A and B are upland ethnic group known as the White 
Hmong, belonging to the ethno-linguistic group Hmong-Mien. In all of the interviews 
conducted in Village A and B, no inhabitants referred to themselves as Lao; rather, they 
referred to themselves as Hmong. For instance, interviewees would refer to themselves 
by their given name, and their Hmong clan. According to Yia Lee (2005), swidden 
agriculture for the Hmong has shaped specific cultural and religious beliefs, 
particularly about the use of time and the value of productivity through labour, as well 
as guiding the integration of spiritual beliefs in health and productivity and the impact 
of labour upon gender roles. The lives of the Hmong, as highlanders, have been 
characterised as ―vertical‖: 
The world of the lowlanders is essentially flat . . . their existence is premised on 
the horizontal, on wetness, and on fish . . . highlanders, on the other hand, live 
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vertical lives, dominated by steep slopes, over-powering landscapes, enormous 
trees, and a vastness of open space. (Chamberlain, 2001: 42)  
The Hmong are a highly labour conscious society and considered ‗pioneering 
swiddeners,‘ as they do not practice rotational fallowing but continually move to new 
locations when resources have been depleted, living a nomadic life style that has  
potential to cause conflict with other lowland or midland ethnic groups (Chamberlain, 
2002: 46).  
This pioneering characteristic of the Hmong has led to what Tapp (2005: xxv) 
describes as ―the old scape-goating stereotype of the Hmong as destructive of the 
natural environment, which first emerged in the 1960s‖. Furthermore, the Hmong grow 
opium, which has lent to biases and is used as justification by Thai and Lao 
governments for the resettlement of populations (Tapp, 2005). However, the validity of 
the claim that swidden agriculture causes environmental degradation has been 
questioned by Chaplot (2004: 45) who suggests that shifting cultivation is more 
sustainable on sloping land than continuous cultivation: 
―If shifting cultivation in the uplands is permanently replaced by continuous 
agriculture, environmental damage will rapidly and greatly increase since 
punctual features with high infiltration possibilities, such as roots, stumps and 
associated biological activity remaining after slash-and-burn, will all disappear. 
Runoff, instead of infiltrating soils, will flow down and off the hillslopes, 
producing more and more erosion and flooding.‖ 
Nonetheless, debate regarding the sustainability of swidden agriculture continues (see 
Walker, 2003; Tapp, 2005).  
5.1.1.3 Village A 
 Village A comprises approximately 28 households, with one chief and three 
deputies. At the time of the study, the village was accessible via a rough trail.  The 
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main crop for Village A was upland rain-fed rice. Mostly un-electrified, a pico-
generator powered a radio for the village, a sewing machine, and rice thresher. One of 
research assistant who was White Hmong compared Village A to his own village in 
another province nearby, named Luangprabang.  The research assistant described 
Village A as conventional or ―old.‖ The examples he gave were the tools, like a wooden 
rice pounder, style of the houses, and lack of amenities (flashlights, lights, radios).  
Other examples were how Village A did not fence off its livestock (chickens, pigs, and 
cows) and the type of spiritual ornaments hanging in the houses.     
5.1.1.4 Village B 
 Village B had approximately 25 households. Village B contrasted with Village A 
considerably. A majority of the houses had fluorescent lights, as well as lights outside 
the homes, electrified from two of three pico-generators. The fencing of livestock and 
around houses was more sophisticated than in Village A and villagers had rice banks in 
case of drought. This village was wealthier than the Village A as a number of turkeys 
and two horses were found, which according to several anthropologists in the field 
indicates the wealth of a village. Five of seven interviews in Village B expressed 
concerns about moving to the new site near Village A, because of the limited 
availability, land with fertile soil, and the availability of water.  
5.1.1.5 REF Village 
 The REF village was not used in the comparison of Village A and Village B for 
several reasons, however, in understanding the role of GAA to Village A and B, REF 
village was invaluable. First, the REF village comprised three ethnic groups.  Each 
ethnic group, Tai Lue, Hmong, and Khamu, lives separately from the other; however, 
this did not mean these populations did not interact with each other. Another reason 
the REF village was not used in the Village A and Village B comparison was because the 
REF village was nearing the completion of a four year development phase under the 
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GAA projects. The GAA had worked in the same village for the previous two years, 
rendering preliminary PRAs or memory of them to be four to six years old.  The 
physical geography of the REF village changed with the development projects 
facilitated by the GAA, including changes in agriculture such as the creation of cash 
crops and irrigated paddies, as well as changes to the layout in terms of ethnic 
divisions, and construction of roads, making the REF village distinctly different from 
Village A and Village B.   
The REF Village was used in the study for several reasons. Inhabitants from 
Village A and Village B passed by the REF Village, to get to the markets near the 
provincial Capital Muang Xai, and inhabitants of Village A and B had relatives in the REF 
Village. The REF village has had the greatest involvement with the GAA over five years, 
starting in 2002, largely because the GAA teams entered through this village to access 
other villages such as Village A and Village B.  The Hmong in the REF Village had 
recently settled approximately 2 years earlier. Farmers from Village A and Village B 
indicated the REF Village served as the model for changes Village A and Village B 
expected to happen in the new site for development (amalgamation of the five villages 
together as indicated in  Maps 3 and 4). Data collected from REF village was used to 
compare what Village A and B expected from GAA as a result of work done in REF 
Village with the realities of those living in REF Village. Inter-ethnic biases against the 
Hmong were found through interviews in REF villages. The Tai Lue in the interviews felt 
the Hmong were responsible for degrading the environment through deforestation in 
the area. 
5.1.2 WATER INTERESTS OF VILLAGES 
 The water interests of Village A and B were internally governed by a hierarchy of 
authority which established rules for water use and sharing which villagers followed.  
Villagers‘ water interests found in the study related to agriculture, drinking water, and 
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multi-purpose dams all of which were managed and enforced through existing 
customs and the village hierarchy. 
5.1.2.1 Agriculture 
  For both villages, the primary source of food, economic security, and spiritual 
belief was the cultivation of upland rain-fed rice (also referred to as upland rice or 
rain-fed rice). Interviews with several farmers in Village A and B, as well as discussions 
with the Hmong research assistant, suggested some rice strains that vary in shape and 
color are passed from  from clan to clan. Farmers also grew two types of rice: one 
which grows in three to four months considered ―cheap and not so tasty,‖ and another 
which takes five to six months considered ―more expensive and tastier.‖ At the time of 
the study, no wet-paddy rice fields (wet-paddy rice is also referred to as    irrigated 
rice) existed in Village A and Village B.  
 The four sub-villages, including Village B, combined with Village A, had 
approximately 106.5 hectares of land, yielding 1.04 tonnes of upland rice per hectare, 
and totalling an average of 113.39 tonnes of rice annually, according to villagers in 
reporting to the GAA. These numbers were reported by participants at the preliminary 
PRA, 28 to 47 heads of households (men) who also reported the amounts of land of 
their neighbours who were not present. As a technical advisor in the area pointed out, 
this amount supplies enough rice for four months a year for the villages. As 
mentioned, farmers are able to grow two varieties three to four months apart, and five 
to six months apart. Thus, farmers were able to store rice for four months, depending 
upon the yield of their crops. However, the margin for error in judging how much rice 
and what type of rice to grow makes them vulnerable.  There were also a number of 
gardens in Village A and B containing chilis, tomatoes, papaya, mangoes, pineapples, 
and sugar cane, as well as other crops.   
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5.1.2.2 Drinking Water and Sanitation 
 Village A and B both knew to boil their water, based on the advice from a nurse 
who had visited in April 2005 from the provincial office of Rural Water Supply and 
Health and Sanitation. Interviews with villagers indicated they understood the River 
nearby was unsafe to drink, but they would bathe or wash clothes in it. For both 
villages, drinking water came from that drained into the River nearby. Village A‘s 
source of drinking water came from an intermittent stream located downhill from the 
village, approximately 800m away. When the streams near the village dried, two 
women and three men in the village informed me they would boil water from the River. 
A small reservoir was built for drinking water made of a dam of stones, mud, and 
wood. In the morning, water was carried up from the creek by women and children in 
large buckets. This contrasted with the system in Village B.  
 Drinking water for Village B came from approximately 1 km away from a small 
reservoir originating from an intermittent stream located uphill from the village. Built 
by the villagers, the supply of water to the village was through bamboo piping, while 
the reservoir was made from materials (wood, rock, and mud) from the forest. 
Approximately 0.5 m high, the reservoir collected drinking water that was transported 
by halves of bamboo, measuring 1.5 – 1.6 meters long. This gravity fed tubing was 
supported by sticks and each bamboo half could be moved to divert the flow of water 
easily into a bucket and also could be easily replaced to maintain a steady flow of 
water. An example of this tubing is shown in Photo 2. At the end of the diversion, the 
stream ended in a stream bed at the centre of the village where the chief‘s home was 
located. The water piping structure eliminated the need for women to carry water and 
was maintained and operated by village authorities.  
 Existing customs regarding water conflicts emerged from focus groups with 
women in Village A and interviews with women from Village B. The topic of potential 
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water conflicts came up as a result of confirming Village B was moving into Village A in 
the new project site. In the focus group with Village A, women felt potential conflicts 
over water as a result of an increasing population were ―childish and silly.‖ They 
explained two things would most likely happen: the women who collect water would 
wait in line and village law would ensure this rule. Village B had similar views, saying 
water conflicts were ―not possible.‖   Women from Village A were mainly concerned 
about the impact of more people affecting their work or daily chores in collecting 
water. More people meant women and children would have to wake up earlier and wait 
longer in the morning for water before going out to the field to work.  
5.1.2.3 Fishing and Hydropower 
 Both Village A and Village B had small hydro-electric generators known as pico-
generators. Village A had one, and Village B had three.  The funds for these generators 
were from relatives in the United States, according to one of the owners of the pico-
generator from Village B. As mentioned, Village B had fluorescent lighting for most of 
the village at night, and they had built a multi-purpose dam not only to generate 
electricity from a pico generator, but also to catch fish, and control the flow of water as 
demonstrated in Photo 1. 
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PHOTO 1: EXAMPLE OF MULTIPURPOSE DAM 
FROM VILLAGE B FOR HYDRO-ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION, WATER DETENTION AND 
CATCHING FISH.  
PHOTO 2: EXAMPLE OF PIPING MADE OF 
BAMBOO TO TRANSPORT WATER TO THE 
CENTRE OF THE VILLAGE 
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5.1.3 HOW VILLAGES VIEW THEMSELVES 
Based on interviews, focus groups, and the physical evidence of structures built 
for drinking water, fishing, and hydro-electricity, both villages seemed to have 
independent control over their water interests.  Thus, villages were determined to be at 
a level of ―Citizen Control: Decision Making‖ as defined in Table 1. Villagers were 
determined to be self-interested actors, comprising several sub-groups, like heads of 
households and village chiefs. The degree of control was illustrated by interviews with 
heads of households, village chiefs, village deputies, and women who felt they were 
the ones who ultimately decided if they would participate in GAA activities.  
Both villages were aware of the opportunities the GAA provided. Whether or not 
―centralisation‖ would happen for Village A and Village B depended upon the changes 
they saw from the GAA. Factors determining the cooperation of Village A and Village B 
were the availability of fertile land, workload placed upon women as described in 
Section 5.1.2.2 Drinking Water and Sanitation, and expectations of developments 
similar to those they saw happening in the REF Village. Most spoke of making a 
decision collectively in deciding to move, although three heads of households indicated 
they had relatives in other villages to whom they could go for help or move in with.  
5.1.4 PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: NON-PARTICIPATION AS PARTICIPATION 
 The absence of water from the list of priorities (see 5.2.2 Activities by the GAA) 
illustrated a type of participation unanticipated in the literature review or discussions 
with on-the-ground PRA practitioners. I call this ―non-participation‖. Non-participation 
is when villagers intentionally do not to participate in specific projects in order to 
maintain control over natural resources. For example, the omission of information 
from PRAs could enable Village A and Village B to maintain control over their water 
interests.  As mentioned, the total hectares of crop land were reported from 28 to 47 
heads of households, out of a total of 145. Furthermore, the omission of information 
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could appear in income from other crops, physical capital that determined the 
desirability to move such as the pico-generators, existing capital or machinery 
obtained from other development projects, and livestock (the horses and turkeys were 
not factored into the socio-economic data). In addition, villages could maintain control 
over water interests because they could determine the sustainability of projects after 
project timelines. 
5.1.5 BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES IDENTIFIED BY VILLAGES 
One of the disadvantages of non-participation was the inability of villages to 
develop water resources. Villages depended upon district authorities and the GAA to 
develop water resources or provide government services such as health care, 
education, and access to infrastructure (roads, electricity, and running tap water). 
Thus, if villages wanted to increase their crop output through wet-rice paddy or 
irrigation, they would have to cooperate with district authorities vis-à-vis the GAA. In 
all of the interviews in Village A and Village B, it was clear that villagers knew there 
were benefits in cooperating with the GAA because they said the REF Village illustrated 
the benefits of such cooperation. They saw GAA as a means to increased access to 
markets, concrete taps, roads, fencing, irrigation, cash crops, and microloans GAA 
offered to villagers to change their livelihoods in ways they could not do 
independently.  
5.2 INTERNATIONAL ACTOR: GERMAN AGRO ACTION  
 The German Agro Action (GAA) illustrated how an international actor was able to 
work at the village level that created an extra administrative area.  
5.2.1 ORGANISATION OF GAA AND WATER INTERESTS 
 As an INGO, GAA is organised into three levels: an international head office, a 
country resident office for Lao PDR, and a provincial or district office. The head office 
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is in Bonn, Germany, while the country resident office for Lao PDR is in the national 
capital of Vientiane. Depending upon the location of the project as well as the 
objectives of their projects (as they do not only employ holistic rural development 
approaches), the GAA projects can be seen as locally based, at the  levels of the village, 
district, or province.  These local projects are given relative autonomy in a 
decentralised style of management, where project managers are largely given the 
responsibility, and decision-making power, to implement their project according to 
what they see on the ground.  In the case where local project decisions require 
authorization at a national to international scale, then the head office will often 
support their local projects. The ability to respond on the ground at the village level 
was due to the GAA‘s proximity to the project villages themselves. 
 The GAA provincial office is located in the Northern Lao province of Oudomxai, 
in the provincial capital of Muang Xai. The GAA district office is in Nga. With a 
combination of formal monthly and bi-weekly meetings, the style of project 
management showed constant updates from project staff about what they saw or 
found happening within their villages.  Most of the project staff either had family 
within the district of the project site or lived in the district of Nga. According to the 
International Directory of NGOs Website for Lao PDR (2008: 
http://www.directoryofngos.org/pub/ngo_intro.php?id=41), the GAA has been 
operating in Lao PDR since 1993: 
 ―the overall programme aims at a sustainable contribution to securing basic 
needs, in particular the food supply, while also protecting natural resources. 
Especially disadvantaged rural households in the highland regions (Khamu, 
Hmong, Tai Lue, Tai Dam) and in the marginal rice cultivation regions of the 
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lowlands (Lao Loum) are the main target groups. Structural support for the 
districts accompanies the work.‖ 
Project time lines could be anywhere between one to four years, depending 
upon funding allocated to two high level officers from the European Commission for 
Lao PDR. Both officers indicated that the longer the project could work in an area, the 
more successful they would be, and sometimes projects could be extended another 
four years, depending upon how budgetary headings were interpreted.  
5.2.2 ACTIVITIES 
 Participatory activities by the GAA consisted of two stages for the preliminary 
PRAs. The first stage is known as a ―fast-and-dirty participatory rural appraisal‖ in 
which basic data such as population, number of households, and hectares of arable 
land available for wet-rice paddy are collected. Then, a preliminary participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA) is done, which consists of a more in-depth collection of data. The 
preliminary PRAs took place in Village A, and were set up like a large meeting of heads 
of households, involving three other villages, and Village B. Prior to the preliminary 
PRA, the village chiefs were called for a meeting, after which the GAA team had written 
reports outlining the village history and religion. The options or projects available to 
the GAA to meet village needs were divided into four categories: what villages could 
do, what the GAA could do, what the local authorities (district and provincial offices) 
could do, what other organisations could possibly do.  The tools which the GAA 
considered at the time of the study are listed below: 
 water supply for drinking and sanitation,  
 road construction 
 identification of suitable areas for wet-paddy rice production or irrigation,  
 planting cash crops ( fruit trees, tobacco, legumes…etc) 
 organise protection of conservation areas: i.e. forests by fines 
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 microfinance: setting up a revolving women‘s fund for small businesses  
 watershed protection in coordination with conservation area protection 
 construction of fish ponds 
 preservation of fish biodiversity 
In implementing these projects, organisations in villages were set up for a food-for-
work program, in which rice is given to farmers in exchange for their labour on such 
projects.   
5.2.2.1 Mapping and Land Allocations 
  The five satellite villages surrounding Village A had been asked to participate in 
preliminary participatory planning facilitated by the GAA to determine the priorities of 
the villages, and the changes that would occur. The resource map involved the heads 
of households (men) that led to discussions about the priorities of the village. This 
map (see Annex: Map with Men GAA PRA) differed from the map drawn by the women 
in Village A (see Annex: Map with Women). Men drew changes that would take place as 
a result of increasing the amount of land for wet-paddy rice cultivation, and the 
gradual decrease of swidden agriculture. Here, allocations of land as represented Table 
8 were outlined.  
According to development plans from the preliminary PRAs done by the GAA, 
the amount of land for rain-fed upland rice was going to be decreased and wet-rice 
paddy (irrigated land) was to increase. The reason given by the GAA was that wet-rice 
paddy land usually gives higher yields of rice over less area.  In the plan, the amount of 
land for rain-fed rice was to be decreased with increases in paddy land, orchard and 
gardens, area for infrastructure, protected forest land, land for villagers to use in 
forest land, and a proposed area for new villages.   
In interviews with farmers, none had experience growing wet-paddy rice and 
they would require the assistance of the GAA which they also referred to as the 
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government.  Despite the proposed changes in land use, the implementation of these 
changes largely depended upon the cooperation and willingness of Villages A and B, as 
the proposed changes in life followed elements of sedentary life styles that differ from 
the nomadic lifestyles described in Section 5.1.1.2 The Hmong. Eventually, the 
allocations of land would be posted in the new village location similar to the picture 
below, which is the standard layout for most villages undergoing land allocations.  
TABLE 8: LAND ALLOCATIONS 
 No Land use  Current area (ha)    Proposed area 
(ha) 
 1 Paddy land  0  36 
 2 Orchard and garden  9.52  21 
 3 Upland/Swidden  107.1  80  
 4 Infrastructure land  0  7.5 
 5 Forest protected land  - 50 
 6 Village utilization forest land  - 6 
 7 Area for new villages - 38 
  Total  238.5 
 
The use of the resource map was confusing to villagers. Of the five villagers 
interviewed regarding the map, none could explain why the map was being drawn 
because they already knew they were going to move. The creator of the PRAs (a local 





5.2.2.2 Priority Ranking 
 Priorities were also ranked by the heads of households for all five sub-villages. 
Their participation varied from 28 to 47 people throughout the two day PRA.  As 
indicated in Table 9, the approximate times of attendance and PRA activities are listed. 
Women were not present during these priority rankings. Women were unable to attend 
because the PRA took place during the harvesting season, and they were working in 
the rice fields. Furthermore, women were not intended to participate in the preliminary 
PRAs, as their participation depended upon the presence of a representative from the 
Lao Women‘s Union according to the technical advisor with the GAA. 




 According to the heads of households, water was their fourth priority. The top 
priority was construction of a road to connect the villages to the district centre of Nga 
and other surrounding villages. The road had already been under construction, 
involving the five sub-villages, including Village A and B, since 2005 through a food 
for work program with the World Food Program. The second priority, rice sufficiency, 
suggested a need for more rice. The solution offered by the GAA was the creation of 
wet-rice paddy or irrigated rice that had also been previously surveyed. Healthcare, the 
third priority, included discussions of family planning, and drinking water would be 
developed as done in the REF Village. Education, the fifth priority, depended on district 
and provincial authorities, leaving the sixth, and the last priority, centralisation.  
 







Type of Activity Village 
Priority 
Ranking 




16 men  
5 children 
Mapping 1 Road Construction 17 
9:00-
10:00 
22 men Mapping 2 Rice Sufficiency 9 
10:00-
11:00 









4 Drinking Water 5 
12:00-to 
Day End 
47 men Priority 
Ranking/Socio-
Economic Data 




47 men Priority Ranking 6 Centralisation 






5.2.2.3 Collection of Socio-Economic and Cultural Data 
 Baseline data from Village A and Village B, including the number of people in 
each village with their corresponding household, the numbers of women, people of 
working age, and children, as well as level of education, were collected by the GAA 
team.  Also documented were the number of hectares of upland dry-cropping rice each 
person had, a record of livestock (buffalos, cows, pigs, and chickens), as well as 
approximate income and expenditure for each household (Table 10). From 2002 to 
2003, IFAD (International Food and Agriculture Development) conducted the 
―Community Initiative Support Project‖ (CISP), in which villages in seven districts were 
surveyed for potential sites for international development efforts. In this survey, the 
same villages involved with the GAA were approached.  According to numbers obtained 
by the provincial Department of Rural Water Supply, Drinking, and Sanitation, the total 
number of people in the same five sub-villages was 722. Data obtained in 2006 by the 




TABLE 10: SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA COLLECTED DEC. 2006 FOR 
VILLAGE A, VILLAGE B, AND OTHER THREE SUB-VILLAGES BY GAA 
Data Type Description of Units Number 
Household Demographic   
 Number of Families 145 
 Number of  people able to 
work 
219 
 Number of women 339 
 Number of working women 102 
 Total number of people (all 
five villages: 
681 
Land Designations   
 Upland rice (ha) 107.1 
 Upland rice produced (ton) 113.69 
 Irrigated rice (ha) 0 
 Irrigated rice produced 
(tons) 
0 
 Garden/ other (ha) 9.52 
Number of Animals   
 Cows 227 
 Pigs 551 
 Buffalo 113 
 Goats 54 
 Poultry 2906 
Income and Expenditure   
 Aggregate Income for all 
five villages ($1 USD = 
10,000 kip) 
$10, 280 
 Aggregate Expenditure for 






 Well-off  23 households 
 Enough  32 households 





5.2.2.4 Cause and Effect Analysis 
 Relationships between food security and village livelihoods were drawn for 
Villages A and B by a member of the GAA staff, who explained the supply of rice 
related to health, labour, scarcity of land, and village wealth. In a separate PRA for the 
women in Villages A and B, the GAA staff focused on population growth (sometimes 
referred to by field operators, provincial authorities, district authorities, and literature 
on rural development, see Bounthong et al., 2003; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004, as 
having too many children). 
5.2.3 GAA VIEWS OF VILLAGES 
Villagers were enlisted to contribute to the project, and responsibilities were 
delegated to villages by the GAA. The GAA enlisted villagers in a food for work 
program in conjunction with the World Food Programme.  Villagers are essentially paid 
with rice for their labour in building infrastructure such as roads, dams for drinking 
water and irrigation, as well as drinking water taps. Meanwhile, at the end of the PRAs, 
village committees were set up by the GAA, which outlined their responsibilities in 
helping to centralise the villages to the new village site.   
5.2.3.1 Women 
 As mentioned, women were not involved because no Lao Women‘s Union 
representative was available. Women were engaged in areas of health (family planning) 
during the cause and effect analysis, and identification of their problems.  As 
illustrated in Table 10, women comprise nearly half the population and half of the 
working force. In separate PRAs by me following some of the GAAs methods, I did a 
resource map and village priority ranking with the women of Village A as shown in 






The   rankings obtained from the first and second PRAs with women in Village A, and 
from the men‘s rankings,   highlight that water is not a priority.  
5.2.2.6 Gender 
 According to interviews with several heads of households and women, the REF 
village served as a model for Villages A and B. Women from Village A and Village B 
would regularly pass the REF Village en route to the market, and concrete drinking 
water taps were visible (as they were  close to the road). From the women‘s focus 
group in Village A, drinking water taps in the REF Village seemed to have generated 
interest in the project sites of the GAA. Another focus group in the REF village was held 
to ask Hmong women about the changes caused by the drinking water taps installed in 
TABLE 11: FIRST PRA WITH VILLAGE A WOMEN: NOVEMBER 2006 
List of Priorities by Women Number of Votes  
Money 8 
Machines for harvesting rice 1 
Road improvement 5 
Better roof 2 
Fish pond 1 
Fruit trees and timber to sell 1 
TABLE 12: SECOND PRA WITH VILLAGE A WOMEN: DECEMBER 2006 
Priority Votes Ranking Votes for 
Effect on 
Labour 
Ranking Problem They Can 
Solve Themselves 
Food insecurity 11 2 13 1 5 
Sickness 6  5  4 
School 4  6  10 
Lack of Income 15 1 11 2 9 
Livestock health 1  2  13 
 Forest Products 2  2  11 
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early November 2005. The focus group also involved other women from the REF Village 
because the village chief of REF Village was worried I wouldn‘t have enough opinions. 
These drinking water taps were fed by a gravity reservoir, located five to six kilometres 
away from the village. Table 13 shows the benefits from drinking water taps from 
focus groups done in REF Village. 
Answer from Men about 
the installation of taps: 
Allow women to work in the field 
Makes village life more comfortable  
 
Answers from Women 
about the installation of 
taps 
Lue: Able to make alcohol, saves time, able to stay at 
home with the family more, more comfortable 
Khamu: More comfortable, clean, and able to spend 
more time with the children. 
Hmong: Water is convenient, and have more time to 
spend with children. 
5.2.4 PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: CONSULTATION AND CO-DECISIONMAKING  
 According to participatory activities alone as listed in Table 1, the GAA level of 
public involvement was consultative, characterised by their food-for-work 
programmes and delegation of responsibilities to the villages for rural development. 
Activities such as mapping, seemed superficial, as their use seemed to inform villagers 
of land allocations that had already been determined in September 2005 by provincial 
and district authorities. Moreover, as land allocations had also already been planned, 
related water resource developments had been planned as demonstrated in Table 8. 
However, these GAA initiated activities, such as the preliminary PRAs, gave villagers an 
opportunity to informally negotiate with district authorities over the access, control, 
and development of resources. This will be explained in the next section. The level of 
participation corresponding to this informal type of negotiation is ―Co-Decision-




Making‖ as indicated in Table 1 in Chapter 2. Therefore, the level of participation of the 
GAA was determined to be between ―Co-Decision-Making‖ and ―Discussion.‖ 
5.2.5 BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR GAA AS AN INGO  
 The existence of a civil society in Laos is debatable because local non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) do not exist (Vander Zanden, 2006; UNFPA, 2004). 
As a result, many NGOs working in Lao PDR are international NGOs (INGOs). Under the 
Decree of the Prime Minister on the Administration of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) in Lao PDR (No. 71/PM), this law enables INGOs to operate in Lao 
PDR, as opposed to local NGOs, because the terms of Decree No. 71/PM concern 
expatriates working for INGOs in Lao PDR. Permits to operate as an INGO in Lao PDR 
are managed by the Department of International Organisations in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. To issue a permit, the Ministry requires a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. New organizations tend to 
receive significant direction by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially, determined by 
the project location and may be given more leeway as the INGO becomes more 
established.  
 In these MOUs, it is often a non-negotiable requirement for an INGO to hire 
local government staff. One reason government officials are hired is to increase 
administrative and knowledge capacity for project implementation to fulfill project 
goals. Yet, in hiring local staff, this number depends on the number available to work 
for INGOs. Hence, there may be a deficit of local government staff an INGO can hire. 
The hiring of local government staff has raised questions, however, over the critical 
capacity of international agencies (Baird and Shoemaker, 2005). In the case of the GAA, 
government staff being seconded to the GAA was non-negotiable and may have 
represented a barrier to its critical capacity in looking at the management of the Lao 
Government in international development. 
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In working with villages, language and non-participation were also barriers for 
GAA staff. Language was a barrier for the GAA in interacting with Village A and Village 
B. None of the facilitators were Hmong or could speak Hmong which negatively 
affected the degree of participation by villagers during PRAs with the GAA. For 
instance, using the few villagers who spoke Lao, only incomplete translations or 
interpretations of instructions were relayed to the group, limiting the GAA staff‘s 
ability to respond to the reactions of villagers and making the PRAs drawn out. 
Furthermore, as indicated in several interviews, in which participants were chosen 
throughout the day, few understood what was happening or could explain what they 
were doing. Another barrier for facilitators was non-participation which seemed to 
harden biases against villagers in rural development. Some GAA staff felt ―villagers are 
irresponsible, they do their own thing,‖ and if villagers did not have the desire to 
sustain the project, it was unlikely to happen. As one field operator explained, the 
project has no control over what the villagers do next or in the future once the project 
is finished.  
Because of seconded local government staff in the GAA project, villagers were 
able to negotiate developments informally. In interviews with people in Village A and 
Village B, villagers made no distinction between the GAA and the district authorities.  
Both were referred to as ―the Government.‖ Some of the district extension staff made 
up the GAA team for the preliminary PRAs enabling them, as GAA staff, to be critical of 
the work happening and to experience first-hand the difficulties in non-participation 
and project implementation. In addition, by being GAA staff, these staff members 
could gain information and a perspective from international counterparts such as the 
German Development Service. 




 Officially, district authorities are to implement national priorities. District 
authorities were using land allocations to meet national policies to alleviate poverty. 
The use of land allocations to help develop mountainous populations is not  explicit in 
the national priorities, as outlined in the National Growth and Poverty Eradication 
Strategy (2003) and Sixth National Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-2010 
(NSEDP); however, the use of land allocations as a tool to alleviate poverty is prevalent 
(Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Rigg, 2005; Baird and Shoemaker, 2005).  
 In the case of Village A and Village B, Nga district authorities worked with the 
GAA to alleviate poverty through food security. The development of water resources to 
meet food security in villages therefore included surveys to identify arable land for wet 
paddy rice production, potential drinking water from reservoirs to be distributed by 
taps, conservation activities in restoring fisheries, and propagation of cash crops. No 
formal policy for public participation in IWRM was found. GAA staff and interviews with 
Nga district authorities revealed no knowledge of IWRM or of the Mekong River 
Commission‘s (MRC) activities.  
5.3.2 ACTIVITIES 
 The level of participation which district authorities used with Villages A and B 
was determined to be between ―Information‖ and ―Discussion,‖ as indicated in Table 1 
Chapter 2. Nga district authorities had the most contact with villages as compared to 
the other levels of government. Documents signed by Village chief A indicated that Nga 
district officials had visited his village monthly for taxes, surveying, livestock, 
statistics, or health.  All of these visits were informative. The documents were dated 
March 26, 2006; July 3, 2006; July 20, 2006; September 8, 2006; September 22, 2006; 
September 26, 2006; and, October 5, 2006.  Most of these documents were 
handwritten on sheets of paper by government staff of the Nga district office. 
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5.3.3 DISTRICT VIEWS OF VILLAGES 
Interviews with district authorities uncovered a general bias against the Hmong. 
The officials felt Hmong villages were the main reason why project implementation was 
not successful. 
The proximity of the district to villages suggests a higher level of participation 
relative to the district government may exist because villages can be approached as 
citizens. As a World Bank Consultant who was interviewed said:  
When you start talking about the district level here, most of these guys come 
from the district, which in other countries is where officials are moved around. 
So, here when district governments make these policies it is their families that 
get affected or their relatives. What we have seen at the district level is personal. 
Therefore, when faced with these policies they naturally want a better life for 
their families and district. 
Other studies provide a different perspective (Daviau and Romagny, 2003; Baird and 
Shoemaker, 2005; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Romagny, 2005), arguing that local 
authorities, including district officials, continue to implement an unofficial policy of 
resettlement that associate ethnic minorities with rural development (Evrard and 
Goudineau, 2004). Regardless  of these familial relations, as suggested above, local 
authorities rarely change their plans to move villages from the uplands downhill 
(Evrard and Goudineau, 2004). Land allocation schemes have variable outcomes and 
have caused contention in rural development plans for international agencies (Daviau 
and Romagny, 2003; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Baird and Shoemaker, 2005).  
 The observations of the World Bank Consultant did not match Villages A and B in 
their relationship with Nga district authorities or extension workers. None of the staff 
in the GAA or extension workers in the preliminary PRA with Villages A and B were 
related to the villages by family or ethnicity. Nevertheless, the proximity of the GAA 
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staff living in Nga as well as extension workers enabled them to be responsive to 
Villages A and B in implementing water resource developments. The Nga district 
authorities could delegate responsibilities or offer assistance to the Villages A and B 
through agricultural, livestock, and gender extension workers working for the GAA. For 
instance, the relatively frequent contact of extension workers as seconded GAA staff 
enabled district officials to observe the success of drinking taps in villages or learn 
about biologically friendly fertilizers for cash crops.  
5.3.4 PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: INFORMATIVE AND CONSULTATIVE 
 Actions of district authorities with Village A and Village B correspond to a level 
of public involvement entitled ―Informative‖, according to Table1. As mentioned, all the 
visits to villages were informative. Land allocations were not negotiated with Village A 
or Village B in their inception in September 2005. However, because district staff 
comprised GAA staff, they shared a similar level to the GAA in ―Discussion‖ and ―Co-
Decision-Making.‖ 
5.3.5 BARRIERS FOR THE DISTRICT  
 District authorities discussed the need for more funding to compensate a lack of 
capacity in the number of capable staff to oversee various international projects to 
implement national priorities. A high ranking official in the district office commented 
that the success of projects to alleviate poverty was from the work of the GAA and 
showed the reason why more funding was needed to develop the poor villages in the 
district.  
5.4 PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN OUDOMXAI 
5.4.1 MANDATE 
 Officially, provincial offices in Muang Xia had similar responsibilities to 
implement national policies as district authorities. Land allocations seemed to be a tool 
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which provincial authorities were using to implement national policies as indicated in 
September 2005 regarding land allocations in Village A and Village B. None of the 
seven interviewees at the Provincial Agriculture and Forestry Office, Department of 
Rural Water Supply, Drinking, and Sanitation, Science Technology and Environment 
Agency, and GAA provincial office were aware of IWRM or public participatory IWRM 
activities. This information was inconsistent with information gained from the Basin 
Development Plan (BDP) of the MRC that described a sub-basin area forum with 
provincial authorities in 2003.   
5.4.2 ACTIVITIES 
 Informative activities were observed being carried out by provincial authorities, 
such as the deployment of the rural nurse who in April 2003 instructed villagers to boil 
their water, collecting annual taxes also in April, and affirming land allocations in 
September, 2005. However, no activity was observed or was found that indicated 
provincial authorities were encouraging public involvement with the villages.   
5.4.3 PROVINCIAL VIEWS OF VILLAGES  
 According to interviews with the Provincial Agricultural and Forestry Office, the 
success of the province was based on the number of poor villages that had been 
developed through projects. As mentioned, provincial officials from the Agriculture 
and Forestry Office and Department for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation said the 
largest barrier to project implementation was specifically the Hmong who were 
described as ―stubborn,‖ ―lazy,‖ and ―backward,‖ and one provincial official also 
remarked the Hmong ―were working against the government.‖  
5.4.4 PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: INFORMATIVE 
 The provincial authorities were determined to have an ―Informative‖ level of 
participation, based upon the activities corresponding to methods in Table 1.  
5.4.5 BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PROVINCE 
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 Barriers such as project funding and provincial capacity were cited as an issue 
by a high ranking official from the Provincial Agriculture and Forestry Office in Muang 
Xai, Oudomxai. In the interview, he explained that policies from Vientaine offered little 
help in implementation at a provincial level. Thus, policies from the national 
government, as reported by the high ranking official, were up to them to interpret and 
implement. There were many international development projects, but, the number of 
provincial staff monitoring those projects was small. And, both high ranking officials in 
two separate departments indicated that more funding would create opportunity for 
more participation. 
5.5 NATIONAL IWRM AUTHORITIES: POLICY AND DEPARTMENTS 
5.5.1 MANDATE 
 The implementation of IWRM through the Lao Government ministries shows an 
agenda for the development of water resources, namely to ―graduate‖ Lao PDR from 
the status of a least developed country by 2020. The 2001 Lao Revolutionary Party 
Socio-Economic Strategy for Poverty Reduction, the National Growth and Poverty 
Eradication Strategy 2003 (NGPES), and the Sixth National Socio-Economic 
Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSEDP) all explicitly acknowledge the need to alleviate 
(or eradicate) poverty and grow economically as a means to develop and meet the 
2020 goal. In the NSEDP, poverty alleviation strategies and implementation of projects 
specifically target remote mountainous villages (also referred to as upland villages).  
The vision for rural development under the NSEDP (2006: 109) ―is to reduce the 
disparities between rural areas and urban centres, enhance the transport and 
communications networks and improve the living conditions of the rural people, 
especially those in mountainous and remote areas. ― 
5.5.2 ACTIVITIES  
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 No formal attempts were found to directly engage villages in public participation 
in water resource development. Attempts to assess, coordinate, and facilitate 
participation were found in the Participatory Poverty Assessment done in 1999, 
existence of the Water Resource Coordinating Committee (WRCC) and Lao National 
Mekong River Commission (LMNC), use of unions called mass organisations, and the 
coordination of international and regional development. 
5.5.2.1 Participatory Poverty Assessment 
In 1999, the State Planning Committee, National Statistic Centre and Asian 
Development Bank commissioned the Participatory Poverty Assessment to engage the 
public at the village scale. The study was intended to ―identify and initiate more 
effective forms of poverty alleviation...by combining different forms of knowledge 
(statistical, cultural, anthropological, institutional, economic etc.,) to understand the 
views of the poor‖ (Chamberlain, 2001: i). From the Participatory Poverty Assessment, 
rice is a primary indicator of poverty in Laos  because it was defined as such by 
farmers, according to the assessment, as an indicator which was later used to 
determine poor districts to be discussed in 5.5.2.4 National Policy: International and 
Regional Development. Rice as a staple is necessary for subsistence in labour intense 
societies and rice sufficiency avoids the pitfalls of calorie-based or kilograms-per-
month based figures but does not effectively measure food security alone 




 The Participatory Poverty Assessment was led by Jim Chamberlain. Chamberlain 
(2001: 53) explains ―new poverty‖ defines poverty in Lao PDR, which is poverty 
resulting from an ideology of development and social engineering because ―poverty, as 
it is defined by the poor today, was not an original condition for the people of Laos.‖  
More specifically, Chamberlain argues poverty in Lao PDR is not the lack of food and 
extreme hunger, exponentially increasing populations, and vulnerability to natural 
disasters as demonstrated in Box 3: International Fund for Agricultural Development‘s 
Steps for Identification (Chamberlain, 2001). In short, Chamberlain writes that poverty 
in Lao PDR is not synonymous with resource scarcity prevalent in Western development 
theory. Instead, poverty is from new expenses arising from the market, health, and 
education that include external factors which villages have no control over such as war, 
the weather, resettlement, or poorly implemented development programs 
(Chamberlain, 2001: 52-57; 78-79).  
BOX 3: INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT‘S STEPS FOR IDENTIFICATION  
Five techniques are in widespread use for setting the poverty line. 
1. The food energy method (FEM) estimates a food-energy minimum required 
to satisfy dietary energy (caloric) requirements and then determines the level 
of income/consumption at which this minimum is typically met. 
2. The cost-of-basic-needs (CBN) method sets the poverty line as the level just 
sufficient to buy an exogenously set, low-cost adequate diet plus other cheap 
basic requirements. 
3. The food-share method (FSM) estimates the minimum cost of a food basket 
that satisfies the food energy minimum 
and multiplies this by the share of non-food expenditure in total consumption 
of a sub-group defined as poor. 
4. The international poverty line method is described in endnote 1. 
5. The relative consumption method sets the poverty line at a percentage of 
national mean or median consumption, often half or one third. 
 
Source: IFAD, 2001 
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5.5.2.1 Water Resource Coordinating Committee 
 Nationally, two political IWRM organizations exist in Lao PDR, the Lao National 
Mekong River Commission Secretariat (LMNC) and the Water Resource Coordinating 
Committee (WRCC). The Water Resource Law of 1996, updated in 2001 with a Decree 
to Implement the Law on Water and Water Resources (No.204/PM), lays the foundation 
for the roles and responsibilities of organisations managing water.  
 The Water Resource Co-ordinating Committee (WRCC) was established on 8 
February 1999 (Decree of the Prime Minister No.09/PM) to work on the research, 
monitoring, coordinating, and advising of IWRM in a national context. The WRCC 
coordinates with ―local authorities‖ consisting of provincial authorities expected to 
delegate and implement national priorities with district offices. According to the 1996 
Water Resource Law, the LMNC and WRCC are to provide a framework of rules to 
administer, exploit, develop, and plan water resources, and prevent water pollution at 
the discretion of ministries and agencies responsible. These ministries are the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of Communication, Transportation, Post and 
Construction, the Ministry of Industry and Handicraft, the Ministry of Public Health, the 
Ministry of Trade and Tourism, and the Science Technology and Environment Agency.  
 Ministries have their own agencies and departments known as line agencies in 
offices at the provincial and district levels. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry has provincial offices (PAFSO) and district offices (DAFSO) that are sometimes 
referred to as local authorities. Provincial authorities and district offices work closely 
together, but are generally instructed to implement national priorities using their own 
resources and personnel.  
5.5.2.2 Lao National Mekong River Commission 
 Lao PDR is a regional member of the MRC. The Lao National Mekong Committee 
Secretariat (LMNC) acts as an intermediary between the Mekong River Commission 
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Secretariat (MRCS) and the Lao Government (Decree of the Prime Minister No. 197/PM 
15 Nov 1999). The LMNC works to coordinate and facilitate IWRM at a regional and 
national level; that is, they work with the MRC and the Lao Government to negotiate 
national and regional strategies, as well as coordinate with other line agencies. The 
line ministries the MRC are concerned with are shown in Table 14: 
Lao National Mekong Committee (LMNC) 
-LMNC Secretariat 
-Planning Division 
Committee for Planning and Investments (CPI) 
-Department of General Planning 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) 
-Department of Planning 
-Department of Irrigation 
-Department of Livestock and Fisheries 
National Tourism Authority (NTA)  
-Department of Statistics and Planning 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
-Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation 
Science Technology and Environment Agency 
-Agency‘s Cabinet 
-Water Resrouce Coordination Committee (WRCC) 
-WRCC Secretariat 
Ministry of Communications, Transports, Posts, and Construction 
-Department of Planning and Finance 
-Department of Roads 
Ministry of Public Health (MPH) 
-Department of Hygiene 
Ministry of Industry and Handicraft 
-Minstry‘s Cabinet 
-Department of Electricity 
SOURCE: Informant, Mekong River Commission  




The National Mekong Commissions which work under the MRC, such as the LMNC, are 
seen as the main entry point for the MRC to cooperate with member states as national, 
inter-ministerial agencies with limited or no interaction among other National 
Committees or with their own National Governments to create or make policy decisions 
(MRC, 2007a: 10). In sum, the LMNC relies on other ministries in the Lao Government.  
5.5.2.3 Mass Organisations and Water User Associations 
 Decrees on Water Law and established rules for water user associations 
established in 1997 illustrated a legal basis of engagement (although none were found 
in the villages in the study). Unions, known as government mass organisations in Lao 
PDR, are considered as a means to engage the village scale from a national scale. Mass 
organisations in Lao PDR are essentially three unions: the Lao Women‘s Union, Labour 
and Trade Union, and Youth Union. None of the villages in this study had any union 
representatives or water associations. 
5.5.2 NATIONAL POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 Over the last 20 years, the Lao Government has directed international 
development to decrease swidden agriculture and resettle swidden populations (Daviau 
and Romagny, 2003; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Baird and Shoemaker, 2005; Rigg, 
2005; Tapp, 2005). Often in the literature, rising populations are blamed for the 
unsustainable practice of swidden agriculture; however, numbers alone are inadequate 
to determine ecological sustainability of land-use (Chaplot, 2004; Evrard and 
Goudineau, 2004). The physical characteristics of Lao PDR have shaped national 
policies, as observed by Jonathan Rigg (2005: 114),  
―a feature of both the Focal Site and Land-Forest Allocation programmes is that 
they are area-based approaches to rural development. This is for good reason: 
the government of Laos simply lacks the resources to comprehensively develop 
the country.   
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Area-based approaches to rural development, according to Rigg (2005), spatially 
assign swidden agriculture to be profoundly reworked (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004). 
International development projects in the province of Oudomxai intended to alleviate 
poverty under the Lao Government‘s policy confirm observations by Rigg (2005). 
Organisations working on separate projects in Oudomxai with projects in Nga district 
indicated little overlap or collaboration amongst INGOs (Table 15).  
 
TABLE 15: ORGANISATIONS FOUND IN OUDOMXAI WITH PROJECTS IN 
NGA DISTRICT 
Name of Organisation for 2006 Project Description 
International Food and Agriculture 
Development 
Oudomxay, Community Initiative Support 
Project, community based rural 
development, 187 target villages 
Action with Lao Children Reading Promotion Project funded by 
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
Asian Development Bank Funding ethnic minority schools 
Agir pour les Femmes en Situation 
Precaire: Action for Women in 
Distressing Circumstances 
Project title: Repatriation, Rehabilitation 
and Reintegration of Women Victims of 
Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation 
American Friends Service Committee Community development and small scale 
irrigation 
CUSO 2004-2009 Development Volunteer  
International Rice Research Institute for 
the Greater Mekong Sub-Region 
Funded by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation: Supporting 
the development of a national rice 
research system 
SNV Netherlands Development 
Organisation (SNV) 
Capacity Development for Non-Timber 
Forest Products 
World Food Programme (United 
Nations) 
Assist Food for Work Projects 
German Agro Action (Deutsche 
Welthungerhlife) 




 Control over regional development demonstrates how the Lao Government 
controls physical water resource development by directing borrowed capital from the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) to develop land and water resources as demonstrated 
in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Program (GMS Program) and hydro-electric power. 
Lao PDR as a landlocked country is to be ―land-linked‖ through a project called the 
GMS Program, which is intended to increase trade, investment and tourism to ―knit‖ 
Southeast Asia together financed by the ADB (Bryant, 2005). The ADB and Government 
of Lao PDR (ADB, 2006; NSEDP, 2006) share a mutual desire to link Lao PDR.  
 Termed as ―corridors‖ from North to South and East to West, these corridors are 
expected to facilitate cross-border investments, reduce trade barriers, and increase 
trade. The North to South transmission line is expected to enhance the Greater Mekong 
Sub-Region and Lao PDR by harnessing the hydroelectric potential of Lao PDR, thereby 
facilitating a greater electrical grid (ADB, 2006: 139). Physical infrastructure (transport, 
power, and telecommunications) is expected to promote economic growth, trade, and 
tourism while addressing common social development and environmental 
sustainability concerns (Bryant, 2005).  
 Hydroelectric power generation is high on the Lao PDR‘s list of development 
priorities. As a consequence of physical geography, the hydroelectric potential of Laos 
is one of the strongest assets of the nation, as well as a means to increase government 
revenues. Lao PDR has an estimated generating capacity of approximately 18 000 to 
23 000 MW (Vitranen, 2006; Schumann et al., 2006).  
 The physical geography of Laos has been a determining factor in the discursive 
imaginings of geopolitical space in Lao PDR (Bakker, 1999; Dieu, 1999) that is explicit 
in the Socio-Economic Atlas of Lao PDR (Lao, 2008). In terms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) that has been invested into Lao PDR,  the sector ―Electricity 
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Generation‖ has received the largest investments over the last five years totalling 
almost 1.52 billion USD (Schumann et al., 2006: 51) out of a total of 2.79 billion USD 
FDI invested in Lao PDR (Lao, 2005). The Lao Government has placed hydropower as a 
means to transform Lao PDR into a power-linked nation that will help alleviate poverty. 
The 2001 National Poverty Alleviation Program essentially allows water resource 
development to be a means to eradicate poverty (Lao, 2003: 5) by allowing the 
increase of FDI for the development of hydropower to broaden the government‘s tax 
revenue base (Vitranen, 2006). Visible and contentious, hydroelectric dams are the 
means to reap the benefits from trade, but how these benefits from increases in 
private capital and investment weigh against the cost and impacts over time at 
different scales imply a loss of transparency, accountability, and scrutiny from the 
public (Bakker, 1999: 228-229). Regional land-based development projects have 
significant impacts. The Lao Government‘s approval of road construction as a means to 
alleviate poverty and increase accessibility (Rigg, 2005; Lyttleton, et al., 2004: 7) ―has 
played a significant role in demographic changes that are fundamentally transforming 
the social fabric in this region.‖  
5.5.3 NATIONAL VIEWS OF VILLAGES 
 Villages A and B are labelled as a remote mountainous communities practicing 
swidden agriculture by the NSEDP. Remote mountainous communities are divided into 
districts, and as a result of their location, these populations are largely ethnic groups. 
The Participatory Poverty Assessment conducted in 2002 and the Committee for 
Planning and Investment with the National Statistics Centre determined 72 districts as 
―poor‖ in the Map 1: 47 Poor Districts in Red.  A consultant for a large donor 
commented: 
―There is nothing we do in Laos where our policies on ethnic minorities don‘t 
get triggered. We know that the ethnic groups are forest people. We know that 
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they are highly concentrated in those 47 districts, where 60% of the population 
are ethnic groups. In theory if you are putting money into poverty reduction 
strategy, the poverty reduction strategy targets the 47 districts. In theory, you 
[are] targeting with an affirmative action policy that targets ethnic groups.‖  
As exemplified in Map 5: in Red Topographic Map of the Mekong Basin and Map 6: 47 
Poor Districts, the location of mountains in the Mekong Basin coincides with the 
location of poor districts. Thus, the spatial relationship of poor districts coincides with 
ethnic minorities who are classified as remote mountainous communities, a 
relationship established in the Socio-Economic Atlas of Lao PDR (Lao, 2008). In other 
words, Village A and Village B are treated as objects that corresponds to the level of 
participation known as ―Information‖ according to Table 1 in Chapter 2, because of 




 MAP 6: 47 POOR DISTRICTS IN RED 
Source: Lao Government, National Statistics Centre, 2004 
MAP 5: TOPOGRAPHIC MAP OF THE MEKONG 
BASIN 
Source: Hori, 2000  
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Ethnic groups in the North of Lao PDR face several inter-related issues in being 
targets of poverty alleviation. In an area infamously known as the Golden Triangle, the 
alleviation of poverty effectively fulfills two national objectives, the eradication of 
opium and eradication of swidden agriculture (Baird and Shoemaker, 2005; Rigg, 2005; 
Tapp, 2005).  Village A and Village B, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1.2 The Hmong, are 
targets for both of those objectives. Officially, opium was successfully eradicated in 
Lao PDR as of 2006 (NSEDP, 2006: iv). Efforts to eradicate opium identified specific 
types of agriculture which have allowed opium to proliferate, for one, swidden 
agriculture. The eradication of opium is supported by international agencies because it 
is viewed as a security concern (Baird and Shoemaker, 2005). Furthermore, efforts to 
eradicate opium and swidden agriculture coincide with the 1998 Focal Site Strategy to 
resettle villages (Rigg, 2005). Popularly seen as intensifying or being the cause of 
environmental degradation, ―slash and burn‘‖ agriculture is scheduled to be fully 
eliminated by the Lao Government  by 2010, which includes other ethnic groups (i.e., 
those which do not traditionally grow opium) (Daviau and Romagny, 2003; Evrard and 
Goudineau, 2004).  
The methods to eliminate swidden agriculture are contentious, making the 
description of processes surrounding the elimination of swidden agriculture political. 
Several words are used amongst international development agencies (governmental 
and non-governmental) to describe their work with villages: resettlement and 
relocation. Resettlement is the most controversial, largely because it hinges upon 
whether the movement of villages is voluntary or involuntary, a definition that can be 
ambiguous (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004), because international development agencies 
can be construed as aiding the involuntary resettlement of people by only offering 
development that requires villages to move (Braid and Shoemaker, 2005).   
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Resettlement is controversial because resettled villages can result in the loss of 
capital, loss of livelihoods, land conflicts, marginalised populations, and mortality 
(Daviau and Romagny, 2003; Evrard and Gordineau, 2004; Romangy, 2005). 
―Resettlement‖ places donors and international aid agencies in a delicate position. 
Consequently, some development organisations and donors remain ambivalent to be 
supportive of, or diplomatic about resettlement (Braid and Shoemaker, 2005). 
Relocation, on the other hand, is supposed to be the voluntary settlement of villages to 
a new location (Brown, 2007 personal communication), which according to an 
international development consultant is a more neutral term preferred for diplomacy.  
5.5.4 PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: MINIMAL 
 Given the 1999 Participatory Poverty Assessment as a ―field trip,‖ and use of 
mass communication organisations, the Lao Government‘s level of participation with 
Village A and Village B is at best ―Informative‖, according to Table 1. The national 
policy indicates a top-down (or nationally-driven) agenda that targets remote 
mountainous communities, as emphasised in the NSEDP. No national government body 
had been in contact with either Village A or Village B.  And, as indicated already, the 
LMNC and WRCC rely upon provincial, district, and mass organizations to have their 
IWRM schemes implemented. The national government thus seems to have authority 
over the development of water resources and land at a large scale due to the ability to 
regulate and move financial capital (human, knowledge, and physical) for large 
hydroelectric projects and infrastructure with the assistance of regional and 
international aid.  
5.5.5 OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS  
 Experiences with IWRM have been frustrating for some technicians in Lao PDR. 
National Lao and international technicians confirm findings from Asit Biswas (2004) 
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over the vagueness of the IWRM definition to operate the framework. As one 
interviewee commented the definition of IWRM is  
―a joke because the people who created IWRM say it is very easy to implement, 
but when we ask how to do it? Nobody answers. And, then we ask to these 
experts to please help us apply the IWRM concept, but they say it depends upon 
your local needs; it depends upon your perceptions. What is the point of you 
saying this was such a brilliant idea? When I ask you to help to apply it, you say 
it depends upon your needs? There is no proof [IWRM is a solution] in what you 
say. [sic]‖ 
 Both the LMNC and the WRCC are supposed to implement IWRM under Lao PDR‘s 
Water and Water Resource Law of 1996. They are also expected to draft with local 
authorities and line agencies a National Water Resource Plan (NWRP) at what the Lao 
Government defines a ―river basin level,‖ under the 2001 Decree to Implement Water 
and Water Resource Law.  Having overlapping mandates, the two organisations exist in 
―coordination‖ with local authorities, yet the LMNC and WRCC rarely work together, 
according to several interviews in each institution. The LMNC is limited to 
implementing IWRM under the MRC‘s mandate, whereas the WRCC is directly under the 
Prime Minister‘s Office and therefore the Lao Government.  
From interviews with the LMNC and other National Mekong Committees (NMCs), 
a central agency like a Ministry of Water or Water Authority in guiding IWRM for Lao 
PDR does not exist. Later, as confirmed by several interviews in the WRCC and LMNC, a 
Water and Environment Association was created in March 2008, replacing the LMNC 
and WRCC.  This Water and Environment Association was seen as a means to mirror 
institutional structures of Lao PDR‘s neighbours (Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia), 
leading to a more coherent and workable institutional structure for transboundary 
water management. With a change in management, the introduction of the Basin 
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Development Plan Phase II, the internal review of the MRC and NMC has pressed for a 
clarification in roles (MRC, 2007a) that could lead to greater attention to public 
participation activities. 
5.6 REGIONAL: MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION 
5.6.1 MANDATE 
 The Mekong River Commission Secretariat (MRC) is responsible for regional 
transboundary issues while the National Mekong Commissions (NMC), such as the 
LMNC, are responsible for relaying transnational issues to their respective national 
governments. The role of the MRC with the NMCs is similar to that of an international 
river basin organisation, working to promote joint regional interests of its member 
states and sustainable development (MRC, 2006). The Basin Development Plan 
Programme (BDP) is responsible for implementing stakeholder and public participation, 
as depicted in Figure 5: Basin Development Programme. 
  
FIGURE 5: BASIN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME  
 
Source: MRC, 2006: Figure 2 p.32 
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The BDP is a permanent core programme within the MRC following the 1995 
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River 
Basin, using principles of IWRM as defined by the GWP, to establish a basin-wide 
participatory planning process (MRC Website). This basin-wide participatory planning 
process under the BDP is conceptually shown in Figure 5: Basin Development Plan 
Programme, illustrating its role in integrating seven water and water-related sectors 
with four broad programs: Environment, Information and Knowledge Management, 
Integrated Capacity Building, and Water Utilisation.  Decisions for the BDP are made 
by the MRC Council and MRC Joint Committee. The MRC Council under the 1995 
Agreement has the ability to make policies and decisions, consisting of ministerial and 
cabinet bodies representing the member states of the MRC (Article 18).  Meanwhile, the 
Joint Committee is supposed to implement the decisions, guided from the Council, 
working with mainly technical issues for a basin development plan (Article 24). The 
rhetoric of the State of the Basin 2006-2010 (2006: 31)  indicates  that a basin-wide 
participatory planning process is  to provide ―for substantial public participation and 
involvement of basin and sub-basin stakeholders‖ to identify projects prioritized for 
funding to be implemented by the BDP and all MRC regional programmes. 
 The main purpose of the MRC is to support the member states, mainly 
comprising those in the Lower Mekong Basin (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) 
in their established goal to alleviate poverty.  The alleviation of poverty is one of three 
broad ―issues.‖ The other issues are the strengthening of ownership and value-added 
functions of the MRC to national governments, as well as adopting an IWRM approach 
(MRC, 2006: 4-5). In the opening message of the Strategic Plan 2006-2010, the 
Chairman of the MRC, H.E. Mr Yongyut Tiyapairat (2006: iii), writes ―the most important 
development in this Strategic Plan is reflected in its poverty alleviation focus.‖ Under 
the heading ―Reducing Poverty through Sustainable Water Resource Management,‖ 
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poverty alleviation is given the  primary role to produce ―tangible results‖ which are 
cited to be increasing investments into irrigation, navigation, and hydropower for food, 
transport, and energy.  
Several aspects are missing in the Strategic Plan 2006-2010. For instance, 
details of operation between the BDP and other sectors in the participatory basin-wide 
planning are vague. None of the staff who I interviewed from the BDP could explain 
how public participation worked in Figure 5. The definition of poverty, like the criteria 
used to determine poverty, for the Mekong Basin is unknown. In addition, the way the 
development of water resources at regional and national levels directly correlate and 
can be substantiated to alleviate poverty is unclear. Lastly, political methods that 
describe the interests of other stakeholders and negotiation of these different interests 
that include villages in the Mekong Basin, as a part of the public, or address the 
challenges of political reforms IWRM proposes, are missing. The Strategic Plan 2006-
2010 thus contains gaps relative to the literature available at the MRC.  
5.6.2 ACTIVITIES 
 The MRC involves the public with forums as observed by Fox and Sneddon 
(2006). Stakeholder participation is considered as ―essential if the BDP programme and 
process is to live up to its participatory claims [sic]‖ (MRC, 2006: 5). Internal BDP 
Stakeholders have been identified as the organizations within the MRC as a whole, 
including the NMCs, while external stakeholders are defined as Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs), the private sector, donors, policy research institutes, universities 
(including individuals with ―relevant‖ knowledge), and the media. There are 10 sub-
areas, defined by their corresponding riparian member states such as (T)hailand, 
(V)ietnam, (C)ambodia, and (L)aos— see  Map 7 below. In these sub-areas, a series of 
forums are supposed to engage stakeholders: 
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Sub-area Forums (SAFs)—identify key issues surrounding development of water 
and water-related resources in the Sub-area, establish participatory planning 
process for Sub-area, involving representatives of a wide range of stakeholders; 
and identify information gaps to complete the Sub-area situation analysis  
Country Forums—held after the SAFs, offers local and national stakeholders to 
critique and elaborate on further sectoral and thematic analyses drawn by the 
SAFs. 
Basin Forums—ensures a basin overview, offering opportunities of exchange 
and interaction between sub-areas at a technical level. 
(MRC, 2003b: 7-10, sic). 
The BDP has been engaged in Sub-area Forums to collect, verify, and identify 
data within the sub-areas. The first Sub-area Forum was conducted for the L1 Sub-
Area in Northern Lao PDR in April 2003, as indicated in Map 7: Mekong River Basin: 
Sub-Divisions. The attendees of these forums have been largely provincial authorities 
and their counterpart district staff.  
The ability of attendees in these forums to implement changes and negotiate 
national imperatives is unclear. In interviews with regional and national technicians in 
the MRC and LMNC, villages have not been involved.  In December 2006, none of the 
staff in the provincial or district offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry knew 
what the phrase IWRM meant, or had contact with the Mekong River Commission. 
Mention of a staff member in planning and construction at the provincial level was 
suggested; unfortunately, no one was able to identify this person or provide me with 
contact information. Furthermore, the GAA had not been approached as a potential 







Source: MRC, 2003b 
 
MAP 7: MEKONG RIVER BASIN: SUB-DIVISIONS BY MRC 
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5.6.3 VILLAGES VIEWED AS: STAKEHOLDERS AND THE PUBLIC 
 The MRC‘s guiding document for public participation is based on a study 
formally approved by the MRC Joint Committee in 1996. The 1996 study outlines the 
MRC‘s position on public participation that was published later in the 1999 Public 
Participation in the Context of the MRC. This 12-page document defines public 
participation in the MRC.  Stakeholders are defined as any person, group, institution, 
beneficiary, intermediary, ―positively affected,‖ and people marginalized by decision-
making processes that have an interest in an activity, project or program from the 
public sector, private developers, and (unclassified category) ―others‖. These 
stakeholders are later categorized as: ―directly affected‖ and ―indirectly affected.‖  
 Key stakeholders are considered as those who have a significant influence or 
impact on the success of the programme or project, to take part and gain influence in 
the decision-making (1999: 3, 8). The process of public participation includes the 
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of MRC programs and projects. 
Participation occurs at four stages according to the document:  ―information gathering, 
information dissemination, consultation, and participation.‖  
 How ―the public‖ is viewed is open to interpretation, as in the 1999 Public 
Participation in the Context of the MRC report the public is undefined. Chenoweth et 
al. (2002: 505) comment that the 1999 document ―does little more than give the 
broadest possible overview of the concept of public participation and points out that 
its short list of principles and guidelines for public participation needs further 
refinement if they are to be used in MRC projects and programs.‖  
The origins of Public Participation in the Context of the MRC are from a study 
conducted in 1996 funded by Swedish International Development Agency which 
contracted with the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) from September 
1997 to June 1998. The name of the study was Towards Public Participation in Mekong 
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River Basin Development. Unlike the 1999 MRC version, the findings make a distinction 
between a cost-sharing model and empowerment model.  
According to the report, a cost-sharing model is where citizens voluntarily 
contribute their labour, cash, and materials for the production of collective public 
goods, a means historically employed by the riparian states of the Mekong Basin 
before the 1995 Agreement. The TDRI Report writes that an empowerment model is 
more appropriate for large-scale projects to encourage ―ownership‖ in the Mekong 
Basin and potentially change the culture of support by donor agencies. This model, 
according to the 1998 TDRI Report, is supposed to be adopted in the 1999 Public 
Participation in the Context of the MRC; however, the 1999 document makes no 
mention of the empowerment model. The TDRI Report (1998: Page 2-15) also 
comments that the structure and mechanisms that enable participation in the MRC 
bear the ―hallmarks of participation: bi- or multi- directional flow of information, 
consultation over issues and joint decision-making‖ amongst ministerial and 
department heads. However, this participation amongst higher-level authorities 
contrasts with the participation of the public which has little or no input.  
 Since the TDRI Report of 1998, little has changed concerning the transparency 
of the Joint Committee and Council meetings in sharing minutes with the public. The 
Council meetings are involve  the member state‘s ministerial and cabinet ministers, 
and their recommendations are then forwarded to the Joint Committee consisting of 
Departmental heads or higher who meet with the Chief Executive Officer Office of the 
MRC. Furthermore, information about public participation or stakeholder engagement 
through up-to-date progress reports from the Basin Development Plan is unavailable. 
Dr. Helen Rosenbaum observed similar findings in what will be referred to as the 2002 
Rosenbaum Report.  Published in February 2002, the Rosenbaum Report is another 
investigation into public participation in the MRC entitled The Mekong River 
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Commission Steps Towards a Public Participation Strategy. Overall findings indicate 
that, without clear roles and responsibilities between the Mekong River Commission 
Secretariat and National Mekong Committees, little progress in public participation can 
happen.  
 Recommendations from the 2002 Rosenbaum Report or from the 1998 TDRI are 
not included or referred to in the 2005 document by the MRC titled Public Participation 
in the Lower Mekong Basin (2005).  Stakeholders in the 2005 document are identified 
as riparian governments, government agencies, (an ill-defined) community, and 
partners such as IUCN, USAID.  
5.6.4 PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: NONE 
 The MRC has yet to create activities for villages to be involved in IWRM 
decisions. Despite the validity of their locations in the L1 Sub-Area, Villages A and B 
have not participated in any of the MRC‘s activities.  
5.6.5 BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MRC 
 There are several reasons why the MRC is unable to implement public 
participation. Control of physical capital limits the relevance of the MRC. The MRC and 
NMC control no physical water resources, and, thus, have no real power to transfer 
financial or human labour to develop water in the Mekong Basin.  Although the MRC 
has financial and human capital to support collection and storage of information and 
research, the translation of information into action or enabling the MRC to be a 
regulatory institution is limited due to the political will of participating member states.  
 The area in which the MRC is relevant in terms of political jurisdiction and by the 
1996 Water Resources Law that defines the MRC by territory was explained in the 
beginning of this chapter. Interviews with both the MRC and LMNC confirm findings in 
the 2002 Rosenbaum Report, however, indicating that since the 1995 Agreement, the 
MRC‘s  relevance  has diminished,  mainly because it lacks the ability to implement 
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projects both regionally and nationally (Bakker, 1999). As an institution, evidence that 
the MRC is limited as a regional body and its jurisdiction is shown in Table 8.  Basically, 
the MRC does not directly involve the public or villages in IWRM decisions. Thus, the 
level of public involvement largely depends solely upon NMCs such as the Lao 
Government. The MRC remains a ―soft‖ institution both in terms of physical power, and 
in political legitimacy as defined by the scope of the MRC‘s jurisdiction.  
 Some interviewees, such as international experts working as consultants with 
the MRC, felt IWRM in the Mekong was developing, to explain the absence of public 
participation activities at a village level. Evidence supporting claims by international 
experts could be interpreted as the inactivity of the MRC and LMNC to enable 
participatory decisions at a village level that would suggest public participation in 
IWRM is not functional. Thus, expectations for an operational IWRM framework by 
stakeholders such as member countries and affiliate organisations as well as donors 
such as the ADB, GTZ, Belgium, USAID, and the European Commission (all listed in the 
Statement of Contributions Received, Expenditures Incurred, and Fund Balances by 
Donors, MRC, 2007b) would require more patience because reforms were political and 
social according to the same international experts. 
The 1998 TDRI Report on public participation for the MRC remains relevant in 
that ―the public‖ is undefined, and apparently has little or no opportunity to participate. 
Information regarding public participation or the decisions of the MRC have remained 
invisible, as noted in the 1998 TDRI Report, Chenoweth et al. (2002), and 2002 
Rosenbaum‘s report. To the credit of the MRC, a document library is available to the 
public, with a sign-in sheet and a selection of some of the BDP reports, and the 
Mekonginfo.org project has a rich array of information on IWRM.  Both developments 
are encouraging, yet, the audience for both sources of information seem to be directed 
to English literate researchers, technical experts, and international policy makers. On 
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the other hand, information from the Mekonginfo.org, according to informants, is 
based upon the approval and filtration of documents from the MRC.  As mentioned in 
the 1998 TDRI Report, it would be understandable if some of the minutes from the 
decisions made by the Joint Council and MRC Council were censored for security 
issues, but censored minutes from these meetings and access to progress reports from 
the BDP remain inaccessible to the public. Thus, the MRC has opportunities to open 
areas of information so that they are more accessible to the public. 
5.6.6 EXTERNAL STUDIES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE MRC 
 Previous academic studies on the MRC regarding public participation qualify the 
lack of public participation as resulting in weak governance in the Mekong Basin. Pech 
Sokhem and Kengo Sunada (2006) explain greater public participation could promote 
better governance needed for the ecological sustainability and livelihoods tied to the 
Tonle Sap Lake and River. However, the existence of ―true‖ public participation, as 
elaborated by Chenoweth et al. (2002), is ―not necessarily possible‖ given the diversity 
of stakeholders and languages in the Mekong basin. Others suggest that current public 
participation practices of the MRC are limited because programs and polices work 
under the assumption that hydropower development is the ultimate goal (Fox and 
Sneddon, 2006) of inter-state cooperation dominated by the largely top-down 
decisions made by the MRCs and NMCs, (Bakker, 1999).  
 The absence of public participation, as explained by Prachoom Chomchai 
(2005), reflects a separation between the principles member states agree upon and 
their actions. He asserts that transboundary principles of public participation hold no 
weight because the MRC depends upon its national counterparts, the NMCs, to 
implement public participation (2005). Hirsch and Wyatt (2004) suggest that the 
reliance upon the NMCs is symptomatic of an MRC unresponsive to different 
stakeholders, as argued in their case study of the Se San Basin that crosses from 
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Vietnam into Cambodia and is under the jurisdiction of the MRC (2004). Therefore, the 
principles of subsidarity and decentralised decisions are highly constrained by national 
water resource development interests in natural resource management, representing a 
crisis in governance (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004).  
5.7 APPLICATION OF DATA TO CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Before applying the conceptual framework, several caveats should be considered 
that emerged from data in this chapter. First, the data presented on the GAA and 
district authorities demonstrated how there could be several types of participation for 
each actor. For instance, public interaction with district authorities indicated the level 
of participation to be Informative, but because some of the district staff worked in the 
GAA, the level of participation rose to the category of Discussion, because district 
authorities could negotiate with villages. Furthermore, unanticipated in the data was 
non-participation as a form of participation that enabled villages to have control over 
their water interests similar to the level of citizen control in the level of Decision-
Making. Thus, findings in the conceptual framework are broad indicators of public 
involvement. 
Figure 6: Conceptual Framework: Citizen Involvement in Lao PDR illustrates 
actors at different levels of authority and their involvement with Villages A and B in 
water resource decisions. Villages were capable of governing and implementing their 
own water interests. Meanwhile, the GAA had the highest level of participation because 
it worked with villages to facilitate water resource developments through participatory 
activities. District to regional authorities responsible for IWRM, on the other hand, 






 Low public involvement was found in Villages A and B in regard to participation 
with government authorities in water resource development decisions or potential 
IWRM decisions. However, opportunities for participation did exist through the GAA, an 
international non-governmental organisation (INGO), which also worked with seconded 
government staff. Village A and Village B were found to have their own water interests 
that they could control independently from the GAA.  
 However, Village A and Village B were to merge with three other villages in a 
pre-defined area as a result of land allocations. These land allocations determined the 
type of water resource developments that could happen. For instance, the development 
of water resources had to serve a larger concentrated population. This required 
changing the production of rice from shifting cultivation to sedentary irrigated rice 
FIGURE 6: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN LAO 




paddies, as well as introducing cash crops, to meet the food security needs of a larger 
concentrated population. To promote economic growth and alternative livelihoods, an 
improved road system was being built to provide better market access. As well, the 
installation of drinking water taps from a larger reservoir would be needed to meet the 
water needs for a consolidated population. Thus, Village A and Village B needed help 
from district authorities and the GAA to develop water resources.  
 Village A and Village B could negotiate water resource developments with the 
GAA and district authorities through non-participation. However, biases against the 
ethnicity of Village A and Village B at provincial and district offices prevented 
participatory outcomes such as ―social learning.‖ Districts and provinces had relative 
autonomy to interpret and implement national priorities to alleviate poverty. And, 
Village A and Village B were labelled ―poor,‖ which also meant district and provincial 
authorities had other policy priorities to eliminate swidden agriculture and the 
production of opium through resettlement and land allocations. However, the 
constraints for district and provincial authorities were the lack of funding and capacity; 
this meant they relied upon the participation and cooperation of Village A and Village B 
if projects such as that of the GAA were to be successful.  
The national Lao Government‘s ability to control capital for international and 
regional water resource development indicated a lack of control at the provincial and 
district levels of authority. However, national priorities and how they impacted levels of 
planning in land allocations for Village A and Village B indicated national policy was 
taken seriously by district, provincial, and international levels of authority.  
Furthermore, as indicated, the Lao Government‘s ability to promote regional and 
international infrastructure projects, including the exploitation of hydropower, 
illustrated its power over water resources. Outside regional and international water 
resource developments are the MRC, LMNC, and WRCC, which control no physical 
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capital and rely upon national departments to implement IWRM. Their lack of power 

























CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL ECOLOGY, EXPLORING WATER RESOURCE 
POLITICS  
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
A critical Third World political ecology perspective is used to explain the low 
levels of public participation in regard to the Lao Government and MRC documented in 
Chapter 5. A political ecology perspective draws upon data similar to that used for the 
conceptual framework by describing actors at different levels of authority who are 
involved in participatory activities. Political ecology also draws upon other areas for 
data that describe contemporary water resource politics, specifically water issues 
arising from water interests and power, the socio-economic characteristics 
surrounding water issues, and any participatory activities themselves.  
The examination of contemporary water resource politics surrounding public 
participation and power relations among actors answers several secondary research 
questions: 1) How is IWRM institutionalised and operational for Lao PDR? 2) What 
organisations are involved in the public participation for IWRM, and what activities do 
they do in Lao PDR? and part of 3) What is the role of public participation in IWRM for 
Lao PDR? The location of water resources helps determine the power that actors have 
to develop water resources at different levels of authority. Physical limitations to power 
help elucidate the limitations of participatory activities and the extent to which villages 
are able to participate in IWRM decisions. This examination of power also highlights 
the use of socio-economic characteristics surrounding villages as a means to 
legitimize water resource developments, particularly as they relate to national policies. 
The conceptual framework highlighted several areas of participation not anticipated in 
the study that gave villages opportunities to control their interests in water. Thus, the 
geography and socio-economic characteristics of Village A and Village B help answer 
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question 4) What are the benefits from and limitations to public participation in IWRM 
for Lao PDR?   
6.1 POWER RELATIONS: THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF IWRM IN 
LAO PDR 
 IWRM institutions were found from the national level of government to the 
international river basin organisation:  LMNC, WRCC, and MRC. As already indicated, 
none of these institutions was found to involve Village A and Village B through public 
participatory activities because they relied upon sub-national organisations such as 
ministries and departments in the Lao Government.  As described in Chapter 5, other 
actors at different levels of authority were also found to have some responsibility for 
the development of water resources. Those actors relevant to Village A and Village B 
were international aid agencies such as the GAA, and local (provincial and district) 
government authorities from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry 
of Public Health; they also included other institutions outlined in Section 5.5.2.2 Lao 
National Mekong River Commission. 
Complex political issues were found in the development of water resources that 
demonstrated contrasting abilities to develop water resources, or power, of IWRM 
institutions in relation to the Lao Government. Those contrasting abilities of actors 
affirmed the use of a multi-leveled stakeholder analysis from McDonnell‘s (2008) 
observations and by several case studies (see Kallis et al., 2006a; Poolman and Van de 
Giesen, 2006; Heyd and Neef, 2006; Banister and Scott, 2008). Power was measured 
according to an actor‘s ability to move capital (monetary, labour, knowledge, physical) 
for the development of water resources. Taking the definition of distributed 
governance from Chapter 2 Section 2.3.3 Expected Outcomes: Governance, 
participatory activities were matched to different levels in the Lao Government. As 
demonstrated in Section 5.7 Application of Data to Conceptual Framework, a gap 
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exists between different levels of government and the villages in the study. Some have 
identified this gap as a ―crisis in governance‖ (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004), or weak 
governance (Chenoweth et al., 2002; Chomchai, 2005; Fox and Sneddon, 2006), 
because opportunities for villages to participate in water resource development 
decisions were limited (see Section 5.3.5.1 External Studies of Public Participation in 
the MRC). 
The national Government‘s ability to direct capital was unmistakable, as it was  
able to develop water resources outside of the MRC, confirms the findings of the MRC 
(2007b) that national governments are the most relevant political organisation to 
implement and operate IWRM. National policies such as the 2001 Lao Revolutionary 
Party Socio-Economic Strategy for Poverty Reduction, the National Growth and Poverty 
Eradication Strategy 2003 (NGPES), and the Sixth National Socio-Economic 
Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSEDP) made it possible for the Lao Government to 
direct capital and international development (see Section 5.5.2 National Policy: 
International and Regional Development).  
Policy goals of the Lao Government to alleviate poverty and promote economic 
growth demonstrated interests in the development of water resources that were 
neither managed nor regulated by the MRC or LMNC. Already illustrated in Map 2 (Lao 
PDR with Key Existing and Proposed Dams), water interests such as hydropower and 
the GMS Programme are said to fulfill national interests to alleviate poverty and 
promote economic growth (see Bakker, 1999; Walker, 1999; Walker, 2003;  Lyttleton et 
al., 2004; Bryant, 2005;Rigg, 2005; Vitranen, 2006). Other water interests which help 
to fulfill the national policy to alleviate poverty were associated with an unofficial policy 
to allocate land (Evrard and Gordineau, 2004; Rigg, 2005; Romagny, 2005), affecting 
the development of water resources in Village A and Village B, as shown in Section 
5.2.2 Activities. As discussed in 5.5.3 National Views of Villages, land allocations were 
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associated with other issues, including resettlement, the elimination of swidden 
agriculture, and the eradication of opium production, that have been known to have 
adverse impacts on villagers (Daviau and Romagny, 2003; Romangy, 2005; Evrard and 
Gordineau, 2004; Lyttleton et al., 2004; Braid and Shoemaker, 2005; Rigg, 2005; Tapp, 
2005).  Collectively, hydropower, infrastructure, land allocations, resettlement, 
swidden agriculture, and opium production are the central issues that make up water 
resource politics in Lao PDR (Allan, 2003; Warner et al., 2006; WWC, 2006; UNESCO, 
2006; Walker A, 2006).  
Water resource politics in Lao PDR presents distinct challenges for the 
integration and management of water for IWRM. The inability of IWRM institutions to 
implement public participation from national to sub-national scales seems to mirror an 
argument in Hodgdon (2008) over the control of natural resources in Lao PDR. 
Hodgdon (2008) uses comments from a US State Department official to back his 
argument regarding the Lao Government‘s control of natural resources: 
 ―‘In Laos there are two political realities,‘ according to a US State Department 
official, who like most other foreign nationals interviewed for this article 
requested anonymity to safeguard access to the country. ‗On the face of things 
there is the civilian government, which is ultimately a rubber-stamp body. It is 
mostly a showpiece for outsiders. Then there is the Party, which is controlled by 
the military. They make all the decisions. They are the real government‖ (online 
journal publication). 
The ―real government‖ appears to control water resource development at the national 
and regional levels of authority through cohesive national policies, such as the 2006-
2010 NGPES, without the oversight of a formal IWRM plan. Therefore, the claims of 
regional IWRM institutions that they help to alleviate poverty are superficial because 
these institutions control no capital and no water. 
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6.2 GEOGRAPHY AND POWER IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
The involvement of MRC and LMNC with local actors or issues surrounding land 
allocations was not found in literature available to the public.  Furthermore, spatially, 
Village A and Village B were found to be located outside the mandate of the MRC and 
other national and international IWRM mandates. Even though Village A and Village B 
are in the Mekong Basin, located in the L1 Sub-Area by the Basin Development Plan, 
the villages are outside the legal and political jurisdiction of the MRC. This is because 
the 1995 MRC Agreement indicates Village A and Village B were neither on nor near the 
main-stem of the Mekong River, nor were they along the tributaries draining into the 
Mekong.  
Where water resource developments were happening, various local actors (GAA, 
district authorities, and provincial authorities) were intimately engaged with water 
resource politics in Village A and Village B. An analysis of the power to develop water 
resources indicated decisions were decentralised at village to provincial levels of 
authority. Table 7 in Chapter 5 confirmed village to provincial levels of authority had 
control over water resource developments. District authorities, provincial authorities, 
and the GAA had the most contact with Village A and Village B in implementing water 
resource developments as a result of land allocations, as illustrated in Section 5.2.2 
Activities of the GAA, Section 5.3.4 Direct Involvement: Informative to Consultative 
(concerning districts), and Section 5.4.2 Activities (concerning provinces).  
The GAA and district authorities were responsive to local issues because they 
conducted activities that involved Village A and Village B in water resource 
developments. Participatory activities indicated the GAA fostered a higher level of 
participation that included district authorities working with the GAA. The GAA and 
district authorities could respond to potential problems posed by water resource 
development in villages within the broader national policy of poverty alleviation; hence 
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water resource decisions were decentralised (Ribot, 2002; Brannstrom et al., 2004; 
WCC, 2006; GWP Tool Box, 2008). 
District and provincial authorities tried to implement national policies to 
alleviate poverty. One means they used was land allocations (see Sections 5.3.1 
Mandate, 5.4.1 Mandate, and 5.5.2 National Policy: International and Regional 
Development). However, their ability or power to move capital was limited. The limited 
funding and the limited capacity of authorities (in terms of personnel and knowledge) 
were described by district and provincial authorities as ―barriers‖ (see Section 5.3.5 
Barriers for Districts and Section 5.4.5 Barriers for Provinces). The number of 
international development projects in Oudomxai (Section 5.5.2 National Policy: 
International and Regional Development), including the work of the GAA, supported 
district and provincial claims to control funding and capacity development. 
Government services were being built through the GAA, under the authority of district 
and provincial authorities, to develop specific types of water resources in Village A and 
Village B. Water resources were developed by setting up concrete taps for drinking 
water; this work involved doing surveys to find suitable locations for reservoirs, setting 
up irrigated agriculture and cash crops to decrease swidden agriculture, and allocating 
land for conservation.  
The limitations of provincial and district authorities to develop water resources 
in their administrative areas seemed to explain why international development 
agencies were facilitating rural development. The study could not confirm if the GAA 
was co-opted by the Lao Government (Branstrom et al., 2004) because the mandate of 
the GAA fit within the realm of providing government services (Baird and Shoemaker, 
2005). However, the position of the GAA illustrated the grey area that INGOs are in due 
to the lack of a true NGO in Lao PDR (UNFPA, 2004; Vander Zanden, 2006). 
Furthermore, international projects were only temporary (see Section 5.5.2 National 
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Policy: International and Regional Development), meaning that local organisations did 
not necessarily have to be accountable past the project timeline. Thus, clear lines of 
accountability were established for maintaining government services, such as the 
servicing of taps or the maintenance of irrigation systems, but these functions would 
eventually be the responsibility of district and provincial staff, assuming they had the 
people and knowledge. 
Unanticipated in the study was the role of the GAA in facilitating negotiations 
between district staff and the villages (see Section 5.2.5 Barriers and Opportunities for 
GAA as an INGO). The GAA was able to coordinate the flow of capital at the 
international level (from the Government of Germany to the Government of Lao PDR), 
and to decentralise control of the capital from the national level (in Lao PDR) to a local 
level (provincial to district to villages). Non-participation enabled Village A and Village 
B to maintain control over their water interests, independent of GAA water resource 
development plans. Because the REF Village had already been under the GAA for four 
years, Village A and Village B were able to see changes happening, as well as the 
benefits of cooperation with the GAA. Furthermore, Village A and Village B were able to 
informally negotiate with government authorities through the GAA, affirming the 
findings from Hirsch and Miller (2003) that much of Integrated River Basin 
Management is based on negotiation. This was also discussed in Section 5.7 
Application of Data to Conceptual Framework. 
6.3 VILLAGES AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN IWRM 
Poverty alleviation is a priority in the national policies of Lao PDR (see Section 
5.5.2 Activities). This confirms findings from Rahaman et al. (2004) and Hermans et al. 
(2006), who indicate that different priorities guide IWRM for developing countries. 
National policies defined the socio-economic characteristics of Village A and Village B 
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as targets for poverty alleviation, as demonstrated in Section 5.5.3 National Views of 
Villages. The poor are specifically labelled ―remote mountainous ethnic groups‖ in 
national policies (see Section 5.5.3 National Views of Villages). Some of these ethnic 
groups have a history of being subject to biases that characterised them as upland 
swidden cultivators. Among these upland groups, Village A and Village B (see Section 
5.1.1.2 The Hmong) were perceived to cause environmental degradation. (This will be 
discussed further in the next section.) Poverty alleviation also spatially characterised 
Village A and Village B. The Socio-Economic Atlas of Lao PDR cites physical conditions 
as the cause of socio-economic weakness in Lao PDR, a finding that supports the 
spatial targeting of poor populations. Therefore, poverty alleviation in Lao PDR is 
contextual, relating to policy and management. This is supported by the literature: 
Rahaman et al. (2004), Hermans et al. (2006), Jønch-Clausen (2004), Kallis et al. 
(2006a), and Banister and Scott (2008). 
The Lao Government‘s use of spatial policies to target specific geographic 
regions matches conclusions in the literature about the effects spatial policies have on 
citizenship (Kabeer, 2005; Ong, 2006). The implementation of spatial policies was 
found to support unofficial policies of land allocations (Daviau and Romagny, 2003; 
Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Baird and Shoemaker, 2005; Rigg, 2005; Tapp, 2005). 
And, as discussed in the previous section, those land allocations did not give Village A 
and Village B the ability to negotiate changes in water resource development decisions 
that affected village water interests. Instead, other types of participation were found in 
Village A and Village B that enabled them to control their water interests (see Section 
5.1.4 Public Involvement: Non-Participation as Participation). 
Biases from other actors surrounding Village A and Village B satisfy conditions 
set by HarmoniCOP (2005) to make the situation suitable for social learning. Although 
Village A and Village B could maintain some control over water resources through non-
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participation, non-participation seemed to reinforce the biases surrounding upland 
ethnic groups, such as the Hmong, at different levels of government. Most district and 
provincial officials believed Hmong villagers did not promote the successful 
implementation of projects, as indicated in Section 5.3.3 District Views of Villages and 
Section 5.4.3 Provincial Views of Villages. Furthermore, other biases concerning the 
Hmong causing environmental degradation were found among other ethnic groups 
(see Section 5.1.1.2 The Hmong). The validity of the charge that the Hmong were 
causing environmental degradation is still being debated (see Walker, 2003; Chaplot, 
2004; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Tapp, 2005). Furthermore, poverty alleviation in 
national policies that spatially targeted Village A and Village B revives questions 
surrounding a contemporary analysis of poverty alleviation in Lao PDR, as discussed in 
Section 2.5.2 Expected Outcomes of Public Participation for IWRM in Developing 
Countries.  
As indicated in Section 5.5.2 National Policy: International and Regional 
Development and Section 5.5.2.1 Participatory Poverty Assessment, Jim Chamberlain 
(2001) suggests that a definition of poverty based upon resource scarcity is being 
applied to Lao PDR and that this definition is being used to direct development 
projects. One popular argument for resource scarcity is burgeoning populations 
(Chamberlain, 2001; Evrard and Gordineau, 2004; Rigg, 2005). Perceptions of the GAA 
staff and district staff emulated the popular argument for resource scarcity and 
populations because they observed there were ―too many children‖ in Village A and 
Village B (see Section 5.2.2.4 Cause and Effect). Yet, as demonstrated in Section 
5.2.2.3 Collection of Socio-Economic and Cultural Data, a decrease in the overall 
population of the five sub-villages that included Village A and Village B contradicted 
the perceptions of ―too many children‖ reported by GAA staff from their PRAs, with the 
population declining  from 722 in 2002-2003 to 681 people in 2006. Thus, the 
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solutions, including water resource development, prescribed by national policy and 
implemented by the GAA and local authorities to Village A and Village B highlighted 
maladapted solutions for the villages based upon premises that address resource 
scarcity when that scarcity exists artificially. 
The policies used by different levels of government and implementation of rural 
development projects for poverty alleviation highlight potential areas of conflict that 
social learning could resolve through public participation. Together, ethnic biases 
against Village A and Village B, and the aforementioned maladapted solutions, cause 
friction between Village A and Village B with different levels of government. Social 
learning could help ease that friction by developing a consensus among government 
authorities, the GAA, and the villages in finding implementable and technically sound 
solutions. 
6.4 ACCURACY OF ACTIVITIES TO ILLUSTRATE PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION IN IWRM 
The results in this study are consistent with the findings of the literature 
discussed in Chapter 2, that participation in international development is dissimilar 
from public participation in Western contexts such as the EU WFD (see Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001; Kumar, 2002; Francis and Roberts, 2003; Ribot, 2004; Chhotray, 2004; 
Kabeer, 2005; Corbett and Lane, 2005). Participatory activities by the GAA and district 
authorities appeared to meet levels of participation suggested in Chapter 5, resulting 
in high rankings of public involvement. However, participation from PRAs with Village 
A, Village B, and three other villages seemed dissimilar to the language of citizen 
power under Co-Decision-making in Table 1. The language of citizen power in Table 1 
suggests PRAs should build the political capacity of villages to enable them to make 




Participation from Village A and Village B and three other villages during the 
PRAs seemed to be partial. The highest recorded number of participants in attendance 
at the preliminary PRAs was 47 out of a potential attendance of 147 heads of 
households. Furthermore, the ability of participants to discuss issues with GAA staff 
was severely limited due to language barriers, and interviews with participants at the 
PRAs illustrated that few understood what the PRAs were. In addition, participatory 
activities seemed to be ineffectual because land allocations that affected water 
resource development decisions had already been confirmed a year previously (see 
Section 5.2.2 Activities).  Therefore, the measurement of public involvement in Village 
A and Village B, according to the conceptual framework, could, at best, be a 
measurement of the types of activities that were happening; the conceptual framework 
could not accurately show the genuine level of participation from Village A and Village 
B. 
The conceptual framework was derived from literature from a largely Western 
origin, with deliberative democratic roots in which democracy implied citizenship and 
citizen power (Arnstein, 1971; Collentine et al., 2002; Mostert, 2003; Kabeer, 2005). 
The conceptual framework depicted a lack of participatory activities at different levels 
of authority. However, the conceptual framework could not explain why participation 
was not happening or uncover the barriers to and opportunities for participatory 
activities in a complex arena of water resource politics. Furthermore, public 
participation in Lao PDR demonstrated a need to understand the issues of a diverse 
public interacting with complex water issues, as suggested by Warner et al. (2006).  
Thus, the study confirms the need for a stakeholder analysis (see Section 2.2.2: IWRM: 
Interdisciplinary Water Research and Methods) to elucidate water actors, water 
interests, and power in water resource politics that will not be elucidated by an analysis 




 Political ecology explained how low levels of participation by Village A and 
Village B in the decisions of the WRCC, LMNC, and MRC mirrored their ability to 
implement IWRM. Water resource developments were happening in Lao PDR without the 
oversight, regulation, or control of IWRM institutions. The national Government was 
found to be capable of controlling capital, and using different levels of authority and 
ministries to fulfill national policies through permits which allowed INGOs and foreign 
direct investments to fund hydropower and infrastructure. Despite the broad 
administrative coverage of national policies that extended to provinces and districts, 
the implementation of national policies seemed decentralised at a provincial to village 
level. The success of provincial and district efforts seems to rest upon the cooperation 
of the villages themselves, but also on the role of international actors such as the GAA. 
The GAA was able to negotiate water resource developments and acted as a conduit for 
seconded district staff to initiate participatory activities with villages. Moreover, the 
GAA provided technical assistance and capital to build government services. Village A 
and Village B were also found to be able to protect their water interests, and being able 











CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
The study investigated how villages could participate in IWRM within the political 
context of an international basin. The specific reference to villages indicated several 
considerations discussed in Chapter 1 Introduction and Chapter 2 Public Participation 
in IWRM that formulated the secondary questions addressing the case study in Lao 
PDR. Those considerations were two fold. First, the role of politics in water resources 
has increased attention to public participation in IWRM, especially with the EU WFD. 
And, IWRM in developing countries is employed differently because the challenges they 
face are contextual (Jønch-Clausen, 2004; Rahaman et al., 2004; Kallis et al., 2006b; 
Banister and Scott, 2008). The second consideration was in order to understand how 
villages participate in IWRM an appropriate framework for analysis was needed, in this 
case political ecology. From these considerations, the secondary questions examined 
what institutions existed in Lao PDR to facilitate public participation, the role of public 
participation in Lao PDR, the activities of different institutions, and the barriers to and 
limitations of those activities.  
Chapter 2 Public Participation in IWRM reviewed the emergence of a water-
sharing paradigm (UNESCO, 2006) that recognises the political nature of water (Allan, 
2003; Warner et al., 2006; WWC, 2006; McDonnell, 2008; Banister and Scott, 2008). 
Consequently, this water-sharing paradigm has increased the institutional stature of 
public participation in IWRM (Kallis et al., 2006b). Interdisciplinary water research is 
needed (Falkenmark et al., 2004; Lankford et al., 2004; Kallis et al., 2006a; Kallis et al., 
2006b) to better understand the contexts in which IWRM is being used (Jønch-Clausen, 
2004; Rahaman et al., 2004; Kallis et al., 2006a; Kallis et al., 2006b; Banister and 
Scott, 2008). Moreover, attention to context has illuminated different uses of IWRM in 
developing countries to achieve internationally agreed goals such as poverty 
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alleviation, public participation, and gender equality (Rahaman et al., 2004; Poolman 
and Van de Giesen, 2006). To understand political processes of IWRM, the research had 
to use appropriate frameworks of analysis and methods (Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006; 
McDonnell, 2008; Banister and Scott, 2008) to explain IWRM decisions in contemporary 
water resource politics (Allan, 2003; WWC, 2006; UNESCO, 2006; Walker, A., 2006; 
McDonnell, 2008; Banister and Scott, 2008).   
This exploratory case study investigated public participation in IWRM for a 
developing country, Lao PDR, using a multi-level stakeholder analysis (Kallis et al., 
2006a; Poolman and Van de Giesen, 2006; Heyd and Neef, 2006; Banister and Scott, 
2008). This exploratory case study used a critical Third World political ecology to 
explain public participation in IWRM and water resource politics by looking at water 
actors, their interests and policies, and power to develop water resources in relation to 
their specific geographies. By focusing water resource politics, the study also looks at 
areas for opportunities for more effective and genuine participation to reach socio-
economic, ecological, and political equity. And, in order to understand those 
opportunities, the secondary questions surveyed existing institutions that made up 
IWRM, their ability to facilitate public participation, the role of public participation in 
Lao PDR, and the opportunities and limitations of participatory activities.  
The study surveyed IWRM institutions in Lao PDR responsible for public 
participation activities. As discussed in Section 4.6 Selection of International Non-
Governmental Organisations and Villages, upon arrival in Lao PDR, participatory 
activities directly engaging villages by the international river basin organisation (the 
MRC) were not being used. As a result, other actors and levels of government 
responsible for the development of water resources were examined that included 
existing IWRM institutions:  the LMNC, a national MRC counterpart, and the WRCC, a 
nationally driven department.   
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IWRM institutions in Lao PDR were reliant upon the capacity of national 
ministries and their corresponding provincial and district departments. Those 
institutions were found to be responsible for water resource developments at a village 
level, consisting of mass media organisations like the Lao Women‘s Union, and several 
ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Ministry of Public Health 
(see Table 14 National Institutions Associated with IWRM). Meanwhile, the limited 
capacity of those ministries and their corresponding departments made them depend 
upon international agencies, such as the GAA, backed by international financial 
institutions to implement water resource developments at a village level. Thus, in 
maintaining the focus of the study of villages in the Mekong Basin, the international 
basin, villages used for the case study were under a participatory rural development 
project by the GAA located in the Mekong Basin.   
To elucidate the role of public participation in IWRM, or, in this case nationally 
driven policies to develop water resources, water interests of each level of government 
were examined. The Lao Government was the most capable actor to distribute financial 
and human capital through different levels of authority to achieve national priorities of 
poverty alleviation. Government actions showed power, such as directing international 
development agencies to specific areas, regional developments in hydropower and 
infrastructure such as the GMS Project, and land allocations. All those actions 
essentially led the development of water resources without the oversight, control, or 
regulation of an IWRM plan or institution. Thus, the Lao Government‘s policy to 
alleviate poverty and promote economic growth (see Lao, 2006) enabled the 
development of water resources at a village level without an IWRM framework.  
The Lao Government‘s approach to poverty alleviation targets poor populations 
(Lao, 2008) using an area-based approach that had physical limitations (Rigg, 2005). 
District and provincial authorities lacked the power to independently develop natural 
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resources like water, thus international development agencies like the GAA were 
directed by the Lao Government into specific areas that matched national policies (i.e. 
2001 Lao Revolutionary Party Socio-Economic Strategy for Poverty Reduction, the 
National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy 2003 (NGPES), and the Sixth National 
Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSEDP).  
Subsequently, the Lao Government‘s use of spatial targeting to alleviate poverty 
supported unofficial policies of land allocation known to have adverse impacts on 
villages (Daviau and Romagny, 2003; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Baird and 
Shoemaker, 2005; Rigg, 2005; Tapp, 2005). Land allocations did not give Village A and 
Village B the ability to negotiate changes in water resource development decisions 
because land allocations pre-determined types of water resource development to 
happen. Hence, Village A and Village B were unable to assert control over their water 
interests with participatory activities because of where they were located, in the 
mountains, and who they were, as Hmong, that rendered them as citizens of Lao PDR 
with a low degree of citizen power (Kabeer, 2005; Ong, 2006).  
Village A and Village B were irrelevant to the MRC and LMNC despite their 
location in the Mekong River Basin. Poverty alleviation in Lao PDR lies outside the 
power or jurisdiction of the MRC and LMNC. On the surface, no participatory activities 
were found concerning IWRM. However, findings from Village A and Village B revealed 
complex issues surrounding water resource decisions that were unanticipated and 
unexplained by the Conceptual Framework. Issues surrounding land allocations made 
up issues surrounding water resource development, and therefore water politics, as 
described in Chapter 2 and demonstrated in Chapter 5. Land allocations came from 
older policies like the 1998 Focal Site Strategy to decrease swidden agriculture, 
eradicate opium, and resettle swidden populations (Daviau and Romagny, 2003; Evrard 
and Goudineau, 2004; Baird and Shoemaker, 2005; Rigg, 2005; Tapp, 2005). 
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Therefore, unless the MRC and LMNC engage these complex issues surrounding land 
allocations and water resource development, their claim to poverty alleviation lacks the 
political weight to make necessary reforms needed for genuine public participation in 
IWRM. 
The activities of different levels of government that included the GAA and MRC 
illustrated opportunities and barriers, particularly in the methods used to measure the 
level of participation and degree of citizen power in participatory activities. As 
demonstrated, the conceptual framework used to analyze participatory activities at 
different levels of government proved inadequate to discuss water interests, actors, 
and power. Those activities demonstrated a picture of distributive governance (GWP, 
2003a) for Lao PDR in implementing public participation in IWRM, indicating that water 
resource developments from provincial to village levels of authority were decentralized 
while still influenced by national policy. Critical Third World political ecology explained 
the low levels of participation in activities and decentralized decisions in distributive 
governance. Critical Third World political ecology explained the role of power in water 
resource development among different actors at different levels of authority and their 
mandates.  
The methods used to gauge participation, the PRAs, were critically examined, 
leading to findings of other types of participation not recognised by the literature. 
Although conventional PRA activities seemed to be superficial, Village A and Village B 
were still able to negotiate control over their water interests. Furthermore, the GAA‘s 
role seemed to enable negotiations between Village A and Village B with local 
authorities that seemed to match an environment for social learning described by the 
HarmoniCOP (2005).  
Overall, the study uncovered a complex political landscape in water resource 
politics. More research is needed to substantiate claims surrounding water resource 
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politics and public participation using Western references such as those used in the 
conceptual framework (see Arnstein, 1971; Mostert, 2003; Cornwall, 2004) are 
appropriate for Lao PDR. As demonstrated, the use of the Conceptual Framework alone 
was limited in understanding other forms of public participation like non-participation 
and the political landscape within which water resource decisions were operating. 
Furthermore, the research opened an area of study, which I referred to as political 
ecology, that helped identify a need to find alternative participatory activities that 
could make IWRM operate contextually.  
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS  
Since the 1995 Agreement, the MRC has made little progress to develop and 
implement public participation policies. Internally hired consultants like the 1998 TDRI 
Report and Dr. Helen Rosenbaum (2002) have made recommendations and they have 
highlighted the challenges the MRC faces. External academic scholars have also written 
about the weak governance of the MRC in the Mekong Basin as a whole (see Section 
5.6.6 External Studies of Public Participation in the MRC). And, as demonstrated in the 
study, the opportunities of public participation in water resource developments are 
possible; however, the ability to implement public participation policies in Lao PDR 
require political legitimacy and knowledge about land allocationsupon land allocations. 
For the MRC to yield ‗tangible results‘ for the alleviation of poverty, the politics 
surrounding water resource development need to be understood, particularly for 
poverty alleviation in Lao PDR. Poverty alleviation is a national issue in Lao PDR that 
defines power relations among different levels of government. Furthermore, poverty 
alleviation is specific to physical geographies such as the North of Lao PDR, which 
characterise the socio-economic situation of remote mountainous villages. Moreover, 
the application of national poverty alleviation policies to remote mountainous villages 
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implicitly use land allocations that are known to have negative impacts as already 
mentioned. The MRC is not involved in national issues surrounding poverty alleviation 
or issues surrounding land allocations. Therefore, the MRC needs to rethink its 
institutional approach to public participation in the Mekong Basin and understand 
villages like Village A and Village B who are involved in water resource decisions. 
Recommendations for this study assume Lao PDR is desirous to implement 
IWRM both regionally and nationally, and political reforms to enable IWRM such as 
public participation are being sought. The recommendations for this study build upon 
the independent institutional review mentioned in section 5.5.5 Barriers and 
Opportunities. The Independent Review (MRC, 2007a), titled Independent 
Organisational, Financial, and Institutional Review of the Mekong River Commission 
Secretariat and the National Mekong River Committees Final Report, offers several 
recommendations if the MRC is to play a significant role in the sustainable 
development of the Mekong River Basin. The recommendations mainly apply at a 
regional and national level of government. Of those recommendations, two in 
particular can further public participation in the MRC: one is for the Basin Development 
Planning Department (BDP) in the MRC to play a greater role in stakeholder 
engagement, and the second is for the MRC needs to clarify the role of the MRC as a 
regional institution and National Mekong Committees (NMCs) 
 At a regional level, the BDP needs to build strategic partnerships with agencies 
involved in the development of the Mekong Basin. 
The Independent Review (MRC, 2007a) cites the role of the BDP as being crucial 
to build strategic partnerships with a diverse set of stakeholders. These stakeholders 
exist beyond regional trade partnerships such as the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) or the Greater Mekong Strategy Initiative by the ADB.   Other 
international agencies such as international non-governmental organisations and 
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national research institutes are also actively involved with villages and closer to them. 
As it stands, the BDP has no means to understand local issues at a village level. And, 
simply relying upon national and sub-national government authorities may not ensure 
the integrity or voice of villagers and marginalized groups. The BDP is most likely 
unable to implement extensive on-the-ground participatory activities with villages to 
understand local issues surrounding the lifetime of water resource developments or 
IWRM decisions.  Furthermore, the BDP lacks the capacity and the resources to 
implement these participatory activities where villages are acknowledged as citizens. 
Therefore, the BDP should seek strategic partnerships with INGOs and national 
research institutes. 
As indicated in the study, local issues and ideas of citizenship differ between 
countries. In adding to the recommendations of the Independent Review (2007), 
considerations for strategic partnerships should include a contextual analysis. More 
specifically, a contextual analysis of strategic partnerships would consider socio-
economic characteristics like policies for poverty alleviation, political institutions, 
cultural characteristics, historical tensions between different stakeholders, and role of 
physical geography.  
In the case of Lao PDR, as mentioned, local NGOs do not exist. Instead, INGOs 
had seconded government staff working for them. Nonetheless, international agencies 
like the GAA are working at the village level and using participatory approaches. There 
are many international aid agencies working on-the-ground with villages as indicated 
in the Directory of NGOs for Lao PDR. In addition, there are international and national 
experts with knowledge of specific geographies in Lao PDR from national institutes 
such as the National Agriculture and Forestry Research Institute or the National 
University of Lao PDR. These agencies have yet to be approached or engaged by the 
BDP or MRC. Furthermore, these agencies and organisations enable the BDP to have 
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access to information about local issues at a village level, understand participatory 
decision-making in natural resources such as land allocations, and establish 
relationships with sub-national authorities.  
One caveat to the strategic partnerships the BDP could make will be what the 
BDP can offer to international development agencies and national research institutes. 
The BDP will have to offer more than its expertise and knowledge, and understand 
their interests in collaborating with the MRC. 
The BDP can expand strategic partnerships with international agencies aside 
from aid with financial capital and further research. The MRC also needs to extend its 
role in research. More specifically, evidence based interdisciplinary water research that 
has integrity, being critical and ethical, in the presention of information to decision-
makers. Independent panels could be formed. These panels could comprise of 
government departments, national unions, universities, international experts, and 
villagers to investigate specific avenues the MRC can further public participation. These 
panels could investigate issues surrounding public participation and foster social 
learning. Thus, these panels could help find implementable, pragmatic, and technically 
sound solutions. For example, these panels could investigate best practices for 
initiating participation with villages and sustaining that participation with local 
government authorities to maintain water resource projects after international agencies 
build them.  
 At a national level, the regional and national roles of the MRC and National Mekong 
Committees (NMCs) need to be clarified. 
The overall findings of the Independent Review (MRC, 2007a) suggest that the 
NMCs, such as the LMNC, do not have a high profile in member countries so planning 
initiatives in the Mekong Basin are insignificant. The Independent Review suggests the 
MRC should be a regulatory institution, and that the NMCs lack political legitimacy.   
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Adding to the recommendation from the Independent Review, political 
legitimacy for the MRC and LMNC could be validated if both institutions had 
jurisdiction at a national to sub-national level in water resource developments. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the LMNC relies upon line agencies to implement IWRM 
because they have no jurisdiction at a sub-national level. Furthermore, the MRC and 
LMNC have no jurisdiction to implement projects at a sub-national level. Therefore, in 
the case of Lao PDR, the LMNC needs jurisdictional authority beyond the main stem of 
the Mekong River to enable them to understand issues surrounding water resource 
developments that happen on the branches and tributaries draining into the Mekong 
River. The extension of jurisdictional authority would enable the MRC and NMCs to be 
involved in water resource development at a national to sub-national level; 
consequently, that political legitimacy would enable them be involved in issues that 
make up water resource politics.  
 At the local level, international agencies need to be aware of their position in 
enabling negotiations between villages, national policies, and district and provincial 
authorities. 
The GAA was able to provide a space for villages and local authorities (district and 
provincial levels of government) to negotiate the implementation of national policies. 
As indicated by Baird and Shoemaker (2005), most INGOs, civil society, and other 
international development agencies are aware of their role in aiding national policies 
by building capital and hiring seconded government staff. The international 
development community can negotiate the implementation of national policies by 
maintaining their normative principles their organisations follow at a local level. Having 
seconded government staff work under the normative principles of international 
development agencies may facilitate in social learning with villages as government staff 
try to accommodate different working principles. In addition, government staff‘s 
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capacity to understand could be enhanced through workshops that may help district 
and provincial biases working with villages. Nonetheless, the risk of encouraging this 
space is also prone to issues surrounding embedded authorities (Ribot, 2004; Francis 
and Roberts, 2003; Corbett and Lane, 2005).  
 At a village level, women need to be involved in the same participatory rural 
appraisals men participate if benefits in water resource developments are to be 
realised. 
If the principles of gender equity in the international development community are 
to be fulfilled, where women are the most likely to benefit and support international 
development and at a local level, then women should be able to participate in the same 
PRAs as men, regardless to who is the facilitator. The awareness of gender among the 
GAA staff was weak because participatory activities that involved women dealt with 
health care and family planning. Participatory activities that extend furthered were seen 
as needing the help of a Lao Women‘s Union representative. Depending upon the 
hierarchical relationships of the village and ethnicity, the role of women in the 
household and their relationship to men may differ. In this case, for the Hmong, I 
found that men could engage in participatory activities that involved women. 
For example, during my second field visit, one of my research assistant was the 
only person who spoke Hmong, resulting in the GAA asking for his help in translating 
questions and answering questions about contraceptives for family planning. The 
women in the village were not shy about asking questions of an intimate nature. 
Rather, they were intrigued, and excited to get answers from a man about questions 
regarding marital relationships in Hmong families, resulting in an animated and lively 
discussion. From this example, the GAA staff observed a type of PRA they were not 
familiar with, and they seemed genuinely interested to know more about how to 
replicate the scenario. PRAs by the GAA in my experience were not limited because of 
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the lack of creativity, motivation, or energy from the staff, but the ability for villagers 
to make decisions and the tools which the GAA were given to facilitate these decisions 
were limited. 
I found many GAA staff were eager to learn how to improve their methods, but they 
were frustrated the barriers in language (Hmong to Lao) that made their work difficult.  
I suggested using pictures from photos to explain to Hmong villagers what the GAA 
could do for them that could be useful for other international development agencies. 
For organisations in the international community who conduct similar work to the GAA, 
I would also recommend workshops that tackle ideas of gender and work with 
concepts of reversing gender roles to implement PRAs. 
7.2 LIMITATIONS FOR THE STUDY 
The study can be described as an interdisciplinary study in the social sciences 
that fits in the fields of geography, political science, and international development. 
This study could be in the areas of public policy or public administration in dealing 
with public participation. However, this thesis was not meant to be a policy paper. 
Furthermore, as indicated, water resource politics and power are addressed in the 
thesis as opposed to policies. Although public participation in IWRM could fall into the 
areas of natural resource management as suggested by Merrey et al. (2005), a full 
investigation of the applicability of natural resource management to IWRM was not 
explored.  
The thesis focused on public participation in IWRM as a political process as 
opposed to a science-based decision-making model. For several authors (Jewitt, 2002; 
Falkenmark, 2003;  Wescoat and White, 2003; Calder, 2005), IWRM is based upon 
scientific methodologies focused at a catchment level that encompass the processes in 
which aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems function, including the interaction of those 
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organisms with people  (Slocombe, 2004; Convention on Biological Diversity Website, 
2006). Therefore, the examination of IWRM as a political process leading to questions 
regarding politics surrounding water resources seemed logical, whereas IWRM as a 
science-based decision-making model could have led to questions looking at the role 
of science in IWRM decisions. 
As mentioned, IWRM as a political process specifically referred to the GWP 
definition (2000) and the GWP Tool Box Website (2008) because the MRC and Lao 
Government were using the GWP definition to implement IWRM. The political process in 
this study was used as a general term to implement reforms necessary to make IWRM 
happen according to the Dublin Principles. To narrow the political processes for public 
participation, the ways that institutions facilitated public participation and the roles of 
stakeholders were discussed. However, political processes in public participation, such 
as legislation enabling water rights, creation of IWRM as a regulatory body, or 
enforcement legislation concerning participatory decision-making, were  unexplored in 
this study. The objectives of the study were to understand the institutional structure of 
IWRM in Lao PDR, the role of public participation, and the limitations and barriers to 
participation.  
The study did not delve further into participatory decision-making, necessary to make 
political and institutional reforms in IWRM. Instead, I focused upon public participation 
as a part of participatory decision-making. The literature review revealed gaps in the 
operation of public participation in developing countries and limitations to using public 
participation as a means to reform institutional structures similar to the EU WFD case 
that which were later confirmed in the findings of the case study. (Also see 4.4.2 
Limitations in Participant Observation and Participatory Rural Appraisals). 
7.4 NEW AREAS OF RESEARCH 
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Several areas for further research were identified. First, the examination of 
public participation in IWRM for Lao PDR showed how different levels of government 
were responsible for public participation. The legitimacy of international and regional 
claims to be accountable for public participation deserves more attention. As 
demonstrated in the findings of the study, the construction and implementation of 
government services such as infrastructure, health, education, and socio-economic 
livelihoods were being fulfilled by the GAA. Due to the length of time projects have, 
and the  tendency for projects to extend  pass project timelines, the role of the 
government in sustaining the outcomes of development projects, which are services 
they are supposed to support, confirms that citizenship remains profoundly linked to 
national governments (see Gaventa, 2004; Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Kabeer, 2005; 
Ong, 2006). The use of spatial policies by the Lao Government demonstrated how a 
national government is the most appropriate actor in IWRM. Moreover, extensions of 
citizenship into environmental decisions such as IWRM at a village level further support 
the role of government in water governance (Collentine et al., 2002; GWP, 2003a; 
Baber and Bartlett, 2005; Eckersley and Joas, 2005; Kabeer, 2005; MRC, 2007a). 
Therefore, areas of study related to international development would benefit from a 
critical and constructive re-examination of citizenship, participation, governance, and 
the international community.  
The second area is the investigation of methods and framework of analysis used 
to assess participation beyond the supply and demand of water (Walker, 2003; 
Hermans et al., 2005; McDonnell, 2008). A complex story such as water interests and 
contemporary water resource politics validates the need for new methods and 
analytical frameworks called for by Gearey and Jeffrey (2006), Warner et al., (2006), 
McDonnell (2008), and Scott and Banister (2008). The story involves water interests in 
the development of water resources and the stakeholders who are not only capable in 
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using policy, but who also have enough capital to implement development. 
Furthermore, water interests involve other water-related interests. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 5 Case Study: Remote Mountainous Villages in Lao PDR, the water interests of 
Village A and Village B were tied to allocations of land that were also related to spatial 
policies for poverty alleviation. Thus, research which can better explain contemporary 
water resource politics may be able to identify which stakeholders are driving 
development agendas and why, including how are those stakeholders accountable for 
the risk they incur to people who their decisions effect. 
The third area is the examination of local water governance structures and how 
those structures work with international actors. As indicated in the study, the role of 
the GAA enabled negotiations between different levels of government. The findings of 
the case study warrant further investigation into the negotiations between villages and 
expatriates as well as villages with seconded government staff that may be a kind of 
social learning. Even though social learning as a term did not appear in the collection 
of data, the processes of negotiation suggest that something significant is happening. 
Therefore, the investigation into local water governance could also lead to a greater 











APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY  
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: 
A) Theme: IWRM  
a. What is your experience of IWRM  
b. How would you describe IWRM for Lao PDR? 
c. What kinds of difficulties do you face? 
d. Why are you using IWRM? 
B) Theme: Public Participation 
a. How do you understand public participation in Lao PDR? 
b. Are there any activities you are aware of? 
i. What kinds of activities? 
ii. Who represents villages? 
c. Who is responsible for public participation activities? 
d. How does public participation work in Lao PDR? 
e. What are the difficulties of implementing public participation? 
f. Are there any other issues surrounding participation? 
C) Theme: Development 
a. What kind of water resource development activities happen at the village 
scale? 
b. How does development and IWRM work together? 
c. Who is most responsible for water resource development projects? 
d. What are the barriers to public participation development activities? 
e. What works in development and public participation activities? 
f. What issues are related to public participation that may effects their 
outcomes? 
D) Theme: International agencies 
a. What is the role of the international community in IWRM? 
b. What is the role of the international community in water resource 
development? 
c. What do you think about INGOs representing villages?  





CASE STUDY PROTOCOL  
Overview of Case Study Project: 
I. Objectives 
To observe GAA in their participatory methods with villages in natural resource 
management decisions, looking at how water is used in the village. Assist in 
participatory rural appraisals for data collection. 
II. Case Study Issues 
A. Issues surrounding case study:  
a. Upland rain-fed swidden is a sensitive issue, as well as the ethnicity of 
villages. Villages are also remote, lacking road access and requiring a 
½ day‘s travel. 
B. Explain to villages that this study is working with not for the GAA; this must 
be clearly stated to participants in the study. 
a. Protocol concerning anonymity [did not achieve this] and 
confidentiality will be strictly followed. 
b. Each time data are collected, must obtain consent, and assure the 
participants control over the information they contribute to the study. 
III. Topic being investigated 
A. Field visits will be gathering a variety of information,  
a. Information from research assistant‘s observations,  
b.  On-going discussions with the assistants and GAA staff 
c. Participation in organising participatory rural appraisals, mapping, 
and interviews. 
d. Observations from research assistants and GAA about villages 
B. Examine: 
a.  how they deal with villagers in using participatory planning.  
b. Attention to length of work terms, how they interact,  
c. what methods are used, guidelines that are followed. 
 
IV. Field procedures 
A. Presentation of credentials 
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For the most part, research assistants are expected to have some familiarity 
with upland-swidden agriculture, as well as command a strong level of 
English.  Notes are to be taken by the assistants in regards to their 
interpretation of the villages, but an unguided style of note taking. 
B. Access to sites 
a. All access to sites is through the GAA in accordance to their 
Memorandum of Understanding.  Permissions have been obtained. 
The furthest village in this trip is Village A and Village B, the main area 
of study, followed by an access project village that receives the most 
traffic of people going to-and-from project villages known as REF 
Village. 
b. Little data exist other than that which GAA generate, partly because of 
their age, and partly because of the capacity of the District 
Government. 
C. General Information: Issues in the area and politically sensitive subject 
material 
a. Resettlement 
b. Poverty Alleviation 
c. Participation 
d. International Development 
D. Procedural reminders 
a. Consent 
b. Translation: literal and figurative 
i. Simple, short, and easy to understand sentences. 
ii. Asking ―do‖ questions versus ―what and why‖ 
c. Use of photos and information for the study 
d. Role with GAA: Collaboration with GAA and independent 
e. Being critical 
E. Case study question 
a. Go over primary research question and objectives of research 
b. Specific questions for field site 
c. Look at how villages participate with the GAA 
i. Understand what participation for villagers is 
ii. Understand what participation for GAA is  
d. Examine priorities of villages 
F. Guide for Report 
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a. Field Reports to be submitted shortly after field research Format for 
data 
b. Presentation of other documentation 




































INFORMATION LETTER: RESEARCH ASSISTANTS AND FORMS 
Date 
Dear (guide or translator) 
Attention to water practices at a local (village) scale has raised many questions about 
how decisions over water work at different political scales.  This study will be looking 
at the water strategies of the Tai Lue in the Mekong River basin, and compare these 
strategies to different levels of the decision making processes of the Mekong River 
Commission. The project is being conducted as a part of my Masters thesis through 
the Department of Environment and Resource Studies at the University of Waterloo 
under the supervision of Dr. Paul Kay. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve your participation in the study 
through a journal, written preferably in a word processing format in the time arranged 
with the researcher, and to share your insights in the study. You may decline to write 
the journal or participate if you so wish. Furthermore, you may decide to withdraw 
from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the 
researcher, and your decision to withdraw will not affect your position as a guide or 
translator.  With your permission, the interview will be recorded into an MP3 format via 
a USB device to facilitate collection of information, and stored on an external hard-
drive that will be encrypted. With your permission, I will use your information in 
quotations of journal entries and interviews from your journal maybe used in my thesis 
or future publications. Shortly after the interview has been completed, I will send you a 
copy of the interview to give you an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of our 
conversation and to add or clarify any points that you wish.  
All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not 
appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study, however, with your permission 
unattributed  quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be 
encrypted and retained for 2 years.  Data collected will be kept upon a separate 
external hard-drive at the EU Asia-Link Program Office and on server at the University 
of Waterloo. Data collected from you will be encrypted and de-identified before being 
sent to the European Union Asia-Link Office. Only researchers associated with this 
project will have access. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant 
in this study. Should you have any questions regarding this study, or would like 
additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please 
do not hesitate to contact me at 020-5280932 in Vientiane, Lao or by email at 
j6ko@fes.uwaterloo.ca. You can also contact my supervisor, Professor Dr. Paul Kay at 
(1) 519-888-4567 ext. 5796 or email pkay@fes.uwaterloo.ca.   
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I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics 
clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. Minimal 
risks to participants are anticipated. However, the final decision about participation is 
yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this 
study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes of this office at (1) 519-888-4567 Ext. 6005. 
This research is partially sponsored by the European Union Asia-Link Programme in 
coordination with the University of Siegen and National University of Laos. I hope that 
the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations directly involved in the 
study, other commissions and organizations using an integrated water management 
strategy or international basin organizations, as well as to the broader research 
community. Upon completion of this study, it will also be made accessible to the 
National University of Lao in their course work for environmental engineering. I very 
much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your assistance 
in this project. 
Yours Sincerely,  
Julia Ko 
Asia-Link Office  
Thai- Lao Friendship Road 
Vientiane Lao PDR 


















CONSENT FORM FOR ASSISTANTS 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by Julia Ko 
of the Department of Environment and Resource Studies at the University of Waterloo. I have had the 
opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, 
and any additional details I wanted. 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing interviews with me to be digitally recorded to ensure an 
accurate recording of my responses.  Furthermore, I understand I have the option of writing a journal for 
Julia Ko, and both digital recordings as well as entries from the journal maybe anonymously quoted in her 
thesis or publications.  
I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or publications to 
come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous.  
I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher.   
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics 
at the University of Waterloo.  I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my 
participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics at (1) 519-888-4567 ext. 
6005.  
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study. 
YES     NO     
I agree to have my interview recorded into an MP3 format using a USB key device, understanding that 
the interview will be encrypted. 
YES    NO     
I agree to write a journal for Julia Ko. 
YES    NO     
I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this research. 
YES   NO 
Participant Name: ____________________________ (Please print)   
Participant Signature: ____________________________  
Witness Name: ________________________________ (Please print) 






CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FORM FOR ASSISTANTS AND THIRD-PARTIES 
I agree to assist Julia Ko in a study being conducted under the Department of Environment and Resource 
the supervision of Professor Paul Kay. I have made this decision based on the information I have read in 
the Information letter. In addition, I understand that my involvement will maybe apart of this study, and 
therefore the terms for confidentiality of this study also apply to myself.   
 
I understand that as an interpreter / transcriber / research assistant (circle one) for a study being 
conducted by Julia Ko of the Department of Environment and Resource Studies, University of Waterloo 
under the supervision of Professor Paul Kay, I am privy to confidential information. 
 
I am aware that all information given by participants and the identity of participants must remain 
confidential, and I agree to keep this information confidential.  Furthermore, I will not disclose any 
information with regards to participants identity or location or the conversations in this study to anyone but 
the researcher, Julia Ko. 
 
I also understand that this project has been reviewed by and has received ethics clearance through the 
Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo and that I may contact this office if I have any 
concerns or comments resulting my involvement in this study. 
I agree to keep the identities, conversations, and information of participants in this study confidential. 
    YES                    NO    (Please circle your choice) 
I also agree to participate as a name of position See Information Letter and Consent for Participation: 
Assistants 
    YES                    NO    (Please circle your choice) 
Assistant’s Name: _______________________________(Please print) 
Assistant's Signature: ___________________________________________ 
Witness’ Name:________________________________________________ 
Witness' Signature: _____________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________ 
Please indicate below whether you would prefer me to call you, to write to you or to contact you. 
My preference is that you contact me by:       PHONE         MAIL             AGENCY     















SAMPLE INFORMATION LETTER: PARTICIPANTS 
DATE 
 
Dear  name, 
 
Currently, I am conducting a study on water resource management in the Mekong 
Basin in a project titled Public Participation in Integrated Water Resource Management: 
Villages in Lao PDR and the Mekong Basin.  This research is for my Master‘s degree in 
the Department of Environmental Studies at the University of Waterloo, Canada, under 
the supervision of Professor Dr. Paul Kay. I would like to invite you to participate in this 
study. Should you decide to take part in this study, your involvement and more 
information about the study are detailed in this letter.  
 
This study will focus upon comparing data collected from villages situated in the 
Mekong Basin to decision-making institutions involved at different levels of 
government up to the Mekong River Commission. Important decisions made over water 
involve many sectors, political jurisdictions, and organizations such as the one you are 
currently involved.  Therefore, I would like to include your organization as one of 
several organizations to be involved in my study, because I believe you are best suited 
to speak about issues concerning the coordination, cohesion, and collaboration of 
water management strategies at different scales. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your involvement may take two to three hours 
in length to take place in a mutually agreed upon location. You may decline to answer 
any of the interview questions if you so wish. Furthermore, you may decide to withdraw 
from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the 
researcher.  With your permission, the interview will be recorded into an MP3 format 
via a USB device to facilitate collection of information. Shortly after the interview has 
been completed, I will send you a copy of the interview to give you an opportunity to 
confirm the accuracy of our conversation and to add or clarify any points that you wish.  
 
All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not 
appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study, however, with your permission 
anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be encrypted 
and retained for 2 years.  Electronic data in this study will be encrypted, and stored on 
an external hard-drive, as well as secured in the European Union‘s Asia-Link Office, 
while paper documentation will also be kept at the Asia-Link Office. Data collected 
from you will be encrypted and de-identified before being sent to the European Union 
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Asia-Link Office. Another copy of the data will also be sent to my supervisor, Dr. Paul 
Kay at the University of Waterloo, Canada. Only researchers associated with this project 
will have access. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this 
study. 
 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics 
clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, 
the final decision about participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns 
resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes of this 
office at (1) 519-888-4567 Ext. 6005. Should you have any questions regarding this 
study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about 
participation, please do not hesitate to contact me at (number will be available upon 
landing in Vientiane, Lao) or by email at j6ko@fes.uwaterloo.ca. You can also contact 
my supervisor, Professor Dr. Paul Kay at (1) 519-888-4567 Ext. 5796 or email 
pkay@fes.uwaterloo.ca.   
This research is partially sponsored by the European Union Asia-Link Programme in 
coordination with the University of Siegen and National University of Laos. I hope that 
the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations directly involved in the 
study, other commissions and organizations using an integrated water management 
strategy or international basin organizations, as well as to the broader research 
community. Upon completion of this study, it will also be made accessible to the 
National University of Lao in their course for environmental engineering. I very much 




Asia-Link Office  
Thai- Lao Friendship Road 
Vientiane Lao PDR 












CONSENT FORM FOR LETTER OF INFORMATION 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by Julia Ko 
of the Department of Environment and Resource Studies at the University of Waterloo. I have had the 
opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, 
and any additional details I wanted. 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be tape recorded to ensure an accurate 
recording of my responses.   
I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or publications to 
come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous.  
I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher.   
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics 
at the University of Waterloo.  I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my 
participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics at (1) 519-888-4567 Ext. 
6005.  
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study. 
YES     NO     
I agree to have my interview recorded into an MP3 format using a USB key device, understanding that 
the interview will be encrypted. 
YES    NO     
I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this research. 
YES   NO 
 
Participant Name: ____________________________ (Please print)   
Participant Signature: ____________________________  
Witness Name: ________________________________ (Please print) 
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